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Abstract 
The dissertation is examining training outcomes of the legal minimum wage in Germany. Human 
capital theory, labor market segmentation theory and labor economic approach constitute the framework 
of the analysis. We employ a quasi-experimental research design on the basis of the German Socio-
Economic Panel for the survey years 2014 to 2016. Measuring the dependent variable, we differentiate 
between training incidence and intensity. Firm-level, individual-level job-related, performance-related 
and personal characteristics are introduced as regressors. For the treatment assignment, we use a subjective 
assessment derived from the branch tariff adjustment which allows differentiating between employees 
who have received a pay raise within the juridically prescribed period and those covered by the 
anticipatory wage adjustments. The analysis is performed using Random Effects Logit and First 
Differences Regression models and followed by the robustness check in the variety of post-estimation 
procedures. Our findings prove the fact that it is the wage adjustment point, and not the absolute sum of 
the income, that regulate human capital investments on the minimum wage labor market. The results imply 
that the law introduction has a moderate positive impact on training participation of the affected workers, 
which is further specified dependently on the choice of the outcome indicator. In particular, we find no 
statistically significant time trends for the training incidence within the observation period and attribute it 
to the inter-compensation between the shares of training costs bearers. Second, our findings imply that the 
announcement upon the minimum wage introduction induces a further increase in the employer-financed 
training incidence prior to the law implementation. Third, we detect an upward adjustment in the number 
of enrollments after the minimum wage implementation for the workers who have received a pay raise at 
this time. We attribute both statements to the developmental and production optimization strategies. 
Finally, the data provides evidences that the upcoming training costs are potentially absorbed by the 
negative shifts in the training volume. Work-related characteristics are the strongest predictors and their 
effect remain consistent with the predominant structural inequalities. The current research empirically 
contributes to the existing literature of the emerging minimum wage research outcomes in Germany, draws 
attention to the problematics of a tight connection between labor market and education inequalities and 
specifies selected aspects of training participation.  
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Legal minimum wage, human capital investments, training incidence, employer-financed training 
incidence, minimum wage labor market, work-related characteristics.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction and Problem Statement 
 
In January 2015, minimum wage law has been officially implemented in Germany. 
Despite the pervious existence of tariff regulations, it became a major policy issue covering 
numerous economic sectors and employees. The nationwide hourly minimum wage has been 
determined at the level of 8.50 Euro gross independently from additional payments and 
bonuses adjusted to 8.84 Euro in 2017, remaining under further control in accordance with 
the actual economic situation in the country (MiLoG 2014). Exceptions on the individual 
level are provided for obligatory internship in terms of education, vocational company-based 
training, voluntary work, youth before 18 without completed professional qualification and 
long-term unemployed in the first six month of their return to the labor market. Established 
sector and workers’ specific exceptional regulations are no signs of the policy’s weaknesses 
but a way to prevent labor market discrimination by employing members of the underlined 
groups and a way to ensure gradual adaptation of the payment policy for the firm owners. 
The area of application of the law is the territory of German state; subsequently, all the 
foreign companies that have employees doing the major part of their work in Germany are 
obliged to confront as well. In short, the adoption of the law means that the price of the 
human resources has significantly grown, remaining all the other conditions unchanged 
(Bossler 2016).  
The introduction of the legal minimum wage in Germany is a part of the general 
European trend (Vaughan-Whitehead 2010). The author summarizes the main reasons of the 
revival of this discourse in the countries’ policies. Those are increased labor and capital 
movements and social dumping; new forms of employment contract, industrial relations 
developments and declining wage trends. In Germany, they are reflected in the following 
examples. Growing availability of guest workers, immigrants, labor force supplied by 
temporary agency workers agreeing on lower wages and less preferable labor conditions 
simplified the replacement of employees. At this point, introduced legal minimum wage 
fulfills the function of protection on both sides: prevention of undermining the labor of the 
already employed and ensuring the equal cost of the temporary and/or migrant workers.  
Besides, after the Harz reforms the number of people on “mini-jobs” has increased 
significantly. This form of atypical contract as well as traditional part-time jobs demand 
more labor market protection due to their strong connection to income insecurity, precarious 
employment and incomplete labor union coverage. The majority of the working poor are 
located in the mentioned labor market segment. Further, the system of collective bargaining 
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in Germany has not been generally binding. Its major vulnerability has been observed among 
small and middle-sized firms, whole business sectors (e.g. textile and clothing industry; 
agriculture and forestry) without union membership and/or work councils. That is why, 
outsourcing jobs to industries and companies with lower labor price has widespread. German 
case study (Bosch and Kalina 2010) delivers following evidences. Low-wage employment 
(less than 60% of the national median income) has raised not only among the traditionally 
defined vulnerable workers (unskilled, migrant, part-time workers, women) but across all 
the segments of the labor market. The described tendencies represent clearly the crucial 
importance of the legal minimum wage introduction for the German labor market.   
When carefully adjusted to the current market situation, minimum wage shall not 
cause negative effects. In the European comparison, minimum wage in Germany is placed 
in the upper sector, both in terms of its absolute sum and under the consideration of the 
purchasing power standard (Schulten 2016). Taking into account the Kaitz Index of 0.49, 
which the author defines as the share of the legal minimum wage to the average wage in the 
country, Germany is located the middle field, that shall prevent negative law outcomes. For 
comparison in absolute numbers, in 2014 the median hourly wage for full-time employers 
was 17.9 Euro per hour (Daussin and Camille 2017). Most experts agree on the relatively 
stable economic situation (stable economic growth, high employment rate, low inflation 
rate) at the time when the law has come into force.  
The importance of the legal minimum wage introduction for the labor market in a 
given country depends on the percentage of workers affected (Masso and Krillo 2010). In 
spite of the previous existence of the sectoral minimum wages and companies’ wage tariffs, 
the law influences numerous segments of the labor market. According to the data of the 
German Socio-Economic Panel in 2014, 13,4% of the employees (17,8% for East Germany 
and 11,7% for West Germany) are affected by the law. VSE (Verdienststrukturerhebung) 
indicates the affection of 11,3% of all the labor relationship in the country with 9,3% in the 
West and 20,7% in the Eastern part. The IAB Establishment Panel estimates the effect based 
on the number of the companies. Those are 12% for the whole Germany (firms with at least 
one worker payed below 8.50 Euro), 24% for Eastern federal states and 9% of Western states 
(Mindestlohnkommission 2016). Exceptional transitional regulations are no longer valid 
have covered only 0,7% of all companies and 0,3% of the employees (Bellmann, Bossler et 
al. 2015). With regard to the latter, the effect of the law could be also analyzed in a cross-
sectoral perspective. Following sectors has fallen under the transitional regulations: 
hairdressing and cosmetics industry, laundry and dry-cleaning products, agriculture, hunting 
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and related activities. The clear majority of the workers in numerous branches without the 
transitional regulations are affected: taxis, gambling and betting activities and restaurants 
(Mindestlohnkommission 2016). The calculations of Ifo Institut (Weber 2016) define hotels 
and restaurants services, agriculture and retail as three branches with the highest share of 
affected workers.  Nevertheless, for some spheres (often classified as “classic high-wage 
branches” (Kathmann 2017)) the introduction of the legal minimum wage has almost no 
impact. For instance, in the building construction and civil engineering, production of 
vehicles and vehicle parts, financial services and public administration, the share of the 
workers payed below 8.50 Euro has been less than 2%. On the basis of socio-demographic 
characteristics, traditionally more vulnerable labor market segments (women, part-time 
employees und employees of small firms, working students and pensioners, low-skills jobs, 
unskilled workers, temporary contracts) are more influenced by the law.  
Apart from directly affected workers and firms, indirectly affected ones should be 
taken into consideration. On the firms’ level those are the companies affected by the 
adaptation measures of others (13% according to the IAB Establishment Panel (Bellmann, 
Bossler et al. 2015)). Ifo Institut (Weber 2016) reports the number of affected companies in 
total (both directly and indirectly), namely 46% for East Germany and 34% for West 
Germany. On the employees’ level spillover-effect (change of the whole wage structure 
(Card and Krueger 1995, Mindestlohnkommission 2016) is often discussed. Due to the scope 
of the affected groups and the measure of the possible effect, the importance of the law in 
public, economic and political discourse is undoubted.  
The major public debates upon the law cover the consequences of the law in 
comparison to its prior goals. Following objectives of the legal minimum wage introduction 
are defined at the EU level: fighting poverty and social dumping reduction, equity, industrial 
relations’ and employment development (Vaughan-Whitehead 2010). Settled minimum 
wage shall ensure a living wage for the full-time work. Taking these expectations into 
account,  the law has gained a widespread support in the German public opinion (Fedorets, 
Schröder et al. 2017). The difficulty at the current state of research of the legal minimum 
wage outcomes in Germany is to differentiate between temporary adjustment strategies of 
the affected actors and long-term outcomes, whereas the latter are simultaneously connected 
to the business cycles, external crises, political situation and etc. (Card and Krueger 1995). 
For this reason, the link between the observed societal changes and legal minimum wage 
introduction should be ensured on the theoretical level. The IAB Establishment Panel 
(Berge, Kaimer et al. 2016) suggest exclusively descriptive approach to the legal minimum 
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wage outcomes in Germany at the current stage instead of the causal analysis. Therefore, the 
final evaluation of the effectiveness of the law is still coming.  
The core of the discussion within the consequences of the legal minimum wage is its 
employment effect. Three scenarios could be expected: fall, raise of the employment rate or 
absence of any change. The experience of the legal minimum wage setting in other European 
countries allows to make only uncertain predictions. Major employment adjustments have 
been observed while introducing legal minimum wage in Hungary and Malta. On the 
contrary, labor markets of Ireland and United Kingdom experienced growth of jobs caused 
by the combination of growing migration rate and law introduction. Polish example 
illustrates the absence of its effect on both employment and unemployment rates (Vaughan-
Whitehead 2010). On the theoretical level, the following explanations are provided.  
Employment rate is supposed to decrease, because of the predicted fall of demand for a good 
(labor) that has become more expensive (Card and Krueger 1995, MaCurdy and McIntyre 
2001, Fields and Kanbur 2007, Pollin 2008, Herr, Kazandziska et al. 2009, Müller and 
Steiner 2010, Brenke and Müller 2013, Hilgenstock 2014, Wojciechowski and 
Wollmershäuser 2015). In a long-term perspective labor could be substituted by machinery. 
In a short-term one, decreasing demand for labor may result in restructuring of the whole 
labor market, when workers leave low-paid sectors for better paid ones. The process has 
been observed in Croatia (Nestić 2010). The opposite effect [raise of employment rate] is 
explained by the changing of business cycles which means that higher minimum wage 
increases purchase power within the population which results in higher demand for goods 
and labor to produce them (Card and Krueger 1995, Pollin 2008). The third opinion is the 
absence of change of the employment rate, due to the fact that those having become 
unemployed because of the legal minimum wage introduction will actively search for jobs 
in other sectors, many of which become more attractive through the overall wage level 
increase (Herr, Kazandziska et al. 2009). Alternatively, employers might follow other 
strategies to cope with the raising labor price. Those will be discussed in detail in the passage 
below. Most of the reviewed research agree on the fact that careful setting and adjustment 
of the legal minimum wage prevents negative employment effects.  
A comprehensive review of the development of the German labor market has been 
made by the Minimum Wage Commission (Mindestlohnkommission 2016). According to 
its information, no negative effects on the employment rate have been observed due to the 
introduction of the law. For April 2015, it has been raised by 1,3% in comparison to the same 
month of the previous year. No raise of the unemployment rate has been observed either. 
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Instead, structural changes, namely decrease in marginal employment due to its transition to 
the one covered by social security, have been observed (Berge, Kaimer et al. 2016, Caliendo, 
Fedorets et al. 2017). The number of transitions from marginal employment has raised, 
remaining newly established labor relationship persistent also one year after the law 
introduction (Berge, Kaimer et al. 2016). Possible explanation for the structural changes is 
German regulations for marginal employment (“mini-jobs”). With the wage raise, the 
number of permitted working hours for this employment form decreases significantly, 
whereas the obligation of the employers to pay social insurance for these workers remains 
the same (Hilgenstock 2014).  
Reasons for the absence of negative employment effect in Germany are well 
summarized by Caliendo and colleagues (Caliendo, Fedorets et al. 2017). Those are better 
correspondence of the affected labor market segment to the monopsonistic rather than 
perfect competition; postponing the layoffs to medium and short-term by legal and intra-
firm administrative hurdes; non-compliance and others. The major observed change is the 
drop down of the number of working hours (Mindestlohnkommission 2016, Caliendo, 
Fedorets et al. 2017). Both papers agree on the intensification of labor in the background of 
this change. The Minimum Wage Commission report also connects the change to the 
technical developments in the production process (Mindestlohnkommission 2016), whereas 
Caliendo and colleagues (Caliendo, Fedorets et al. 2017) analyze it in terms of increase in 
the overtime unpaid, non-compliance and employees’ initiative to lower the working time 
to keep the eligibility for social security and tax benefits. These evidences provide a limited 
understanding of the labor market development after the law introduction, as the conclusions 
are given on a middle-term descriptive basis.  
The absence of the crucial employment effects of the legal minimum wage in 
Germany shifts the focus of the discussion to the adaptation strategies of the companies 
towards the raising labor price. Following Vaughan-Whitehead (2010), the latter could 
become either “a quality enhancing high road” or “a cost minimizing low road”. The first 
one aims to increase productivity through investments in human recourses and technologies, 
improve the quality of services and products. The second option is driven by the effort to 
pay the increasing costs of labor by saving on other ones, e.g. employees’ dismissal or 
replacement by less-skilled labor force, shortage of fringe benefits and training, changes in 
the production process in favor of cheaper options and etc. As an example of the prevalence 
of the “low road” option author describes the case of the United Kingdom. The reasons 
behind are low supply of the skilled labor force and qualified managers, distrust of the firm 
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owners towards the national training system and constant increase of the international 
competition.  On the contrary, Vaughan-Whitehead predicts the opposite situation for 
Germany. According to the scholar, the absence of the legal minimum wage has been a major 
obstacle for the employers to develop their companies following the “high road” model. 
The report of the Minimum Wage Commission (Mindestlohnkommission 2016) 
provides an overview of the companies’ adaptation strategies with respect to the law using 
the IAB Establishment Panel of 2015. The most popular measures named, apart from already 
discussed intensification of work (undertaken by 23,5% of firms, planned by 4,6%), are price 
raising (19,5% and 6,3% correspondently) and limitations in employing new workers (10,4% 
and 6,3%). One of the core differences between “low” and “high” road models is the strategy 
towards the affected workers reflected in possibly changing quality of their jobs.  This 
concept includes the whole variety of non-wage aspects, e.g. fringe benefits like meals or 
job tickets, job intensity, development of human resources through investment in training, 
employee commitment and mobility, discouraging labor turnover (Card and Krueger 1995, 
Acemoglu and Pischke 2003, Vaughan-Whitehead 2010). These factors could become a 
powerful explanation for the absence of employment loses while introducing legal minimum 
wage (Cubitt and Heap 1999).  The current state of research describes the situation only 
partially. Referring to the IAB Establishment Panel (Mindestlohnkommission 2016), the 
following measures has been mentioned by the affected companies: reduction of the 
investments (undertaken by 5,8% of affected firms and planned by 5,4%), increased usage 
of alternative (flexible) employment forms (2,6% and 2,4%), increasing (1,5% and 2,1%) 
and decreasing (1,8% and 0,6%) employees’ training,  substitution of the labor force through 
machinery (1,4% and 1,1%). Ifo Institute (Weber 2016) reports more dramatic figures on the 
undertaken adaptation measures with respect to the law both direct and indirect affection is 
covered:  price increase (29% East Germany, 14% West Germany), shortage of working 
time (19% East Germany, 13% West Germany), investment reduction (18% East Germany, 
10% West Germany), shortage of additional payments (17% East Germany, 11% West 
Germany), personal restructure (16% East Germany, 13% West Germany), no measures 
(44% East Germany, 59% West Germany). Those are not only simple outcomes of the legal 
minimum wage introduction, but a possible measure of its share in creating “high skill, high 
value” economy stimulating the investments in physical and human capital (Cubitt and Heap 
1999).  
Already in the foundations of labor market theory investing in the human capital has 
been regarded as the most valuable type of investment (Marshall 2009). Technical and 
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scientific innovations, their application to the production process and contribution to the 
improved productivity, have dramatically increased the value of knowledge that are mainly 
embodied in people (Becker 1964). Unlike other types of capital, individual knowledge and 
abilities are associated with changes in action and economic growth (Coleman 1988). 
Following the original definition, it can be defined as the activities that affect future profits 
through imbedding resources in people. Human capital theory in the foundations of Becker 
(1964) and knowledge-based view on the firm (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995, Liebeskind 
1996, Krogh and Wallin 2011) focus economic analysis on the individual knowledge and 
skills. Within both frameworks, investment in human capital is analyzed as the relationship 
between a firm and an individual based, on the one hand, on differentiation of their interests 
and, on the other hand, on the common goal of improving knowledge and skills. An 
important characteristic of the human capital theory is the prominent role of an individual in 
investment decisions, whereas firm becomes a mean to increase their private returns. On the 
contrary, within the knowledge-based view, individual is viewed as a mean to increase firm 
knowledge and improve firm performance. Both views agree on the crucial importance of 
human capital for the economic development, individual and firms’ profit.  
When discussing the improvement of skills of an active labor force, the concept of 
training has to be introduced. Together with education, these are two most important types 
of human capital investment. For this reason, earning degree at an institution that specializes 
in teaching is a preparatory stage within the career path, whereas specialization and 
acquisition of job-related skills happen mostly at work (Mincer 1993). Further education 
provides workers with basic and updated competencies, stimulates their motivation, sense 
of responsibility and attitudes conductive to productivity in work and strategic goals of the 
organization (Hashimoto 1982, Wilkinson, Bacon et al. 2010). Besides, employees’ benefits 
from it include increased employment duration and continuity, payment raise and promotion 
(Wilkinson, Bacon et al. 2010). Nevertheless, its provision is limited by the challenging 
features of human capital in comparison to other productive forces, namely the possibility 
of movement to a competing firm, demand for higher payment, demotivation, dissatisfaction 
and authority rejections (Coff 1997). Uncertainty about the usefulness and returns on the 
investment are further barriers with this regard (Wilkinson, Bacon et al. 2010), as well as 
worker’s motivation for learning (Xu and Lin 2011), incomplete information upon their 
skills and available training opportunities (Becker 1964). When considering continuing 
vocational training as a part of lifelong learning, it becomes a central characteristic to rank 
groups upon their participation in further education (Bilger and Strauß 2015). 70% of all 
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overtaken adult education activities are defined as employer-provided further training, which 
also makes their prevalence clear in comparison to individual investments. However, listed 
arguments and statistics makes both of them a complex and significant subject of the labor 
market research to be examined in a tight connection.  
On account of the legal minimum wage introduction, unskilled and low-skilled work 
is one of the most affected segments of the labor market, experiencing the strongest wage 
growth due to the reform (Caliendo, Fedorets et al. 2017). Therefore, they are also the ones 
who face the greater risk of unemployment as the direct outcome of the law (Fedorets, 
Schröder et al. 2017). With reference to the report of the Minimum Wage Commission 
(Mindestlohnkommission 2016), these are 24,3% of all the employment relationships of the 
workers without a formal qualification and/or 21,5% of the jobs with low qualification 
requirements. If the calculations are performed on the employee-level, similar picture could 
be observed. According to the data of the German Socio-Economic Panel in 2015 (Kalina 
and Weinkopf 2016), around one third of the workers affected by the legal minimum wage 
(30,4%) did not have a formal qualification. Following the definition of the Federal ministry 
for economics and labor (Hieming, Jaehrling et al. 2005), those workers could not be called 
completely unskilled. Many of them have collected relevant professional knowledge and 
experience, although it is not formally certified. The same study states that the work of their 
majority goes beyond the tasks for which no qualification is needed. A further discrepancy 
is observed in the definition of “simple jobs” or “jobs for everyone”, for which employees 
provide constantly raising application requirements, e.g. computer or soft skills.  Due to the 
fact, that German industry is specialized in the field of goods and services of high quality, 
formal qualification has gained its importance even for the low-skilled work and, therefore, 
contributes to the falling demand for the workers without professional certificates. Legal 
minimum wage introduction has enforced the tendency towards higher employment 
(Mindestlohnkommission 2016) and productivity (Agell and Lommerud 1997) 
requirements. An example of this contradiction is the debate to raise the exception for the 
long-term unemployed up to twelve months to support their chances for being recruited. 
Therefore, unfavorable labor market perspectives (e.g. higher risks of unemployment and 
underpayment (Kalina and Weinkopf 2016)) of the described group are becoming worse.  
Apart from that, it is not only workers without the professional qualifications 
performing simple jobs. Skills’ mismatch (Hieming, Jaehrling et al. 2005) is often observed 
when qualified applicants do not have professional capabilities expected by the employers. 
Accepting these jobs might be the way to avoid unemployment, as a well as the 
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compensation for a better work profile (package) or promotion perspectives. The field of 
simple work is associated with lower labor productivity and underpayment, as well as limited 
developmental perspectives. In terms of the legal minimum wage introduction, it is another 
two thirds of the affected employees having completed vocational training or academic 
degree. Since January 2015, there are no legal instruments of abusing this labor market 
segment independently from the qualification level of the workers or job they perform. The 
tendencies described above provide two possible implications for the firm owners. First, 
massive dismissals and replacement of unprofitable workers by the those who are better 
qualified and/or machinery. The statistic provided has not given widespread evidences for 
that. Second, the employers might decide in favor of improving the productivity of existing 
workers through providing additional training for them (Acemoglu and Pischke 2003). 
However, the power of this argument is restricted by the pressure on the employers to cut on 
the expenditures, wherever possible, due to the raised labor costs. Wage increase especially 
by the unskilled workers remains sensible with regard to the learning perspectives for them. 
This implies that legal minimum wage introduction might become either an already 
mentioned step towards “high skill, high value” economy (Cubitt and Heap 1999) or an 
additional restriction of labor market chances in the sector of low-skilled/ low-payed /simple 
jobs that are a target group of the legal minimum wage introduction. The named aspects 
provide a strong link between social and economic aspects of labor market theory and 
ongoing political debates upon the reasonability of the law.  
Taking into account all the provided evidences and arguments, the current paper will 
answer the following research question. What is the impact of the legal minimum wage 
introduction on employees’ training in Germany? It is going to contribute to the ongoing 
studies of the law outcomes directly after its introduction and, therefore, especially valuable. 
The paper is going to proceed in the following way. In the first chapter the theoretical basis 
of the influence of the legal minimum wage introduction on the training opportunities on the 
workplace is going to be critically examined.  In the next part the empirical analysis is going 
to be performed on the data of the German Socio-Economic Panel. Implication of the results 
and conclusions will be provided in the final chapter of the paper. 
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Chapter 2. Theoretical Framework   
 
2.1. Outline 
 
The goal of the following chapter is to define the theoretical background of the analysis 
of the impact of the legal minimum wage introduction on training opportunities on the 
workplace. It includes the nature of connection and reasons behind, macro-, meso- and micro 
level characteristics influencing it and conceptualization of training notion. Existing literature 
on the topic is going to be critically reviewed to define existing research gaps and derive the 
objectives for the current study.  
Our research takes the perspective of labor economics approach to analyzing training, 
which is based on the human capital theory of Becker (Wilkinson, Bacon et al. 2010). 
Therefore, structural and subjective factors of participation in training, as well as its effect on 
individuals, organizations and economy will be approached. Following the perspective of 
Becker, it is the same pool of characteristics determining employer’s and worker’s investment 
in the human capital of the latter. Therefore, they will be viewed together with necessary 
differentiations between both where necessary. Additionally, human resource management 
perspective will be incorporated through understanding the training provision in social 
exchange theory (Wilkinson, Bacon et al. 2010). On the one hand, training is perceived as a 
resource provided by employers to help their workers, demonstrate support and caring. The 
latter view it as commitment and investment, responding with increased effort and cooperation. 
Last but not the least, is inclusion of industrial relations approach while operationalizing 
training concept, focusing on employee, the amount of training provided for him and working 
practices and conditions promoting training.  
The chapter consists of the following parts. First, the general logical link between the 
legal minimum wage introduction and employer-provided training will be discussed using 
existing empirical studies within the field and their theoretical implications. Second, the theory 
of human capital will be reviewed with relation to the current research question. Third, the 
concept of postgraduate education and its special characteristics with relation to the analyzed 
group will be discussed. Within the final part the conclusions upon existing theoretical gaps 
and solutions that will be applied for them in the current study are going to be presented.  
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2.2. Legal Minimum Wage Introduction and Human Capital Investments  
 
As it has already been noticed in the introduction, the link between the legal minimum 
wage introduction and training is an essential part of the research of the outcomes of the legal 
minimum wage. Its shortage as well as increase could become an important adaptation strategy 
of the firm towards the law to avoid massive dismissals. In the first case, training is viewed as 
an additional expenditure for the firm owners and, therefore, shall be reduced to compensate 
for the raising labor price. In the second case, further professional education is a way to make 
the workers more productive so that the increased price of the labor pays off through an 
optimized production process. Deepening existing training provision inequalities is included 
into discussion as the third definition of the outcome. Self-explaining is the absence of any 
impact of the law on training provision if the firm owners do not incorporate it as a management 
instrument at all. Law introduction might also affect individual investment decisions. The 
detailed theoretical explanation for these links is presented below. Due to the short time since 
the introduction of the legal minimum wage in Germany, it is mostly foreign research (mainly 
United States and United Kingdom) that build the theoretical contribution of this section.  
Most of the studies upon the link between two analyzed concepts prove the competitive 
labor market model and Becker’s human capital theory predicting the negative impact of the 
legal minimum wage on training provision. The starting point is the fact that a large share of 
human capital is accumulated on the job and workers finance their training accepting lower 
wages. If no training had been provided, workers would have received higher wages, but they 
choose the other way in order to invest in their human capital expecting future returns (Becker 
1964, Acemoglu and Pischke 2003). The alternative explanation outside human capital theory 
is that lower wages could be also accepted due to their compensation by fringe benefits (e.g. 
transport or meals) (Fairris and Pedace 2004). The processes of wage negotiations, as well as 
background of financing training through lower payment are difficult to support empirically 
(Lechthaler and Snower 2008), therefore it is only possible to use statistic indicators of training 
provision as evidences. The negative impact of the legal minimum wage on employer-provided 
training has been empirically proved by the wide range of studies using different methodology, 
both firms and individuals as the units of analysis (e.g. (Mincer and Leighton 1980, Hashimoto 
1982, Schiller 1994, Neumark and Wascher 2001, Haepp and Lin 2016)). Brunello (2001) 
proves this conclusion performing the analysis on the international level, indicating less amount 
of provided training in the countries with higher minimum wages. Shortage of the training 
opportunities on the employers’ side is also driven by the mentioned necessity to cut on the 
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expenditures. Apart from the direct costs, training is connected to the range of indirect ones like 
wasting raw materials, production of the defected goods, damage to the equipment because of 
mistakes in usage while educating (Becker 1964, Hashimoto 1982). Before the reasonability of 
the application of these theoretical arguments is discussed in the German context, alternative 
explanations of the link between two analyzed concepts will be described.  
Higher legal minimum wage makes it unprofitable to employ unskilled workers  
(Acemoglu and Pischke 2003). The alternative solution for the revision of the labor costs might 
be improvement of the quality of already existing work. Human capital model predicts the 
productivity growth as a direct outcome of the human capital investment, namely further 
training (Barron, Black et al. 1989). Therefore, introduction of the legal minimum wage may 
stimulate the employers to supply further education opportunities for the workers. The 
theoretical model is created on the basis of the perfectly uncompetitive labor market, therefore 
there is only a limited amount of empirical evidences provided for its support (e.g. (Cubitt and 
Heap 1999, Arulampalam, Booth et al. 2002, Acemoglu and Pischke 2003, Metcalf 2004).  
Within the quantitative methodology of the research it is difficult to capture 
simultaneously all the incentives for employers to reduce or increase training as well as reasons 
for the workers to accept lower wages. Although on the theoretical level perfect causation 
between two patterns is assumed, there is no doubt that the effect of the law is impossible to 
separate from other economic processes. Besides, training provision is connected to the range 
of own independent predictors. The third group of studies consist of those that indicate no 
impact of the legal minimum wage on training provision (Grossberg and Sicilian 1999, Fairris 
and Pedace 2004). As an additional explanation for the absence of substantial fall of the 
employed rate despite unprofitability of employment of unskilled workers, labor-labor 
substitution could be mentioned (Fairris and Bujanda 2005). Only the workers matching a 
productivity floor are selected (Agell and Lommerud 1997). Hungary is an example where 
unskilled employment was significantly decreased for this reason, with poor career perspectives 
for the outsiders (Köllő 2010). The choice may be performed not only on the qualification (skill) 
basis but express the “taste of discrimination” towards certain workers’ groups arbitrary chosen 
by employers (e.g. migrant workers, women). Firm owners would search for the employees 
who already poses the capabilities needed for the optimization of the production process instead 
of helping the existing workers acquire ones. An alternative notion is the “hires of a better 
quality” (Lang and Kahn 1998). Last but not the least, no strong effect on postgraduate 
education will also be expected when the latter fulfills mainly the abilities’ screening and 
evaluating function with the aim of identifying the most capable workers (David 2001). The 
13 
 
named factors could be examined when more specific information about the affected actors is 
given.   
The same mechanism of maximization the future benefit and choosing the most 
profitable investment alternative is embedded into the individual decision to invest in their 
human capital (Belman and Wolfson 2014). A differentiating feature at this point is that there 
is no uncertainty upon who would profit from the investment and loss in case of movement to 
another firm. The authors find that the negative effect of minimum wage on individual 
investments is reflected in school drop-outs among teenagers to pursue better employment 
opportunities. As initial education stands beyond the scope of the current paper, this link will 
be not discussed further. However, it is important to keep in mind that for workers longer 
working hours become a more profitable opportunity than training, therefore, this might 
negatively affect their own training decisions. Cahuc and Michel (1996) discuss alternative 
explanations of the positive influence of minimum wage on individual investments. Minimum 
wage raises the demand for the high skilled labor in comparison to the one of the low-skilled. 
This motivates the latter to qualify for the jobs and increased employment requirements. Apart 
from the direct effect on the worker’s investment initiative, the one of the firm owner could 
face an indirect negative effect with this regard. The reverse mechanism is reasonable to expect 
either. Employees’ increase own training investments in response to the shortage of firm-
financed training (Hara 2017).  
Bellmann and colleagues (Bellmann, Bossler et al. 2017) discuss the relevance of this 
evidence in the German context. They bring into discussion training subsidies as the third 
source of human capital investments and, therefore, explanation for the absence of the 
employment effect. The latter cover both employer’s and employee’s training initiative and are 
of a major importance in Germany, where additional budget for qualifying the unemployed and 
employed in danger of dismissal has been introduced with regard to the law. The theoretical 
link upon the integration of the different kinds of human capital investments remains weak. In 
terms of the newly introduced arguments, we could predict the stability of the overall training 
participation due to the inter-compensation of different sources for human capital investment. 
Nevertheless, the characteristics of worker’s credibility outlined by Becker are relevant for all 
of them in most economic contexts and, therefore, should be placed in the focus of the 
discussion.  
Apart from direct training costs, human capital investments also include hiring 
expenses, fees for employment agencies, open position advertisements etc. According to 
Becker (1964) they should be considered so due to their positive impact on productivity 
14 
 
although not improvement of skills and knowledge and loss of value, when the worker leaves. 
For an individual, they are reflected in the costs of gaining additional knowledge upon 
employment opportunities. In Germany, the reduction in hires has been detected as one of the 
employment outcomes of the minimum wage introduction (Bossler and Gerner 2016). 
Therefore, the risk of reduction of training investments for this reason has to be excluded.  
Although the current paper focuses on the training outcomes of the minimum wage 
introduction, those do not remain isolated from other adaptation strategies. Hirsch and 
colleagues  (Hirsch, Kaufman et al. 2015) introduce the concept of the channels of adjustment 
that describe the blocks of changes through which labor price increase influences the behavior 
of firms, which, in its turn, affects employees, consumers, stakeholders and other agents.  
Described labor market models are then characterized by different mixes and strength of 
adjustment channels. Therefore, the cost of the minimum wage is not attributed to single 
adaptation strategies but absorbed through a wide range of the channels of adjustment. The 
German labor market review upon the first outcomes of the law presented in the introduction 
proves the described theoretical approach. Nevertheless, channels of adjustment do differ in 
their relative weights for the overall company’s adaptation strategies and authors emphasize the 
importance of the human-related and internal operational ones. Training on the job is one of 
those. In its general terms, we relate the channel of adjustment concept to the “high” and “low 
road” dichotomy discussed above.  
The complementary concept applied for the employee’s side is the pattern of the 
worker’s subjective gains. It is applied for the research of the positive effects of the minimum 
wage introduction on the different dimensions of personal and professional well-being (Bossler 
and Broszeit 2017, Pusch and Rehm 2017, Gülal, Ayaita et al. 2018). With regard to framework 
introduced in the previous paragraph, those reflect the workforce reaction towards different 
channels of adjustments. Productivity increase is regarded as the central one in the German case 
as the response towards the increased labor demands for the minimum wage legitimate 
employees (Pusch and Rehm 2017) and a prominent reason for the absence of the shortage in 
labor demand for other groups of workers (Bossler and Broszeit 2017). Pusch and Rehm (2017) 
name following changes in the work organization from worker’s perspective: the reduction in 
the number of unproductive tasks and disruption, necessity to cope with more difficult 
problems, increased workload and resulting higher need for further education. Therefore, 
workplace optimization and related challenge of further qualification is beneficial not only from 
the company’s and country economy perspectives, but also contributes profoundly to the overall 
job and life satisfaction of the affected employees.   
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The discussed results give only a holistic introduction of the impact of the legal 
minimum wage on on-the jobs training, as additional factors on the individual, firm and state 
level has not been accounted for. The purpose was to give a general understanding and logic of 
the studied link which creates a background for the theories discussed within the next chapters.   
The prominent works of the field prove an overall tendency of the contemporary labor market 
research: domination of the economic theories over those from the political and social sciences 
(Haupt, Sesselmeier et al. 2015). Interdisciplinary approach in the construction of the 
theoretical framework seeks comprehensive coverage of the topic and not diminishing the 
contributions of single disciplines.  
 
 
2.2.1. Country-Specific Characteristics and Training Participation 
 
The current chapter opens the discussion upon different factors on micro, meso and 
macro level that mediate the relationship between the two analyzed concepts. So that one could 
understand the nature of this connection, it is important to account not only for emerging 
characteristics while introducing the law (e.g. Kaitz index) but on constants that had defined 
the amount of training provided previously. If the latter has been a priority before the law 
introduction, it is likely to remain so after it (Heyes and Gray 2003). The theoretical concepts 
defining training provision on the country level (Brunello 2001) will be applied on German 
context.  
Further training is a way of educating; therefore, it should be analyzed in a close 
connection with the whole educational system and consequent skills’ level across the state. 
First, the mentioned research predicts that training participation is higher in more developed 
the countries with a more educated labor force. The assumption behind is the fact that the supply 
of training increases with the supply of more qualified employees, as firms are stimulated to 
open and occupy vacancies for the skilled jobs. The same factor is a powerful stimulus for the 
workers to improve their competencies to be promoted. With its share of educated labor force 
(employees with upper-secondary and more than upper-secondary qualifications, 61% in total) 
Germany is placed in the middle part of the continuum in the European comparison (Quintini 
and Pouliakas 2014). Besides, the supply of training is going to be less in the countries with a 
more stratified schooling system. Comprehensive schooling reduces specialization in favor of 
students’ flexibility, so the latter would require more training on the workplace within the 
chosen occupation fields. Germany is characterized by a stratified school system, where a large 
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share of formal education happens on the workplace (Allmendinger 1989). Therefore, if the 
students keep their workplace after the graduation, the need for their further training may be 
reduced.  
The second group characterizes employees’ protection on the labor market. On the one 
hand, it is high union coverage that increases wage compression, reduces turnover and 
encourages firms to sponsor training. Although labor unions in Germany enjoy major influence 
on wages and labor conditions, their density remains rather low in comparison to Scandinavian 
countries (OECD 2016). For the year 2013, it is 67-69% in Finland, Sweden and Denmark 
versus 18% in Germany. On the other hand, employment protection increases turnover costs 
and discourages involuntary separation potentially favoring investments in the human capital. 
Within the same OECD dataset, it is measured as the strictness of employment protection 
(individual and collective dismissals) separately for regular and temporary contracts.  Germany 
is the upper cluster in the first case and below the average in the second case, which would be 
reflected in a better developed training system for the workers with permanent contracts in 
comparison to temporary ones. Last but not the least, is the existence of federal subsidies to 
cover training incentives of both employers and employees (Bellmann, Bossler et al. 2017) to 
support the unemployed or workers in danger of becoming so.  
The institutional characteristics indicate potentially selective approach in training 
provision for German workers. On the one hand, its need is reduced by the stratified school 
system. On the other hand, the demand for it will be maintained by the share of the highly 
qualified labor force most probably enjoying high union coverage. These assumptions are 
illustrated by the following statistics prior to the law implementation. According to Adult 
Education Survey (Bilger and Strauß 2015), 37% of adults (age: 18-64) have taken part in 
employer-provided professional training. Nevertheless, when discussing human capital 
investments, the decision is made on the firm (employer-provided training) or individual level, 
placed in the country’s context.  
 
 
2.2.2. Firm-Specific Characteristics and Training Participation 
 
A substantial part of the research upon the discussed topic agree on the issue that training 
provision is negotiated within the firm development strategy (Wilkinson, Bacon et al. 2010), so 
it is reasonable to use single companies as units of analysis. Need for specialized skills, 
introduction and usage of high performance work systems generally influence decision upon 
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that in a short and long-term perspectives. Before single firm characteristics are discussed, it is 
important to look at contextual ones, namely region and business sector, as they determine the 
whole market conditions of the firm.  
Region, namely East and West division, is an inevitable control variable for most 
research subjects in Germany. Although national standards of further education determine 
training provision for the whole country, path-dependency for both regions should be kept in 
the background of interpretation. For example, it could be illustrated through labor force 
composition with the larger share of skilled workers in East Germany after unification (Fitzroy 
and Funke 1998), driven by the right and obligation for professional education in DDR  
(Herkner 2015). There could be no clear-cut conclusions made on this basis because of the labor 
force migration after unification and incomparability of training and technological standards 
(Fitzroy and Funke 1998), which, according to the authors, are qualitatively higher in the West. 
The motivation to keep up to them as well as previous tradition of learning organization might 
explain slightly higher participation rates in further education in East Germany (42%) in 
comparison to West (36%), as reported by Adult Education Survey (Bilger and Strauß 2015). 
Nevertheless, these rates also illustrate previously observed convergence tendency in the 
regional division (Schiersmann 2007). Taking into account that East German firms face more 
substantial wage growth than West ones, effect of legal minimum wage introduction has to be 
higher there (Mindestlohnkommission 2016). Regional differences could be also observed 
through comparison between rural and urban areas. The latter are associated with stronger labor 
market positions of employees (Leuven and Oosterbeek 2000), and consequently higher rates 
of training supply (Böhm-Kasper and Weishaupt 2002, Offerhaus, Leschke et al. 2010). The 
inclusion of the concept as a single variable is connected to the range of inconsistences like 
several locations of the same firm, job rotation between them, commuting, classifying suburbs 
etc. Therefore, it will not be incorporated into the current analysis.  
The determination of business sector is observed through the level of competition and 
profitability, labor market compositions, management expertise, access to the capital 
(Arrowsmith, Gilman et al. 2003). Extent of training provision is also dependent on the level 
of technological development in the branch. When it is low, there is little incentive to invest in 
training, as there will be no opportunity for the “upskilled” workers to perform “upskilled” 
tasks in the same company (Bassanini and Ok 2004). This pattern is discussed in terms of the 
qualification requirements and knowledge intensity of the tasks within the branch, attributing 
lower training participation to construction and hospitality industries, where both are relatively 
low (Schiersmann 2007). Another factor outlined by the author is the organizational aspect of 
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work. Namely, group and project work are reported to influence positively training 
participation. Nevertheless, Schiersmann omits a generalized conclusion due to the ambiguity 
of sources of the observed discrepancies. Sector differentiation is especially important in 
Germany, due to the established dual system (Kathmann 2017) of wage negotiations: previously 
existing sector-specific tariff regulations and newly introduced nationwide minimum wage. 
The following statistical distribution of the participation in further training across 
sectors illustrates these theoretical assumptions (Bilger and Strauß 2015). The two sectors with 
its major shares are public services (64% of employees) and non-profit associations (62%). 
Clear differences are observed across private sectors providers (44% in general): 46% in 
production industry, 35% in commerce, 45% in other services. Positive externalities (e.g.) 
funding is a possible explanation for higher participation rates in the public services and non-
profit associations. At the same time, private sector providers might be often discouraged by 
the imperfect competitions on the market for skills and information failures (Abramovsky, 
Battistin et al. 2011). Production industry is leading potentially due to higher level of 
innovation, technical and organization environment, staff and qualification structure and labor 
conditions (Dobischat, Seifert et al. 2002). Mentioned statistics on the most affected by the law 
sectors should be also taken into account while predicting its impact. As already discussed 
above, the most affected sectors are hotels and restaurants, agriculture, retail, gambling and 
betting activities, taxis.  Those characteristics are structural factors for the participation in 
training, further mediated on the firm level.    
Further important index is the company size, as the researchers agree on the 
disproportional affection of the small firms by the legal minimum wage 
(Mindestlohnkommission 2016). Besides, due to a limited access to the capital and shortage of 
skilled staff, small firms are reported to provide in overall less training for their employees 
(Arrowsmith, Gilman et al. 2003, Heyes and Gray 2003). Large companies enjoy more 
advanced technologies, and consequently attract more qualified employees and experience 
lower labor turnover (Leuven and Oosterbeek 2000). The theoretical assumption is proved by 
the statistics of Adult Education Survey (Bilger and Strauß 2015).  Labor relationship in small 
firms could be viewed through two major perspectives.  On the one hand, they are driven by 
close physical proximity between the manager and workers, lack of hierarchies and often 
specialists, and therefore, rather informal “give and take” negotiations (Arrowsmith, Gilman et 
al. 2003). It often leads to lower wages than in large companies, which is, however, accepted 
by the employees due to a more congenial work environment. In terms of this perspective, 
setting legal minimum wage has only limited influence on the wage negotiations (Tzanov 2010) 
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and creates relatively little pressure for the employers to provide higher pay, which is then 
mainly compensated through work organizational changes. The informal nature of labor 
practices and their negotiation, multifunctional positions of employees complicate the research 
within this field. The alternative view on the work of the small firms introduced by Arrowsmith 
and colleagues (Arrowsmith, Gilman et al. 2003) is based on their incapability to influence the 
high competitive working environment they are existing in and their major vulnerability 
towards it. That is why, the introduction of the legal minimum wage would have following 
outcomes: decreasing profitability, massive dismissals and incorporation of illegal practices. It 
is also valid to predict rather low probability of the positive boost of training (Heyes and Gray 
2003). The latter is still going to be attributed to an effort to offset the increase in the labor 
costs, rather than a planned developmental strategy.  
Arrowsmith and colleagues (Arrowsmith, Gilman et al. 2003) define three groups of 
firms on the basis of their reaction towards the legal minimum wage introduction. The first 
group consist of those where the wages had been already settled above the established minimum 
wage and, therefore, not facing major influence. The second group of firms move to the “black 
market” employment due to the reasons discussed above.  The third group considered reposition 
themselves in the market and revising existing arrangements. It becomes clear that the firm 
economic behavior before the law introduction influences the adaptation strategies towards it.  
Heyes and Gray (2003) specify their research using the importance of the training 
provision before the law introduction as a predictor of its later impact and use qualitative 
methodology. The assumption behind is the stability of firm owner’s decision to provide 
training or refuse from it within the general managing strategy independently of the newly 
rising labor costs. Although this statement falls into the major critic through the theoretical 
points introduced at the beginning of the chapter, it might explain relatively low changes in the 
provision of training according to the IAB Establishment Panel 2014 on the adaptation 
strategies mentioned in the introduction. Namely, it is 1,5% of the participating firms having 
increased further training and another 2,1% planning to do so. At the same time, 1,8% of the 
companies have reduced the amount of provided further training and 0,6% plan this measure  
(Mindestlohnkommission 2016). In general statistics of 2014, 61% of the participants in 
professional training report company incentive in its provision and 70% - cost coverage of 
further education by the firm-owner (Bilger and Strauß 2015). This policy is regulated within 
the general investment strategy which is dependent on the discussed sector specifications as 
well as individual decision of the firm owner.  
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The reaction that Heyes and Gray (2003) predict in response to the law is the adoption 
of a more strategic approach towards training instead of its radical change. For the companies 
where training has been important previously it might mean focus on the quality of education 
provided, updating the staff about learning possibilities, simulating self-learning, enhancing 
skills or control and reduction of training costs through dismissal of staff who learn slowly or 
pressure to finish the training earlier. The absence of such reaction is accounted for the factors 
having formed before the legal minimum wage introduction and making the firm owner refuse 
from human capital investments. These are wage costs, high labor turnover and low demand 
for highly trained employees. The authors also indicate possible indirect outcomes of the legal 
minimum wage introduction. Those are improved quality of goods and services due to the 
intensification of work and in case more strategic approach towards training has been 
overtaken learning transfer of the acquired skills. The paper provides “a soft solution” for the 
analyzed problem and serves as a valuable contribution to a broader understanding of the 
influence of the introduction of the legal minimum wage in terms of the general firm strategy 
and policy. 
One of the few studies upon actual the short-run consequences of minimum wage in 
Germany is the paper by Bellmann and colleagues (Bellmann, Bossler et al. 2017). They use 
the data of the IAB-Establishment Panel for the years 2011-2015, applying difference-in-
difference method on the firm level. The authors conclude upon the absence of the negative 
impact on training incidence but on training intensity in the affected establishments, mostly 
driven by the employer-sponsored training. Reduction of vocational education opportunities 
has been observed for medium and high-skilled employers, with no impact on the low-skilled 
ones. Although a detailed information is gathered upon training provision (distinguishing 
between three types: external, internal and on-the-job) and financing (solely firm-financed and 
one including worker’s expenditures), its little amount is available for the employee’s 
characteristics. Although skill group is one of the central determinants of job performance, we 
have the reasons to believe that training participation is affected by the range of further 
individual characteristics. The authors also agree on the necessity of extension of the findings 
to individual-level analysis. Despite the outlined limitations, the study contributes profoundly 
to the current research question.  
To draw a conclusion, it is the limited access to the capital, shortage of high-skilled 
workers, informality of business relationship and firm biography that mediate the relationship 
between the legal minimum wage introduction and provided training. Besides, it is important 
to keep in mind that large companies and/or highly developed sectors attract better qualified 
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employees, more motivated to participate in training and invest in it themselves. Following the 
logic of the approached scholars, even negotiated on the firm level training strategy finds 
diverse application for different groups of workers. Consequently, it is reasonable to proceed 
with the review of individual characteristics influencing human capital investment as the central 
part of the theoretical framework.   
 
 
2.2.3. Individual Characteristics and Training Participation 
 
This chapter presents an overview of the individual characteristics of workers 
influencing investment in their human capital. The same factors are in charge of the rate of 
employer-financed training, individual investments and change of both when legal minimum 
wage law is being introduced. These theoretical assumptions are embedded in the human capital 
theory (Becker 1964). The key principle of their differentiation is credit constraints. It means 
that investment is made in the human capital of those workers who are expected to provide the 
most future profit with the least share of loses and risks (Lechthaler and Snower 2008). 
According to the authors, this decision is completely arbitrary and subjective. Besides, training 
is related not only to the employee’s current workplace, but to their general employability 
(Dobischat, Seifert et al. 2002). Therefore, workers’ individual characteristics indicated by 
Becker (1964) as ones potentially influencing it, will be in focus of this chapter. For conceptual 
differentiation, we divide them into job-related, performance-related and personal. The 
differentiation between firm-specific and general training in terms of the human capital theory 
will be first omitted and discussed in the next part of the theoretical overview. 
Following the logic of Becker and its prominent interpretations (Becker 1964, 
Grossberg and Sicilian 1999), the major part of investment in human capital occurs at the 
beginning of the employment, therefore shorter work duration by the current employer (job 
tenure) implies higher training provision. Nevertheless, training itself limits labor turnover and 
its provision often solely fulfils this function (Mincer 1988), therefore the causal link in the 
opposite direction is possible either. In the case of the entry labor market, the indicator is closely 
connected to other job-related (e.g. job complexity), performance-related (work experience) 
and personal characteristics (age). Those will be approached in the respective paragraphs.  
When discussing technological development and optimization of the production 
processes, job complexity often takes the focus of attention. Nevertheless, their direct link 
becomes less obvious when operationalizing the concept. Work complexity is reflected in the 
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employee’s function and nature of job tasks (Cole 1992). It could be measured through 
objective (personnel requirements to be employed on the position) or subjective indicators 
(information about the job and activities performed from the incumbent) (Nedelkoska and Patt 
2015). Both are dependent on macro (industry, workforce characteristics and industrial climate) 
and micro influence (type of technology used on particular position) (Hoffmann 1999). The 
prominent approach implies using objective measurements, as employees are not always aware 
of the distribution of the jobs, so they mostly compare their tasks with a limited set of familiar 
positions (Nedelkoska and Patt 2015). Besides, this perception is relative to their own individual 
ability. In terms of objective indicators, job complexity is a complement to the worker’s 
qualification, discussed below.  According to the data of the IAB Establishment Panel (Bogai, 
Buch et al. 2014), there is a direct ratio between the worker’s and job’s qualification levels. The 
current tendency of constant development of skilled work leaves little chance for people without 
formal qualifications, as almost a half of simple jobs (44,7%) is occupied by persons with the 
already lowest professional (school) qualification.   
The cognitive demands of the jobs are constantly raising through the proliferation of 
computers, growing complexity of production and globalization of the division of labor 
(Nedelkoska and Patt 2015). Therefore, lower productivity of the simple jobs has become one 
of the major challenges of the rising labor costs through the legal minimum wage introduction. 
In general words, improving productivity means substituting low-skilled for high-skilled labor. 
Apart from dismissals and raising application requirements, it could be dome through 
redistribution of tasks among existing positions or creating new kinds of jobs (Piore 1968). In 
this case, legal minimum wage becomes an incentive to optimize routine and repetitive tasks 
through innovation and finding new ways of doing the job. Innovation includes skills 
development, possible both for the simple and complex jobs, dependently on the company’s 
strategy. Complex jobs impose higher cognitive tasks on workers, and, therefore, are 
traditionally associated with a wider scope for improvement and returns, and consequently, 
higher amount of further training (Wilkinson, Bacon et al. 2010, Nedelkoska and Patt 2015), 
whereas simple tasks are often seen as peripheral and lacking promotion opportunities (Mangan 
2000). Though, a need to improve productivity of the latter and, its lower cost in comparison 
to complex ones, (Leuven and Oosterbeek 2000)  is the basis to expect raising provision of 
training for the simple jobs. On the employee’s side it is reflected in the mentioned initiative to 
qualify for better jobs (Belman and Wolfson 2014). 
The impact of digitalization is also analyzed with regard to the complete substitutions 
to the range of jobs. We address a comprehensive review with this regard (Dengler and Matthes 
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2015). According to the authors, helpers’ and specialists’ jobs are more probable to be replaced 
by machinery than those requiring high qualification and/or more complex ones. Therefore, it 
is reasonable to expect higher rates of human capital investments for the latter. The same is true 
for social and cultural services that have much lower substitutability potential than industrial 
professions. Further data upon the dynamics of changes in the companies’ qualification 
structure is needed for more generalized conclusions with this regard. 
Due to the multidimensionality of the job complexity concept, empirical evidences 
remain limited.  Authors indicate the difficulty to predict the nature of organizational changes 
on the basis of previous experience (Piore 1968). Besides, it is often a matter of skill adjustment 
rather than radical change (Pannenberg 1996). The current state of research (Grossberg and 
Sicilian 1999, Acemoglu and Pischke 2003, Vaughan-Whitehead 2010) support these 
assumptions rather theoretically. Institutionally comparable French case proves the impact of 
legal minimum wage in the combination with other instruments of employment protection 
legislation on optimization of production process in food processing industry through 
automatization combined with training and multiskilling (Caroli, Gautié et al. 2010). Available 
statistics on participation in training on the job depending on the job function in 2012-2014 
(Bilger and Strauß 2015) provide two implications for the theory. First, selection matrixes 
reproducing social inequality remain stable, as operative workers receive training the least 
(37%), followed by specialists (58%) and managers with the highest level of training 
participation (69%). Second, there is a tendency of raising the participation in training for 
operative workers (further education in general: from 34% in 2007 to 44% in 2014; continuing 
vocational education: 30% in 2012 to 37% in 2014). This change is more profound that the one 
for specialists (4% - training on the job, 2% further education in general) and managers (-1% 
and -2% correspondently) and is an important sign of the optimization of production process 
for this group of jobs. To draw a conclusion, inequality in training provision based on the job 
complexity is going to remain after the law introduction, thus with further potential increase in 
training for simple jobs.  
For Becker (1964), one of the basic principles of differentiation in the human capital 
investments is the amount of switching between activities. From the employer’s perspective 
(Becker 1964, Cole 1992, Wilkinson, Bacon et al. 2010) it implies that firm owners tend to 
invest more in the employees who are more likely to stay longer in the company to collect the 
most returns from the investment. The same could be stated about workers having more 
profound incentive to invest in the activity that they do on a permanent, rather than temporary 
basis. The described concept could be defined through the contract duration (temporary or 
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permanent) and/or employment type (full-time, part-time, marginal). As irregular employment 
has become a norm on the German labor market, the discussion gains further importance 
(Münchhausen 2007). According to the author, human capital investment is long-term oriented, 
therefore atypical employment forms are limited in training opportunities. It is combined with 
the fear of firm-owner that those who are low-skilled will not be able to use the knowledge, 
whereas high-skilled ones might prefer to leave for another firm in the absence of employment 
guarantees. Organizational commitment (Colquitt, LePine et al. 2000) is maintained weaker 
both by the employer and employee. Often it is the matter of limited employment time 
(Münchhausen 2007), making it impossible to use for training. In the case when workers are 
systematically changing tasks, their certain performance level is expected in the background 
and there is no motivation for both sides to improve the performance sustainably. Negative 
impact of these factors is strengthened when workplace is often changed, which is inevitable in 
terms of temporary contracts.  
Adult Education Survey (Bilger and Strauß 2015) delivers following statistical 
implications. First, there is no significant difference between participation in professional 
training in 2014 for permanent (53%) and temporary contracts (54%), despite the expected 
difference of both on the contextual level, discussed in the first chapter, and individual level. 
The possible explanation behind is the fact that for the persons employed on the temporary 
contracts, competence development might become a compensation for unstable professional 
situation or primary motivation to overtake the position, possibly with transition to permanent 
employment. Another way to define the duration within which employers can collect their 
investment in worker’s human capital is the form of employment: full or part-time. The 
theoretical assumption is supported by the rates of training participation (Bilger and Strauß 
2015):  42% for people employed on the part-time basis and 52% for those on the full-time 
contract. In case of the negative effect of minimum wage on training, mini-jobs and part-time 
positions are the most vulnerable to shortages, unless their transition to full-time employment 
does not take place, which is a widespread case for Germany (Berge, Kaimer et al. 2016). Both 
contract duration and form have to be controlled for, as these concepts are often overlapping.  
The discussion upon the performance-related individual characteristics is driven by the  
generating assumption of education research, namely that learning processes are strongly 
connected to selection matrixes that reproduce social inequality (Dobischat, Seifert et al. 2002). 
When the latter is considered within the human capital framework, performance-related 
characteristics could be used to measure the equality of opportunities. It is recognized that the 
introduction of the legal minimum wage gives the rise to the existing skills inequality in terms 
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of its impact on the training opportunities (Lechthaler and Snower 2008). It means that after the 
law adoption lower ability workers would participate less in the training being placed into the 
“low-skill trap” and higher ability workers enjoy its further raise.  
When highest achieved formal qualification is considered, education and training 
become complements (Brunello 2001). It implies that training incidence is higher as the 
professional degree acquired by the employee raises. The theoretical explanation for this 
phenomenon provided by Becker (1964) is the fact that future economic value of the investment 
in human capital depends on the individual’s set of skills and, thus, is higher by the abler 
persons. In other words, abilities acquired in the initial education form a basis for more 
advanced skills provided through postgraduate education (Katz and Ziderman 1990). 
Nevertheless, high school graduates also spend longer time in education allowing to accumulate 
more skills so that less job-related training would be needed afterwards. Apart from that, 
competencies developed without acquiring a formal degree might have an impact on 
performance on the workplace. Therefore, it is necessary to separate overall duration of 
education. Besides, investment in low-qualified employees is often connected to the lower 
economic returns combined with higher training costs, as they might take longer to master 
easier operations (Fouarge, Schils et al. 2010). The latter also explains the raise of participation 
in training with the raise of worker’s specialization in the given field.  
On the contrary, when provided training is viewed as an employer’s investment, more 
advanced formal certificates might lead to less provision of training opportunities, as they make 
workers freer in their mobility and, therefore, increase the chance of their quit (Katz and 
Ziderman 1990). Besides, when an incentive to finance training is driven by already discussed 
goal of increasing the profitability of workers, it should be low-skilled workers who get the 
most raise in training to keep up with the increased employment standards. The absence of 
connection between formal qualifications and employer-financed training is derived from the 
credentialism, meaning that abilities and performance in the working life are of interest of the 
companies and success at schoolwork does not reflect them (Becker 1964, Piore 1968). Many 
of these abilities are taught informally often self-organized, especially by the low-qualified 
(Münchhausen 2007). In order to draw hypothesis for the current research, statistics on the 
current professional training participation is needed to observe the given theoretical 
implication.  
Various indicators could be used for measuring the individual skills’ level. We use the 
examples of Adult Education Survey of 2014 (Bilger and Strauß 2015) to verify the discussed 
theoretical assumptions and create a comprehensive picture of the state of professional training 
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participation in Germany. It is important to mention that the statistics presented refers to all the 
participants of continuing vocational education, independently of the employment status (84% 
of them are employed).  Measurement of the employee’s ability through formal qualification is 
split onto different scales. Using school diploma or International Standard Classification of 
Education (ISCED) 1997, produces a direct ratio between the qualification level and training 
participation. Using German scale of professional qualification creates a slightly different 
picture. Participation in training is the highest among the graduates of technical colleges 
(Meister/Fachschule) – 58%, followed by high school((Fach-)Hochschule) – 48%, vocational 
school (Berufsfachschule) – 36% and those without formal qualification – 22%. A major variety 
of courses offered at German high schools in addition to the regular studies and/or broader job 
opportunities for the graduates might explain lower participation rates of this group. It might 
be stated that the statistics prognoses an overall direct ratio between the skills’ (qualification) 
level and provided training, except high school graduates. 
Another performance-related characteristic is work experience. Generally, more 
experienced workers need less training, as they already acquired a certain amount of skills 
previously (Grossberg and Sicilian 1999). Brunello (2001) finds lower rates of training 
provision for them, unless their skills become outdated. In this case, worker’s age, discussed 
below in detail, would mark an upper border for worker’s credibility.  Both citied authors agree 
on the negative impact of the legal minimum wage introduction on training for more 
experienced workers.   
The last section summarizes personal characteristics affecting training provision. We 
start with age, closely connected to the work experience, discussed in the previous paragraph. 
According to Becker (1964), younger workers both receive and invest themselves more in 
training because the return can be collected over a longer period of time afterwards. Besides, 
they are more interested and capable of learning, less tied to family responsibilities. For these 
reasons, training opportunities often justify lower wages for the working youth (Heyes and Gray 
2003). Nevertheless, higher flexibility of this age group is connected to higher job mobility and, 
therefore, greater risks of quits (Leuven and Oosterbeek 2000). Although this often discourages 
firm human capital investments, those could be compensated by the employee’s own ones in 
industry-specific rather than firm-specific skills. The compensation mechanism is also relevant 
for older workers. They are more confident of their abilities and aware of available training 
opportunities (Becker 1964), which first and foremost affects their own human capital 
investments. 
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 Importance of age variable inclusion is crucial, as due to the absence of radical changes 
in employment rate that have been observed in Germany, employment perspectives of young 
workers are of risk to be negatively affected (Abowd, Kramarz et al. 1999). With this respect, 
setting youth minimum wage has been a policy issue in several countries. For example, case of 
the Netherlands (Salverda 2010) proves its negative impact on training provision incentives. As 
the wage floor is raised with the age of workers independently on their work experience, 
employers are tempted to replace the employees with the younger cohort, which is cheaper than 
keeping older labor force and/or developing their skills.  Generally low minimum wage for the 
youth stimulates them stay longer in education and discourages employer’s human capital 
investments in the positions starting at this level. The following implications of the theoretical 
assumptions are provided by the statistics on further education attainment (Bilger and Strauß 
2015). People aged 35-44 participate the most (45%) in training on the workplace in 2014, with 
similar indicators for the groups 45-54 years – 42% and 25-34 – 40%. Comparatively lower 
participation rate (27%) by the youth in the sample (18-24) is explained by the fact that the 
majority of them are not employed yet. The lowest value of the index in the oldest group is 
perfectly predicted by the human capital theory.  
Further socio-demographic characteristic possibly affecting training provision is 
gender. Men are more likely to be selected for investment, as they are less time-constrained by 
family responsibilities and career breaks for maternity leaves, and, hence, associated with 
higher returns and lower turnover rates (Becker 1964, Leuven and Oosterbeek 2000, Bassanini 
and Ok 2004). Offerhaus and colleagues (Offerhaus, Leschke et al. 2010) hold the view that the 
absence of the impact of family status on training opportunities is explained by the described 
discrimination of females, carrying the most of its negative impact. Besides, authors claim that 
women attribute generally lower value to the further education than men. These theoretical 
assumptions are proved but slightly lower participation rate of women (34% in 2014) than men 
(40% in the respective observation period) in training on the workplace (Bilger and Strauß 
2015). However, gender differences are related to the job characteristics (Leuven and 
Oosterbeek 2000). Women in Germany are reported to be more often employed in small firms 
and part-time jobs, both characterized by generally lower training provision (Offerhaus, 
Leschke et al. 2010). It is clearly reflected in the statistics. When controlling for the full-time 
employment, similarities grow, with 52% for men and 50% for women respectively; and 
tendency for raising participation for both genders (Bilger and Strauß 2015).With relation to 
the legal minimum wage introduction, empirical research predicts no impact of gender on the 
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change of training provision (Grossberg and Sicilian 1999). Therefore, the variable will be 
included into analysis under the control of job characteristics (already discussed above).  
Widely discussed in different contexts, migration background has numerous 
implications in the labor market research. Natives usually enjoy relatively stronger labor market 
position in comparison to immigrants (Leuven and Oosterbeek 2000), who shall be equally 
covered by legal minimum wage regulations. A comprehensive overview of the barriers for 
further education of foreigners and persons with foreign background  is performed by Öztürk 
and colleagues (Öztürk, Schuldes et al. 2014). They highlight the role of following factors in 
lower participation of immigrants in continuing vocational training: insufficient qualification 
often caused by the fact that foreign qualifications remain unrecognized in Germany, low 
professional status and proficiency in German language. The latter creates an additional barrier 
when causing extra costs for suitable training organization (Bassanini and Ok 2004). Sense of 
discrimination for people of non-German origin is another subject of discussion by Öztürk and 
colleagues (Öztürk, Schuldes et al. 2014). When referring to the temporary labor migration, 
generally lower motivation for human capital investment could be observed (Becker 1964). 
German Education Report (Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung 2016) differentiates in 
their measurement between first and second generations of immigrants. The first group 
participates much more often in professional education activities; whereas for the second group 
training serves as an instrument for labor market integration and professional consolidation. 
The subject gains further importance due to the European and German refugees’ debate.  Within 
this group not only gender-specific expectations of economic integration (lower ones for 
females), but traditional or patriarchal views of women’s societal roles, are related to intention 
of obtaining further education (Haan, Kroh et al. 2017). To draw a conclusion for the listed 
theoretical assumption, statistics of Adult Education Survey (Bilger and Strauß 2015) is taken 
as a baseline. It indicates that Germans participate almost twice more often (39%) than 
foreigners (20%) in employer-financed training. Therefore, we expect further shortage of 
training for workers with foreign background in comparison to natives.  
Although training is negotiated in terms of the firm strategy, most variation upon its 
provision is observed on the individual level. We have viewed them in three arbitrary built 
groups: performance-related (education, work experience); job-related (job tenure, job 
complexity, contract duration, form of employment) and personal (age, gender, origin). Each 
item causes major selectivity in training provision independently from the legal minimum wage. 
These characteristics are also in charge for the discrepancies between human capital 
investments of different groups of workers. The fundamental question that is going to be 
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answered in the current analysis is if the law introduction in Germany will contribute to the 
maintenance of these inequalities or becomes an incentive to invest in skills of those who 
previously remained disadvantaged.  
Traditional critic of human capital theory is also applicable to the current overview, well 
summarized by Özturk and colleagues (Öztürk, Schuldes et al. 2014). First, employer and 
employee not always have the complete information about each other. Second, decisions are 
not always rational, thus they are often made in account to a very limited part of all the possible 
range of knowledge resources and consequences. Özturk and colleagues also mention signal 
and filter theory (Arrow 1973, Spence 1973, Seibert and Solga 2005), that take into account the 
uncertainty of decision-making processes. In the case of limited information about worker’s 
potential performance, employer would address the observable indicators (perform objective 
selection (Becker 1964)). Educational background is mostly used as the standard in this case.  
Personal characteristics (age, gender, origin) might modify or diminish the impact of 
performance-related characteristics.  
A tight connection between the described characteristics proves that employees are not 
distributed across positions randomly (Nedelkoska and Patt 2015), but inequalities are 
interdependent. This brings the theory of labor market segmentation into discussion (Reich, 
Gordon et al. 1973, Öztürk, Schuldes et al. 2014). Employees affected by the legal minimum 
wage would mostly belong to the “labor market for everyone” with low qualification 
requirements and promotion perspectives and partially to specialists’ one. The latter is 
characterized with baseline formal qualification requirements, that are still applied to a wide 
range of firms. Whereas in the first segment human capital investments are almost rejected, 
they are also critically low in the second case, as knowledge can be applied in other companies. 
Low income returns provide little encouragements for individuals to invest in training 
themselves.  The highest level of training provision is observed for the firm-specific labor 
market, where tight connection between employee and employer make these investments 
obligatory. Differentiation between skills, that the representatives of each market possess is a 
well-balanced transfer to the next paragraph. 
 
 
2.3. Continuing Vocational Training  
 
The current section provides the theoretical overview of the training concept. Due to the 
fact that this research is performed in terms of the labor economics approach, its limitation is a 
slightly simplified perspective on learning on the workplace. The latter is viewed as a human 
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capital investment and as one of the subjects of labor relationships, therefore, its process and 
content remain out of scope of this study. The purpose of this chapter is to conceptualize the 
training on the workplace for further operationalization and measurement. We proceed in the 
following way. First, we start with definition(s) of training. Second, we define types of training 
dependently on the provider and content and draw their reference to the central theoretical 
framework. Conceptual focuses of the current paper will be emphasized.   
 
 
2.3.1. Definition  
 
The major difficulty at the starting point is to find the universal concepts of training and 
its types. It appears problematic to match the vocabularies of different papers, as authors often 
match terms to their research goals. Further obstacle, is the subjectivity of German-English 
translation. Therefore, in case of the conceptual discrepancies of the terms used in the current 
work in comparison to the others, it is recommended to refer to the definition and not the word 
choice.  
We start with the most general term of continuing vocational training (education). 
According to the EU Commission (Litster, Carpentieri et al. 2010), it is “a training process or 
activity which has as its primary objective the acquisition of new competencies or the 
development and improvement of existing ones, and, which is financed at least partly by 
enterprises for their employees, who either have a working contract or who benefit directly 
from their work for the enterprise, such as unpaid family workers and casual workers. The 
training processes or activities must be planned in advance and must be organized or supported 
with the special goal of learning”. Following the vocabulary matrixes created by Litster and 
colleagues (Litster, Carpentieri et al. 2010) and European Center for the Development of 
Vocational Training (CEDEFOP 2008), we compare the term with related ones. Continuing 
vocational education is often analyzed as a part of lifelong learning activities, but the latter is 
overtaken not only for professional reasons, but social and personal as well. However, the 
statistics indicates the lower share of the latter for the whole range of further education 
activities, overtaken by the dominant majority (82% (Bilger and Strauß 2015)) for professional 
reasons. Continuing vocational education is also similar to the adult learning in the way that it 
happens after leaving initial (school and high school) education but does not include university-
level or higher education undertaken in this time. Coverage of the costs by the employer is 
included already in the definition, similar Adult Education Study (Bilger and Strauß 2015). 
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However, it is important to keep in mind that employees might be overtaking the training on 
their own or search for other sources to cover the expenses. The importance of having a contract 
or profiting from the business activity of the company remains a valid limitation. Further 
conceptualization would be made on the basis of the skills’ application fields.   
 
 
2.3.2. Types of Continuing Vocational Training: Skills 
 
It is reasonable to comment on differentiation of training upon the applicability of the 
skills within and outside the firm, as it is used as one of the basics of human capital theory by 
Becker (1964).  
The basic idea of the author is to define if the skills acquired increase productivity on 
the current workplace more than in other firms (specific), only on the current workplace with 
no effect on employability anywhere else (completely specific) or to the same extent 
independently on workplace (general). The differentiation is important in order to emphasize 
the importance of investment in firm-specific human capital for the employers and general one 
for the employability of worker; and compare their investments in human capital. The critical 
point is to provide isolated objective measures of increase in productivity within and outside 
the firm, therefore the author of the classification states himself that most of the training is not 
completely general nor specific. On the basis of this critique, an alternative approach could be 
brought into discussion (Dakhli and De Clercq 2004). They differentiate between individual-
specific (corresponds to the concept of general skills by Becker), industry-specific 
(intermediate value for the firm and individual) and firm-specific (completely specific skills of 
Becker are meant). This classification gives a more graduate understanding of the possible 
content of training and motivation of affected actors to support different types of human capital 
development.  
In terms of the current research question, human capital and investment in it are viewed 
as cumulative values. It is not the content of training, but amount and its change that illustrate 
the effect of the legal minimum wage law.  Both general and specific training improve 
individual productivity, which is the issue in focus due to the raising labor price. We also refer 
to the mentioned statement of Becker that strict differentiations between two types is 
conceptually impossible. For these reasons, the classification will be excluded from the current 
research model.  
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2.3.3. Types of Continuing Vocational Training:  Organization Degree and Form 
 
Another differentiation, widely used in the adult education studies, is the way further 
education is organized. On the one hand, it could be differentiated by the degree of organization, 
namely formal, non-formal education and informal learning. We follow the vocabulary 
provided by Litser and colleagues (Litster, Carpentieri et al. 2010). By formal education 
“learning that occurs in an organized and structured environment (e.g. in an education or 
training institution or on the job) and is explicitly designed as learning (in terms of objectives, 
times or resources) is meant. It is “intentional from the learner’s point of view and typically 
leads to validation and certification”. The latter is often embedded in the state qualification 
recognition system and might have duration restrictions. The similarity of the non-formal 
learning is its intentionality from the learner’s point of view, but skills’ development does not 
lead to certification.  Most definitions agree on the presence of “student-teacher” relationship 
in information exchange, that are not obligatory physically present as a formal learning 
situation. The definition of the informal learning excludes intentionality of learner’s perspective 
and formal organization in favor of contribution of everyday activities related to work, family 
and leisure. On the other hand, vocational training can be differently organized in terms of the 
location, namely on-the-job training often used for the designation of the whole vocational 
education process, performed in the normal working situation, or off-the-job training, provided 
outside it.  
Current classification is essential in terms of the measurement of learning transfer for 
different educational offers, competence and training development (Autorengruppe 
Bildungsberichterstattung 2016) and is less relevant for reflection on the initiatives for human 
capital investments. It could be argued that formal education is connected to higher initial costs, 
that still do not guarantee the direct productivity raise in the participating groups. Measuring 
further education activities will most probably exclude informal learning, which is often not 
perceived as one. Therefore, it might appear especially problematic for the studied labor market 
segment. As already stated in the first part of theoretical overview, performance in the low 
skilled tasks might gain substantial profit from informal learning and practice. The conceptual 
focus of the current research is to capture the intention to develop the skills of labor force, even 
though it is connected to additional costs, further raising due to the legal minimum wage 
introduction. Therefore, we follow the logic of labor economic approach studying the incidence 
and intensity of training as the indicators of the outcome.  
 
33 
 
2.3.3. Training Incidence and Intensity in the Quantitative Adult Education Research 
 
Selecting supporting statistics for the current paper has not overcome several major 
problems of quantitative research in adult education. Measurements derived from different 
reports often produce major discrepancies in the conclusions (Kuwan and Thebis 2006, Wohn 
2007, Widany 2009, Rosenbladt and Bilger 2011). Hence, it is argued that the differences in 
the operationalization, questionnaires, reference time frames, conceptual and methodological 
validity make individual surveys hardly comparable (Widany 2009). This becomes especially 
problematic when arbitrary classifications upon strictly separating characteristics are applied 
(e.g. general vs specific training; employer vs individually financed training). With this regard, 
the author concludes that in most cases operationalizing adult education is pragmatically rather 
than theoretically driven and, therefore, completely survey specific.  
The discussion of the previous paragraphs has placed the focus of the current study on 
training incidence and intensity. In terms of the Input-Process-Output model (Klieme, 
Avenarius et al. 2007), it means the emphasize on the Input segment, namely education 
participation and participants. The latter is regarded as one of the most important indicators for 
the usage of training offers and, hence, expansion of lifelong learning as well as equality of 
chances for different socio-economic groups. In this way training participation becomes a 
characteristic of the population in general (Widany 2009). The author suggests measuring two 
components of the concept separately. For “training”, already discussed classifications upon 
the content, organizational degree and form are relevant. We stick up to the drawn conclusions 
and proceed with the discussion upon the participation notion.  
Three components are dominating in describing this concept: scope (participation rate), 
number of enrollments (training events) and volume (duration of participation) (Borkowsky 
2000, Kuwan and Thebis 2006, Widany 2009, Rosenbladt and Bilger 2011). These statistics 
might be gathered from firms, providers or individuals; each creating a separate field to interpret 
the variables. Individual surveys are regarded as the most beneficial for representative studies 
for the sake of population-wide conclusions. Participation rate is the share (percentage) of 
persons who took part in further education activities within the observation period (Rosenbladt 
and Bilger 2011). With regard to the research goals, participation rate might be calculated 
separately for different types of training as well as cumulatively for learning activities of any 
kind, both referred to as training incidence. Although the indicator is of a central importance 
for the quantitative adult education research, its extension into intensity dimension is needed 
for substantive implementations.  
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Number of enrollments links the institutional perspective and individual attitude towards 
further education. In provider surveys, it serves as the measure of demand for different offers 
(Rosenbladt and Bilger 2011). On the personal level, it is an important indicator of learning 
behavior. Nevertheless, it should be interpreted with a major caution, as the definition of a 
training event is not universal but study-specific or assigned to respondent’s own interpretation 
by default. This is connected to numerous potential pitfalls such as an equal count for a two-
hour seminar and a semester-long program or inconsistency in splitting or uniting the basic and 
follow-on courses when calculating events (Rosenbladt and Bilger 2011).  One of the authors’ 
proposed solutions is a clear communication of an event definition to the respondents. 
Another way to ensure careful measurement is inclusion of volume which is a total 
number of hours (or days) spent in further education activities within the observation period 
(Kuwan and Thebis 2006). Various indexes are derived from this measure. For structural 
analysis total volume of a group or population (sum) is mainly applied. Its absolute number has 
little informative value on its own, but is suitable for building growth models and observing 
developmental trajectories (Kuwan and Thebis 2006). Using training event as a unit of analysis 
usually involves calculating its average duration. For group comparisons measures of the 
average volume per person or per participant. Rosenbladt and Bilger (2011) limit the minimum 
of two overtaken training events within the observation period to be assigned to the latter. 
Taking into account an overall low rates of training participation within the observed labor 
market segment, we relax this assumption to one event per observation period.  
There is no doubt that separate constructs deliver segmented information and a 
comprehensive approach requires inclusion of all of them as well as their interrelation. The 
measurements are not necessary following the parallel patterns of change and each one may 
portrait a different perspective on training participation of the selected groups (Kuwan and 
Thebis 2006, Rosenbladt and Bilger 2011). Rosenblat and Bilger depict the tendency of 
shortening the duration of training events under the raising participation rates and/or number of 
enrollments. This happens on the costs of reduction of their quality, as they report longer 
activities to be profoundly more beneficial for the learners.  
In terms of the minimum wage research, little implicit attention is given to the 
interaction between both concepts. Whereas findings upon training incidence are relatively 
comparable, this is not the case for its intensity. For instance, firm-level research of the German 
case (Bellmann, Bossler et al. 2017), concludes the reduction of training intensity (number of 
workers trained) under the unchanged training incidence at the treated establishments. The 
extent to which these results are comparable to the individual level findings remains arbitrary. 
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Arulampalam and colleagues (Arulampalam, Booth et al. 2002) find a slight positive effect of 
the minimum wage introduction on both participation rate and training volume. Parallel trends 
have gained an empirical support either (Bassanini and Ok 2004). Group inequalities in training 
provision (gender, origin, company size etc.) are still more profound by training intensity. 
Besides, the widespread practice in the minimum wage research is to use one of the named 
indicators only. Therefore, the differentiated effect of the minimum wage introduction in 
different components of training participation remains uncertain.  
 
 
2.4. Interim Conclusion: Summary and Theoretical Model of the Research 
 
 
Table 1 below summarizes the presented theoretical arguments. Although the review 
has been done with the specific focus on the minimum wage labor market, they are applicable 
for any group of workers due to the embeddedness in the human capital theory. The table makes 
clear that the complexity of the impact of the minimum wage introduction goes beyond an 
increase in the employee’s income to be invested in training and its decrease by the firm causing 
cut off on additional expenditures. Their interrelation and inter-compensation exclude 
straightforward prognoses. As positive externalities in the form of state and third-party 
subsidies cover both employer and employee training incentives and, therefore, do not reflect 
the patterns of the human capital theory, we do not make a specific focus on them. Under the 
minimum wage introduction, training incidence is most likely shaped by the firm investments 
and less by the individual ones.  Positive externalities do contribute to the training incidence 
level in the affected group, but there is no indication for the change in their distribution 
according to workers’ characteristics.  Hence, we do define a specific central object for each 
argument as it is stated by the author, differentiating between individual, firm or both. The 
arguments are assigned to the author’s quotations when being used as a theoretical argument 
and/or approved empirically. They are ordered according to their appearance in the text and no 
hierarchy in the contribution to the variance of the outcome is assumed. The arguments of 
different authors upon the same research subjects are marked with the hyphen.   
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Table  1. Predictors of Human Capital Investments under the Minimum Wage 
Introduction 
 
Concept Object Positive impact Negative impact Absence of impact 
Labor price 
increase 
Firm Uncompetitive labor market 
model (Cubitt and Heap 
1999, Arulampalam, Booth 
et al. 2002, Acemoglu and 
Pischke 2003, Metcalf 2004) 
Competitive labor 
market model (Becker 
1964, Mincer and 
Leighton 1980, 
Hashimoto 1982, 
Schiller 1994, Brunello 
2001, Neumark and 
Wascher 2001, 
Acemoglu and Pischke 
2003, Haepp and Lin 
2016) 
Other adaptation 
strategies in response to 
the law (Agell and 
Lommerud 1997, Lang 
and Kahn 1998, David 
2001, Fairris and Bujanda 
2005) 
Worker -Increased demand for the 
skilled labor as a motivation 
for the qualification upgrade  
(Cahuc and Michel 1996, 
Belman and Wolfson 2014) 
-Compensation for the 
shortage in the firm 
investments competitive 
labor market model assumed  
(Hara 2017) 
Higher financial 
profitability of longer 
work in comparison to 
education (Belman and 
Wolfson 2014) 
 
Both   More profound influence 
of other factors in the 
economic environment 
on human capital 
investments 
(Grossberg and Sicilian 
1999, Fairris and Pedace 
2004) 
Firm-level characteristics 
Firm 
location  
Both East Germany:  
need to keep up with the 
technological standards of 
the West Germany (Fitzroy 
and Funke 1998) 
East Germany:  
stronger affection by 
the law introduction 
(Mindestlohnkommissi
on 2016) 
Convergence in the 
regional development 
(Schiersmann 2007) 
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Business 
sector 
Both -Higher level of competition, 
profitability, labor market 
compositions, management 
expertise, access to the 
capital (Arrowsmith, Gilman 
et al. 2003) 
-Higher technological 
development of the branch 
(Bassanini and Ok 2004) 
-Higher knowledge intensity 
and qualification 
requirements within the 
branch (Schiersmann 2007) 
-Higher share of group and 
project work (Schiersmann 
2007) 
-Positive externalities 
(Abramovsky, Battistin et al. 
2011) 
-Lower substitutability 
potential in social and 
cultural services (Dengler 
and Matthes 2015)  
Imperfect competitions 
on the market for skills 
and information failures 
(Abramovsky, Battistin 
et al. 2011) 
 
Company 
size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Both Large firms:  
more advanced technologies, 
more qualified employees, 
lower labor turnover (Leuven 
and Oosterbeek 2000) 
Small firms:  
-greater affection by the 
minimum wage 
introduction 
(Mindestlohnkommissi
on 2016) 
-limited access to the 
capital and shortage of 
skilled labor force 
(Arrowsmith, Gilman et 
al. 2003, Heyes and 
Gray 2003) 
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Individual level characteristics (Job-related) 
Job tenure Both - Shorter job tenure:  
major part of human capital 
investments at the beginning 
of the employment (Becker 
1964, Grossberg and Sicilian 
1999) 
- Longer job tenure:  
training provision limits 
labor turnover (Mincer 1988) 
  
Job 
complexity 
Both More complex jobs:  
-wider scope for 
improvement and returns 
(Wilkinson, Bacon et al. 
2010, Nedelkoska and Patt 
2015) 
-lower substitutability 
potential (Dengler and 
Matthes 2015) 
   
Firm   Simple jobs:  
productivity 
improvement is of a 
higher need and lower 
costs (Leuven and 
Oosterbeek 2000) 
 
Worker   Simple jobs:  
increased demand for 
the skilled labor as a 
motivation for the 
qualification upgrade  
(Cahuc and Michel 
1996, Belman and 
Wolfson 2014) 
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Contract 
duration and 
Employment 
form  
Both Human capital investments 
dependency on the amount of 
switching between activities 
(Becker 1964, Cole 1992, 
Wilkinson, Bacon et al. 
2010) 
Temporary contracts 
and/or part-time and/or 
marginal employment:  
-lower organizational 
commitment (Colquitt, 
LePine et al. 2000) 
-limited amount of 
employment time for 
training  (Münchhausen 
2007) 
 
Individual level characteristics (Performance-related) 
Education Both Highly qualified persons: 
higher returns and value of 
the investments (Becker 
1964, Katz and Ziderman 
1990) 
Low qualified persons: 
longer learning process  
(Fouarge, Schils et al. 
2010)  
Credentialism (Becker 
1964, Piore 1968) 
Firm   Highly qualified 
persons: 
higher risk of quits and 
mobility (Katz and 
Ziderman 1990) 
 
Work 
experience 
Both More experienced workers:  
outdated skills (Brunello 
2001) 
More experienced 
workers:  
less need for training 
due to the previously 
acquired skills 
(Grossberg and Sicilian 
1999) 
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Individual level characteristics (Personal) 
Age Both Younger persons:  
-returns can be collected over 
a longer time period 
-more interest and capability 
of learning 
-lower tightness to family 
responsibilities (Becker 
1964) 
  
Worker Older workers:  
higher confidence of own 
abilities and awareness of 
training opportunities  
(Becker 1964) 
  
 Firm  Younger persons:  
higher mobility and 
greater risk of quits 
(Leuven and 
Oosterbeek 2000) 
 
Gender Firm Men: lower time-constraints, 
higher returns and lower 
turnover (Becker 1964, 
Leuven and Oosterbeek 
2000, Bassanini and Ok 
2004) 
  
Worker  Women:  
attribution of generally 
lower value to 
education  
(Offerhaus, Leschke et 
al. 2010) 
 
Migration 
background 
Both Natives:  
stronger labor market 
position  (Leuven and 
Oosterbeek 2000) 
Foreigners:  
language barrier  
(Öztürk, Schuldes et al. 
2014) 
 
Worker  Temporary migration:  
lower motivation for 
long-term investments 
(Becker 1964) 
 
 
Source: Chapters 2.2 and 2.3 of the paper  
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In order to visualize the described theoretical framework, Illustration 1 is provided 
below. It underlines the key concepts as well as connections between them, that will be in focus 
of the current paper. Minimum wage introduction is modifying the impact of firm-specific and 
individual characteristics on training opportunities. With regard to the labor market 
segmentation theory, the causes of inequalities on the individual level are interdependent with 
their outcomes on the professional and firm levels. As the dominant majority of job-related 
training is paid by the firm, employer-sponsored training is viewed as a dominant part of all 
continuing professional education. Following the labor market economical approach, training 
is conceptualized in terms of its incidence and intensity, both influenced by characteristics 
derived from the human capital theory.  
 
Illustration 1. Minimum Wage and Training: Theoretical Model  
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Source: Chapters 2.2 and 2.3 of the paper  
 
 
2.5. Potential Contributions of the Current Study  
 
2.5.1. Existing Research Gaps 
 
The main part of the chapter has defined the existing theoretical framework and 
contemporary state of research. This passage deals with its current gaps to draw the implication 
for the contributions of this analysis.  
In terms of the baseline link between minimum wage introduction and training there are 
three theoretically established interpretations. Negative impact, derived from the competitive 
labor market model, is gaining the growing body of evidences from the studies in the United 
Kingdom and United States. Both countries represent liberal welfare state (Esping-Andersen 
1999), therefore, their experience could be only partially applied for the German labor market. 
Institutionally comparable French case delivers an opposite positive prognosis of the 
production process optimization through multiskilling as an outcome of the law. Due to the 
absence of the straightforward answer to the law outcomes with this respect, empirical research 
is valuable. This is both vital within the body of studies of the minimum wage consequences 
and evaluation of the newly introduced policy in the German context.  
Further point to be underlined is the inconsistency and fragmentation of findings due to 
the usage of different level of analysis. Performing study on the establishment level is beneficial 
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to observe training as a part of firm’s strategy. Nevertheless, major variation of its provision is 
still placed among workers. Hence, we believe that it is more reasonable to use them as units 
of analysis controlling for firm-level characteristics.  For this purpose, human capital theory is 
applied to draw main logical connections and define central concepts of the thesis. It has been 
well established within the scientific community and verified by numerous empirical 
examinations. Its basic statement of choosing the human capital investment that brings the most 
profit and least risk is proven by the consistency of findings controlling for various individual 
characteristics. Nevertheless, a gap being mostly approached from a managerial perspective 
exists in the incorporation of labor market segmentation into human capital theory. Due to the 
growing complexity of the employment relationship and their forms, it remains unclear if the 
same patterns regulate human resources development for all groups of workers. Current 
research performs an attempt to contribute to this field from the perspective of social sciences 
in the affected by minimum wage introduction segment.  
In terms of the research on job-related training, the study extends the understanding of 
its provision in Germany under the labor economic approach. Besides, statistics available for 
now, do not provide a differentiated dynamic picture of causal relationship between predictors 
with the focus on workers who are directly affected by the law. Little synthesis is also done for 
the findings upon training incidence and intensity in the observed workers’ segments. Special 
attention should be paid to employer-financed training, as it constitutes the majority of further 
education activities in the country, on the one hand, and indicates the potential for production 
process optimization and consequential general economic development, on the other hand.   
To sum it up, despite relative consensus upon the theoretical guidelines of minimum 
wage consequences and training provision linked to it, the topic is only being developed in the 
German context on the empirical basis.  It is possible to draw approximate predictions only, 
whereas their specification remains an empirical exercise to explore.  At the current stage, the 
findings do not overcome the limitations of descriptiveness to be further developed in a longer 
observation period. This research makes its contribution to forming a basis for that at the current 
stage.  
 
 
2.5.2. Research Objectives 
 
Taking into account the defined research needs and potential contributions of this study 
for them, following major research objectives are derived:  
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- Create a comprehensive understanding of the impact of the legal minimum wage on 
the training for the affected workers in Germany. 
- Specify the effects with regard to contextual and individual-level predictors of 
human capital investments. 
- Differentiate the effect of the minimum wage introduction and indicated predictors 
with regard to different indicators of training participation. 
Specific steps towards them will be discussed in detail as the parts of the research design.  
 
 
2.5.3. Hypothesis 
 
In order to draw a transitional conclusion to the next part of the paper following 
hypothesis are formulated on the basis of the reviewed theoretical framework:  
- Introduction of the legal minimum wage reproduces and deepens existing 
inequalities in training incidence and intensity of the affected workers.  
- On the contextual level, lower training participation is observed in the most affected 
sectors (Retail, Accommodation and food service activities, Transportation) and in 
small companies. Its higher rate is attributed to the East German establishments in 
comparison to the West ones.  
- The differentiation between workers for investments in their human capital remains 
consistent with the outlines of human capital theory:  
a) In terms of the job-related characteristics, higher job complexity, permanent 
and/or full-time contracts have positive impact on training provision, whereas 
the relation of the latter two to labor income and job tenure is reverse.   
b) For performance-related characteristics, education and training remain 
complements. The connection of the latter to work experience is opposite.  
c) Personal characteristics affect training participation in the following way: 
younger age, male gender and absence of migration background increase the 
training chances of an employee.  
Operationalization and measurement of each item as well as sample selection for testing 
these predictions will be described in the next chapter.  
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2.5. Conclusion  
 
We have provided the necessary theoretical framework for answering the research 
question of the impact of legal minimum wage on continuing vocational training of directly 
affected workers. Several labor market models have been revised to derive predictions upon the 
general nature of the connection. Human capital and labor market segmentation theories has 
been applied to emphasize the differentiation of human resources within the investment 
approach. Discrepancies on definitions and typologies of continuing vocational training (on-
the-job training), has been discussed and incorporated into the chosen labor economic 
perspective. Research gaps in the existing literature have been exhibited and translated into the 
current study objectives. Acknowledgements of the current state of the topic create sufficient 
basis for hypothesis formulation. These contributions are transferred to the Research Design 
chapter.  
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Chapter 3. Research Design  
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The third chapter approaches the major elements of the current research design in detail. 
It is structured as follows. Its first part deals with the working dataset and basic information 
upon it, proceeding with the sample construction and treatment assignment. Then we describe 
the measurements of the dependent and independent variables. In the third part, we establish 
the methodology of the analysis and its implications for the research question. The last section 
summarizes and concludes.   
 
 
3.2. Data Selection  
 
On the account of arguments discussed in the literature review, training provision and 
participation with relation to the minimum wage is reasonable to study on the individual level. 
It is necessary to cover both rate and trend patterns. The major research ambition in the policy 
evaluations is to establish causality of the observed intervention. At the same time, predictors 
that are stable over time have to be controlled for. These research needs are best fulfilled by the 
usage of panel data (Andreß, Golsch et al. 2013). They are especially valuable for studying the 
dynamics of adjustments and changes of individual standards through the development policies 
and interventions (Baltagi 2005). From this perspective, the current research presents the prior 
step in capturing the outcomes of the minimum wage, whereas short time-series dimension 
remains a problem. The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP 2014-2016) has been chosen 
due its recognized survey standards and comprehensive coverage of the topics of interest, both 
pointed out below.   
SOEP is a longitudinal study, carried on since 1984 in West and 1990 in East Germany, 
covering 30.000 respondents in 11.000 households (Haisken-DeNew and Frick 2005). It 
follows the micro-economic approach under the inclusion of sociology and political science 
variables to examine the changes in living conditions in the country. The thematic fields of 
education, training and qualification, labor market, earnings, income and social security, that 
are of the central importance for the chosen research question, belong to the major focuses of 
the panel. Sampling has been performed on the multi-stage random basis using random-walk 
selection of households. Interviews are done with all their members through pretested 
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questionnaires. To minimize the panel effect, equivalence of survey instruments is maintained 
under continuing adaptation of the questions to the current situation (Andreß, Golsch et al. 
2013). Their separate versions are developed for households and individuals; in addition to 
those covering further topics of interest for family, children and immigrant surveys.  
 Numerous measures have been established to account for representing the target 
population of the German residents over time. To reflect its natural changes, follow-up concept 
is carefully maintained through inclusion of the newly born or moved-in household members, 
as well as following up those who split off. Apart from response refusals to be prevented by 
numerous measures of panel care, movement abroad and death are reasons for panel dropouts. 
Last but not the least, the immigrants are oversampled, as well as East Germans to gain the 
sufficient number of cases for analysis of these samples on their own. Nevertheless, the number 
of observations in these special groups that are difficult to achieve remains limited for 
multilevel analysis enabling further within-group differentiations.  
The German Socio-Economic Panel is an established instrument in the country’s adult 
education survey, in spite of the fact that the latter is not its prior thematic focus. On the one 
hand, multiple topics covered in the survey allow for broadening the paradigm to economic and 
social science perspectives on continuing vocational education, as well as interdisciplinary 
approach. The opportunity to compare a major variety of socio-demographic groups upon their 
training participation enriches profoundly the education policy research. On the other hand, 
multi-themes questionnaire is beneficial for comprehensive coverage of training concept also 
on its own. People who did not take part in it and/or have no interest in the field, are not in 
danger of drop outs, as in happens in the adult education surveys (Schiersmann 2007, Widany 
2009). Nevertheless, the absence of the educational focus comes on the costs of the 
shortcomings in the available measurements. First, this is reflected in the fact that only basic 
ones are collected. Second, the operationalization of continuing vocational education concept 
by respondents on their own is taken for granted and the information is gathered upon the 
training measures considered as those by participants on their own (Rosenbladt and Bilger 
2011). Despite these acknowledgements, we advocate the selected dataset as one of the best 
contemporary available research solutions to approach minimum wage and adult education 
fields simultaneously.  
We use the datasets of survey years 2014-2016 to make pre- and post-comparison as 
well as observe partially the latency of the changes and dynamic of adjustment. Earlier 
datasets could not be used due to the absence of comparable dependent variables of further 
training participation in the questionnaires. It is important to notice that the information on the 
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dependent variables is measured for the previous year. We do account for that in the 
interpretations but keep using the wave index for marking the variables to avoid 
misunderstandings. It has been acknowledged that the law has increased employers’ 
uncertainties and expectations of the wage costs to become a problem already prior to its 
introduction (Bossler 2017). The author provides a range of theoretical and empirical evidences 
for both to influence investment and employment decisions. This implies that the effect of the 
minimum wage introduction is reasonable to analyze already prior to the 1st of January 2015. 
Bossler starts the chronology of the minimum wage introduction with the Federal election on 
22nd of September 2013 followed by signing the coalition agreement that mentions the law on 
the 14th of December 2013. Hence, we use the three-year comparison (all waves pairwise) to 
observe the latency in the findings and short-run impacts on a descriptive basis. The chronology 
is visualized with regard to the treatment assignment in the end of this chapter with regard to 
other elements of research design.  
As the current paper is based on the secondary analysis with established measurements’ 
validity and reliability, data collection and variable construction are discussed only briefly. 
Measurement error is further minimized within the study design through repeated data 
collection and stable characteristics of research units (Andreß, Golsch et al. 2013). The work 
of SOEP Team have been incorporated on all stages of sample and variables selection by using 
a large share of already generated variables (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung 2017).  
The next chapter gives an outline on this issue.  
 
 
3.3. Measurement of Variables 
 
Translating the theoretical concepts into variables is of the central importance for the 
strength and quality of a quantitative research. Nevertheless, there is no universal standards to 
be overtaken. As pointed out by Haepp and Lin (2016), discrepancies in the minimum wage 
outcomes research are often caused by different ways of operationalizing the key variables. 
Therefore, we maximize the advantages of already established SOEP indicators; which comes 
at the cost of matching the theoretical concepts to already measured items. Choice and recoding 
the variables to fulfill the current research needs is made transparent. Its guidelines are 
summarized in the Table 46 of the Appendix.  
Considering the arguments for the reasonability of introducing multiple measures of 
training participation, we provide four indicators for the outcome. Survey instrument itself 
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contains the operationalization of the concept. Training incidence and derived participation 
rate is meant as a binary response of participating in any type of further professional education 
(German: “berufliche Weiterbildung”) at any cost within the previous year. Training intensity 
includes two components: number of enrollments (total number of training events within the 
previous year) and training volume (their total duration in days). The relevant critic discussed 
in the first chapter, remains valid for the listed variables either. Employer-financed training 
incidence is a binary variable, where a positive outcome indicates partial or complete coverage 
of training costs for one, the most important training measure by the current employer (the 
chosen formulation has been needed for annual data comparability). Hence, there is no 
possibility to differentiate training solely financed by one of the sources. A short response upon 
possible critic towards uncertainty of the costs’ share should be given at this point. As 
demonstrated in Adult Education Survey (Bilger and Strauß 2015), the dominant majority of 
the further education activities is financed by the employer. Following the logic of human 
capital investments (Becker 1964), their individual capability is related to one’s income; 
therefore, they are going to be even lower in the observed labor market segment and are possible 
to be regarded secondary. Besides, we have to keep in mind that subjective definition of the 
most important training measure is not free of bias to represent the employer’s intention to 
invest in training of their workers. Whereas training incidence and intensity are measured for 
the three observation years, the measurements of the employer-financed training incidence are 
available only for 2014-2015 survey years.  
Most of the explanatory concepts are available as SOEP generated variables (Deutsches 
Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung 2017). The firm-level variables include its location, sector and 
size. Firm location is operationalized by a dichotomy of East (including Berlin) and West 
Germany. There is no evidence in the reviewed literature for the need to analyze Berlin 
separately. Following the example of the Federal Employment Agency and Federal Office for 
Statistics (Mindestlohnkommission 2016), we assign it to East Germany. For the measurement 
of business sector SOEP uses Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European 
Community (NACE) (Eurostat 2017). First, we recode the original responses up to the highest 
industry level. Second, we use a cut point of 20 cases pro category as sufficient to draw 
representative conclusions (Babyak 2004) including the sector in the analysis on its own. The 
branches that do not meet this requirement create the “Other sectors” category. As the result, 
following branches will be observed separately: Manufacturing; Wholesale and retail trade, 
repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; Accommodation and food service activities; 
Transportation and storage; Administrative and support service activities; Education; Human 
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health and social work activities. Company size is measured as a generated categorical variable. 
The same as other ordinary variables in the current research model, the predictor will be 
included in the model using category dummies to observe for the patterns of change in the 
outcome for each one individually. Although the ranking of the variable reflects its magnitude, 
non-linear trajectories can be captured including categories separately (Wooldridge 2012).  
Explanatory job-related variables (individual level) are incorporated in the analysis in 
the following ways. Labor income is measured as generated current gross labor income for all 
respondents who are employed in the main job using imputation by non-response (Deutsches 
Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung 2017). Inclusion of the minimum wage variable in this case 
would have better reflected the theoretical assumptions but is not reasonable due to the high 
rate on data loss. For those respondents who did not have minimum wage established before 
2015 its value is missing and no change of it could be quantified. Job tenure is measured as a 
generic metric variable indicating the length of stay with a firm. For job complexity, subjective 
evaluation of the training required for the work is used. The shortcomings of this 
operationalization have been approached on the theoretical level. The time for collecting 
possible revenues from the investment could be expressed through contract and employment 
types. For the contract duration, we shall differentiate between permanent and temporary jobs. 
As employment forms relevant for the current research question, we separate full, part-time and 
marginal (“mini-job”) employment.  
Education is included in the model as an indicator of worker’s ability. As discussed in 
the theoretical overview, no consensus has been achieved upon its link to training provision. In 
order to account for both formal qualification and length of studies, these patterns shall be 
separately controlled by two variables. For the first concept, ISCED-2011-Classification 
variable has been applied and recoded (See Table 46 in the Appendix) to ensure that each 
category has enough observations for drawing representative conclusions. For the second 
concept, SOEP generic metric variable indicating the amount of education or training in years 
is used. Work experience is measured by the total number of years of employment. As there is 
no possibility to control for the work experience which is relevant for the current occupation, 
an equivalent value of work experience of any kind has to be assumed. In the case of continuous 
employment history, which does not constitute a requirement in the sample construction, the 
variable is going correlate with the worker’s age. This shall be accounted for in the 
multicollinearity diagnostic. Similar to further individual characteristics of gender and origin, 
it will be included into the research model, not only as socio-demographic characteristics but 
as the one highly relevant for the human capital theory.  
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The function of time as a variable has not gained a universal definition and depends 
mainly on the research question. It is either separated it as a predictor on its own (Field 2009) 
or recommended as a control notion for period effects but not as a causal factor on its own 
(Allison 2009, Andreß, Golsch et al. 2013, Giesselmann and Windzio 2013). Wooldridge 
(2012) recommends using time trends to omit spurious regression problem, when relationship 
between two variables are caused by the growth of both over time.  As the panel used in the 
current paper is equally spaced, year dummies will be included in the models as indicators of 
the change in dependent variables at a given time point. For detailed description of the described 
measurements of the concepts, please refer to the Table 46 in the Appendix Original SOEP 
variables, recoded values and value labels.  
Dependent variables are all time-varying. Independent variables are quasi time-
constant, as both their general effect and one of their change might affect the variables of 
interest. For example, as claimed by Berge and colleagues (Berge, Kaimer et al. 2016), 
structural changes in employment forms took place due to the minimum wage introduction. At 
the same time, each employment form itself has its impact on training provision within the 
human capital framework. Similar assumptions could be addressed to every predictor, as 
employees might be switching between fields of work, gaining additional degrees and years of 
work experience and etc. As the observation period is relatively short and this kind of changes 
is unlikely to happen instantly after the law introduction, we have valid reasons to treat the 
independent variables as time-constant and study their general effect. We show that both 
within- and between-variation in the variables is present (Table 54 in the Appendix) and a 
combined analytical solution is needed. For that, we first approach the statistical portrait of the 
sample in the next chapter.  
 
 
3.4. Target Population and Sample  
 
The target population of these analysis are all the employed German residents who are 
affected by the legal minimum wage introduction through the actual increase of the latter. An 
employee is defined by the Eurostat definition (2017) as “a person who has a contract to carry 
out work for an employer and receives compensation in the form of wages, salaries, fees, 
gratuities, piecework pay or remuneration in kind… The contract is an agreement between an 
enterprise (the employer) and a person (the employee), which may be formal or informal, 
normally entered into voluntarily by both parties…”. Following this definition, the sample 
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construction after prior data retrieval and matching for all persons participating in the survey in 
these years is performed on the basis of PGSTIB generated variable of the occupational position 
(Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung 2017). We follow the recommendations of 
Andress and colleagues (Andreß, Golsch et al. 2013) maximizing the efficiency of estimates by 
the largest available number of cases and use an unbalanced panel, relaxing an assumption of a 
continuous employment history. Therefore, spells (an individual remains in the sample if being 
employed in one of the survey years) of following statuses are excluded: not employed, 
pensioner, in education, military/community service, registered unemployed, self-employed 
and sheltered workshop. The latter are excluded while employers of these establishment might 
receive additional training subsidies and, therefore, are not incorporated into traditional labor 
relationship model.   
At the second step of sample selection, affection by the legal minimum wage 
introduction is to be defined. The reviewed theoretical background points out the complexity 
of separating the adaptation practices from each other as well as the widespread incompliance. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that the change in training provision takes place as an 
outcome of an increase in labor costs.  Those workers who are eligible for the law and still do 
not receive the stated wages are not going to experience the change in training provision either, 
as for their employers the labor price in its absolute numbers remained the same. Further 
complication is to calculate the sum of the minimum wage through the labor income and 
working hours; separating additional benefits and bonuses in their monthly dynamics; actual 
and subjectively estimated work duration. Therefore, we formalize our analysis to measuring 
the change in the minimum wage through the branch tariff agreement. These assumptions result 
in the following operationalization of the treatment and control group.  
For the sample construction, we use the binary affection information of the survey year 
2015. The magnitude of affection is to be controlled in the models by the inclusion of the labor 
income variable. We assume that a person is directly affected by the law introduction when 
having no minimum wage in their salary or the one that is below 8.50 Euro per hour in the 2014 
and changing into the wage of 8.50 Euro and higher per hour in 2015. Filter questions 104 and 
105 of SOEP questionnaire of 2015 (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung 2015) and 
own calculations have been applied for this purpose. Several adjustments are made at this point. 
People who face a profound income increase in the time when the law has been introduced (15 
persons in the sample) are defined as unaffected, as this change is unlikely to be attributed to 
the legal minimum wage but to specific adjustments and regulations 10.50 Euro per hour has 
been arbitrary defined as a cut criterion, as the last value indicating a lower than 25% income 
53 
 
increase. People whose minimum wage has remained below 8.50 Euro in 2015 respondents 
facing exceptional transitional regulations or illegal non-compliance practices are defined as 
those unaffected by the law, as both concepts are the subject of a research on their own and are 
out of scope of the current analysis. As mentioned by Caliendo and colleagues (Caliendo, 
Fedorets et al. 2017), the universality of the policy limits significantly potential strategies for 
evaluating the law impact. Following the methodology proposed by the Minimum Wage 
Commission (Mindestlohnkommission 2016), we use the concept of anticipatory wage 
adjustment to construct the control group. It shall be constituted from those employees who 
have got the minimum wage of 8.50 Euro an hour already in 2014 and kept it for 2015. The 
latter cannot be defined neither as those completely unaffected by the law nor as those indirectly 
affected. Therefore, both joined and differentiated analysis of the experimental and control 
groups is needed for generating the robust findings.   
The number of observations in the control group is distributed in the following way: 
166 in 2014, 190 in 2015, 150 in 2016. The majority of them (136) participated in all the three 
survey waves and 44 – in the two survey waves. For the treatment group, there are 357, 442 
and 361 units respectively, 302 of which are available as a strongly balanced panel, and 
measurements at the two times points – for 114 respondents. Control for descriptive statistics 
and statistical significance of their differences (Tables 49-53 of the Appendix) proves their 
comparability and similarity. West Germans are dominating in the sample due to the SOEP 
sample structure despite the fact that East Germany actually faces a more profound wage 
increase with regard to the law. Other characteristics of the sample go in line with the general 
tendencies described in the affected labor market review of the previous chapter. The employers 
of the constructed sample are concentrated in the following sectors:  Manufacturing, Wholesale 
and retail, Transportation and storage, Human health and social work activities. There are also 
no statistically significant differences in groups’ distribution across companies of different 
sizes.  
One cannot define the employment of the persons affected by the law, as completely 
unstable and/or non-traditional, as permanent contracts and full-time work are the prevailing.  
Whereas no statistical dependence exists between treatment assignment and contract duration, 
it is present by the employment form. The higher share of part-time and marginally employed 
persons in the treatment group indicates the fact that anticipatory wage adjustments have taken 
place mostly by the full-time workers. The reverse explanation is possible either: wage increase 
causes employment status to change. The latter has already been discussed among the 
employment outcomes of the minimum wage law. Overall decrease in the share of part-time 
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and marginal jobs is also clear from the presented annual descriptive statistics. Similar pattern 
is observed by the job complexity. Consequential upgrade in the task requirements due to the 
anticipatory wage adjustment as well as selectivity of candidates for the wage increase 
according to the knowledge intensity of the performed jobs could be both sources of the 
observed statistical differences in the variable due to the treatment assignment. It is also notable 
that the studied work segment is not exclusively unskilled: approximately the half of the 
workers in both groups are doing work for which at least vocational education is needed. Their 
share has also grown further within the observation period on the cost of decrease in the 
percentage of simple work.  
This claim is supported by the values on formal qualification and education duration. 
The examined workers mostly have upper-secondary education. Nevertheless, this is still 
followed by almost equal shares in the groups of lower secondary and grades below; and 
bachelor (or equivalent) degrees. Statistically significant differences are observed neither by 
the duration of education nor by the highest achieved formal degree. The affected segment is 
not an entry labor market either: the shares of the newly established relationship (up to one 
year) and young professionals (less than 5 years of work experience) are low in comparison to 
the others. Nevertheless, T-test results show that the employment relationships of the members 
of the control group are significantly longer than the ones in the treatment group. The previous 
argument also implies the low share of young people (17-24 years old) in the sample. The age 
does marginally affect the selection probability on the basis of employment status, because 
persons below 24 are likely to be in education. No statistically significant differences are found 
between groups on the gender or migration background basis.  
As minimum wage research refers to the field experiments under the labor market 
intervention, the design of the current research is not free of shortcomings. Despite the existence 
of comprehensive datasets with the sufficient number of the control variables, randomization is 
impossible in this case (Hammerschmidt, Sagebiel et al. 2017). This is made clear in the 
following example. Despite an increase in the gross labor income in an annual perspective, it 
remains higher in the control group. The limitation behind is the fact that wage distribution is 
regulated by the variety of factors (Caliendo, Fedorets et al. 2017), that are impossible to 
simplify by a single theoretical model. The assumption behind a current design is the fact that 
wage differences between two groups are explained by no other factors than the anticipatory 
wage adjustments. The latter become possible due to already described public policy discussion 
prior to the law (Bossler 2017). Nevertheless, we have indicated the range of differences in 
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work-related characteristics that constitute both valid causes and outcomes of the wage 
differentials settings.  
Illustration 2 below summarizes the main outlines of the current research design within 
the calendar of the main events in the minimum wage implementation in Germany. It also shows 
the reference time frame for measuring the key dependent variables and the intervention.  
 
Illustration 2. The Current Research Design within the Chronology of the Minimum 
Wage Introduction in Germany  
 
 
 
Source: Chronology listed as Bossler (2017), Chapters 3.2-3.4 of the paper  
 
 
3.5. Methods of Analysis 
 
Following Giesselmann and Windzio (2013), we apply the following criteria for 
choosing the appropriate method of analysis: nature of the research question and variation of 
independent variables, verifying both by a formal statistical approval. As the dependent 
variables are measured on different scales (metric and nominal) within different time spans 
(2014-2015 and 2014-2016), separate selection of methodology is needed to achieve the 
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comprehensive coverage of the research question. The models still have to remain equivalent 
and incorporate the fact that some outcomes and predictors refer to different biography points. 
The discussion of the methodology provided below is not claimed to be a detailed description 
of each analytic procedure but aims to explain its benefits in the current methodological 
solution. Descriptive statistics will be guiding at the starting point for each analysis. All the 
calculations are performed using Stata software and their syntaxes are made transparent.  
For the analysis of the change in incidence of employer-sponsored training (2014-2015) 
and one of the training participation (2014-2016) Random Effects Logit Model Stata: xtlogit, 
re will be applied. For a binary dependent variable, logistic regression is reported to provide 
more accurate results than a linear probability model, as the estimation is derived from the 
relation between an event and a complementary event under the influence of predictors. It does 
not rely on the assumptions of homoscedasticity, normality of distributions and linearity of 
relation between outcome and predictors (Giesselmann and Windzio 2013). We proceed with 
the argumentation of the book in the choice of the random effects option. In terms of the 
semantic interpretations, random effects model accounts for the general effects of the predictors 
rather than their change. It is especially beneficial for studying the incidence of employer-
financed training within 2014-2015 survey years, when the law is unlikely to cause rapid 
massive changes in the explanatory characteristics of the employers. Therefore, we cannot rely 
solely on the information coming from the observations changing them. Instead we focus on 
the time-constant predictors of the variation in the training incidence and intrapersonal rather 
than within-observation comparison. The pattern of change will be incorporated using time 
predictors in the model, as well as comprehensively approached through descriptive statistics.  
Although the chosen method refers to cross-sectional scientific issue, it models the panel 
data structure and, therefore, accounts for overly conservative correction of standard errors after 
the estimation (Giesselmann and Windzio 2013). Production of optimal estimates for unit-
specific intercepts, possibility to differentiate between error components, usage of unbalanced 
panel and measurability of the effect of time-constant variables refer to further advantages of 
the random effects models (Allison 2009, Wooldridge 2012, Andreß, Golsch et al. 2013, 
Giesselmann and Windzio 2013). In other words, the chosen command is reported to produce 
the most comprehensive conclusions due to the usage of both longitudinal and cross-sectional 
information from the data. In the case of logistic regression, random effects option is especially 
reasonable, as no observations have to be excluded; whereas competing Fixed Effects Logit 
Model would have kept only those units, for which the change in the dependent variable took 
place (Giesselmann and Windzio 2013).  
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Shortcomings of the method also have to be pointed out to draw the potential limitations 
of the upcoming findings. The dependence of measurements and errors within observations, 
which ensures control for unit-specific heterogeneity in fixed effects models, causes an 
inference statistical problem for random effects ones (Giesselmann and Windzio 2013). The 
latter rest on an assumption of model specification, meaning that all the necessary variables 
have been included in the regression and no correlation between observed and unobserved 
variables exists; which is, however, practically claimed to be almost unrealistic (Allison 2009, 
Giesselmann and Windzio 2013). To advocate the method at this point, all the predictors having 
a potential impact on the outcome within the theoretical background, have been incorporated 
into the analysis.  
Last but not the least, is a formal statistical verification of the method choice by the 
Hausman test (Allison 2009, Wooldridge 2012, Giesselmann and Windzio 2013) to check if 
the estimates of two identical specifications performed on two different procedures, show 
statistical differences. Although in the case of logistic regression the test is performed on the 
different samples due to observation exclusion by the Fixed Effects Model, this does not cause 
a problem, as the comparison is made between coefficients (Giesselmann and Windzio 2013). 
As the test does not produce significant results (Tables 55 and 56 in the Appendix), we conclude 
upon the absence of the correlation between unit-specific effects and time-varying variables of 
interest and treat random coefficients are undistorted.  
Incorporating mentioned limitations of the methodology, selected for the entry stage of 
the analysis, we proceed with modelling the longitudinal nature of the research question upon 
the change in training intensity through First Differences Regression. As both dependent 
variables total number of overtaken training measures and total number of days within which 
they took place; for both within the previous year with reference to the survey are metric and 
available at three measurement points, less formal statistical shortcomings are applied in 
comparison to a binary variable. We apply the computations of Allison (2009), constructing 
separate OLS equations for the first differences in 2014-2015, 2015-2016 and 2014-2016; and 
proceed with the GLS estimator in  the population-averaged model to combine the first two 
Stata: xtreg, pa. The suitability of the method for policy analysis, program evaluation and 
obtaining causal effects due to its embeddedness in the experimental logic is widely recognized 
(Allison 2009, Wooldridge 2012, Andreß, Golsch et al. 2013, Giesselmann and Windzio 2013). 
The selected dataset also complies with the formal statistical assumptions for method 
application manifested by the above-mentioned authors.  
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The basic idea of First Differences Regression is modelling the instantaneous change in 
the outcome under the change in the predictors (change scores instead of absolute ones). This 
implies that the intrapersonal differences in the level of training intensity will not be 
incorporated allowing to interpret the effect of explanatory variables as actual and immediate 
(attributed exclusively to the event) (Giesselmann and Windzio 2013). Controlling for the 
unobserved heterogeneity refers to the further major advantages in this case. Unobserved unit 
effect correlating with the worker’s training participation may include average employee 
ability, productivity, learning initiative and motivation, which, according to Wooldridge 
(2012), are unlikely to change over a short observation period.  
There are several shortcomings of the method, which are substantially compensated by 
the two-stage research design of the current paper. An interpersonal variation is fully 
incorporated in the random effects models of training participation. Although estimating direct 
impact of the predictors is highly beneficial for before-after comparison, it remains problematic 
for the events that happen rarely in the individual biography and, therefore, cause gradual 
changes following a longer pass (Andreß, Golsch et al. 2013, Giesselmann and Windzio 2013).  
Whereas employment type might change quite often, this is not the case for the education. 
Although the law might theoretically motivate workers for obtaining additional qualification in 
the fear of losing the workplace, the effect of initial education is more likely to be attributed to 
the persons first completing their education. Hence, the impact of this variable along with time-
constant characteristics (gender, migration background) will be treated as unobserved unit 
effect and cannot be quantified in terms of the model.  
Following the recommendations of Adress and colleagues (Andreß, Golsch et al. 2013), 
we avoid estimating the effect of age in the model, as it is a linear function of time. 
Nevertheless, we advocate the inclusion of work experience and job tenure variables, to control 
for possible previous unemployment spells and/or job changes. First Differences Regression 
method also rests on the assumption that all time-varying variables affecting the dependent 
variable other than those being a linear function of time are included in the model.  It has been 
ensured by the comprehensive review of the minimum wage outcomes in Germany, as well as 
by the assumption of the strict exogeneity of regressors. Self-selectivity of the respondents 
might become a further problem, as the regression equation operates on a strongly balanced 
panel (Wooldridge 2012, Giesselmann and Windzio 2013) 
As the current research seeks to make representative statements upon the target 
population, a notice on weighting is needed. The variables of interest (training participation and 
provision) do not affect the selection probability. Hence, following the strategy proposed by 
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Andress and colleagues (Andreß, Golsch et al. 2013), we do not use weights in the analysis but 
control for the variables of gender, age, education and immigrant status that influence response 
probabilities. Together with the previously described implications, this rounds up the 
methodological solution of the current paper.  
 
 
3.6. Conclusion  
 
The current paper is based on the secondary data analysis within two methodological 
dimensions. The necessity of longitudinal design and specific benefits of the German Socio-
Economic Panel have been critically approached with regard to the needs within the current 
research question. Shortcomings of the secondary data analysis are compensated by the validity 
and reliability of established measurements selection procedure and have been made 
transparent. Sample construction as well as treatment assignment have been introduced into 
consideration of existing empirical and theoretical limitations. The methodological solution 
implies the combination of modelling interpersonal variation in the outcome variable and its 
change within units. We are going to employ procedures to estimate both incidence and 
intensity of training under the inspection of group-specific trends. The combination of 
methodologies seeks to compensate for their separated usage but has the range of persistent 
limitations in the extrapolation of findings. The next chapter introduces the application of the 
described procedures into actual analysis and discussion of the upcoming findings.  
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Chapter 4. Analysis and Discussion  
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
This part delivers the main contribution of the current paper issuing the empirical results 
to the stated research question and discussing their implications. The analysis is structured 
chronologically with regard to the limited data availability for dependent variables. In the first 
chapter employer-sponsored training under the legal minimum wage introduction is 
approached. In the second chapter, training participation of the affected workers is analyzed 
within the 2014-2016 panel waves. The third chapter is dealing with training intensity. The last 
chapter includes the concluding discussion of all findings. We provide interim conclusions for 
each outcome separately. The key statistical results will be included throughout the text of the 
chapters. Supplementary statistics is provided in the Appendix. 
 
 
4.2. Employer-Financed Training Incidence under the Minimum Wage Introduction in 
Germany 
 
4.2.1. Dynamics and Predictors of Incidence 
 
The discussion upon the impact of minimum wage on training opportunities on the 
workplace for is reasonable to start with employer-financed training. As it has been noted in 
the previous chapters, in Germany it represents the largest segment of further education 
activities and differentiates groups the most according to their participation. From the 
theoretical perspective, it is exponential to describe the potential effect of labor price increase. 
Employer-sponsored training portraits the intention of the firms for innovation, labor force and 
technical development, that in a short run often causes major expenditures. For employees, it 
takes an important share in the perceived quality of work and employer’s attainment to the 
established labor relationships.  
As the information upon training cost bearers is available only for 2014-2015 survey 
years, we have to limit the first step of analysis by this observation period. Nevertheless, as 
discussed in the previous chapters, it is impossible to provide a single treatment interpretation 
for the 2015 wave. On the one hand, as the information for the dependent variable refers to the 
previous year, it measures the training participation before the law officially comes into force, 
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namely pre-treatment period. On the other hand, the exact month of wage adjustments could 
not be estimated as well as one for the change in training policy if one takes place. We assume 
that the employers were previously aware of the law adoption, hence, the adjustment policies 
for the treatment group could have been overtaken already in 2014 either. Therefore, the 2015 
survey year information could be also considered as the post-treatment effect of the minimum 
wage announcement and not implementation. We avoid a single definition at this point, as the 
comprehensive conclusion upon the short-term effects of the law will be made on the basis of 
a three-year perspective, adding the wave of 2016 as clearly post-treatment information.  
Figure 1 opens the analysis in terms of descriptive population-averaged statistics. It 
graphically shows the observed proportions of people having participated in further 
professional education on different cost bearers differentiating between employer and other 
sources (e.g. employee, employment agency, third-party) as shares of all the affected by the 
law workers. Figure 1 delivers several starting points for the further analysis. First, it shows 
lower rates of training participation in the sample in comparison to the population-average of 
37% (Bilger and Strauß 2015). The figure is given for a holistic orientation and could not be 
used for analytic comparisons due to the differences in the sample construction and 
operationalization of the concepts.  In between-groups comparison, they are also clearly lower 
for the treatment one. Annual comparison of the training participation dynamics is omitted at 
this point and is comprehensively discussed in the next chapter within the three-period 
perspective. The focus of the discussion at this point is the sources for financing the training, 
available for 2014-2015 survey years. Figure 1 proves the dominance of employer-sponsored 
training activities and their further raise in 2015 in comparison to other sources of payment for 
both treatment and control group, although more profoundly in the latter. Other cost bearers 
could not be operationalized in more detail to keep the data comparable in the two years.  
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Figure 1. Financing Training Participation under the Minimum Wage Introduction in 
Germany: Descriptive Statistics  
 
 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2015, own calculations 
 
Before the discussion shifts towards its main focus of employer-sponsored training, a 
broader notice is needed upon other sources of its financing. Table 47 of the Appendix delivers 
a deeper understanding of their dynamics of change. Remarkably is that in 2014, more than the 
third part of it (35.59%) has been paid in this way, being even higher (40.28%) in the treatment 
group. However, in 2015, its major shortage occurred to 15.08% of the overall overtaken 
activities sample average occurred. Nevertheless, the rate of training paid from other sources 
remains higher in the treatment group (17.81%) in comparison to the control one (11.32%). In 
order to prove the significance of the change in the overall percentage of employees having got 
training paid from other sources, we perform a McNemar’s test that checks the difference of 
two proportions which are computed from dependent observations (Andreß, Golsch et al. 2013). 
The test statistics is significant at the 0.001 level (p<0.001). This proves the statistical 
significance of the described change in the dependent variable. The lack of information upon 
the actual distribution of costs among parties as well as extremely low absolute number of cases 
in the category allow only for speculative explanations for the presented statistics. The latter 
illustrates probably the inter-compensation between different sources of human capital 
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investments. Lower rates of firm human capital investments in the treatment group could 
become a motivation for its members to search for other cost bearers and/or invest on their own. 
These becomes less often, as the employer-sponsored training increases, which is illustrated by 
the 2015 survey year statistics. Subjective perceptions of the workplace security and 
employment requirements could be further examples of the explanations of the observed 
changes. Due to the complexity and multidimensionality of potential causal relationship, a 
qualitative research is the best methodological solution for the issue.  
The provided statistics show that despite being a predominant resource of human capital 
investments, training provision from employer’s side is not a widespread practice in the affected 
labor market segment. It is also proved by the dynamics of incidence of the event given in the 
Table 2 below.   It shows the number of people who never received training within the study 
period, those who got it in both years and for whom the change in any of the directions took 
place. To enable the annual comparison, the calculations are performed using a balanced panel. 
Generally low rates of training costs coverage by the firms become clear by the fact that 80% 
(285/357) of the members of the treatment group and 65% (108/166) of respondents in the 
control group did not take part in employer-sponsored training in both years. Once again, the 
reasonability of the main methodology choice is being proved. The main part of the analysis 
will cover all the three table categories unlike the fixed effect model, which would have been 
based only on the observations for whom the change in the dependent variable took place. 
 
Table  2. Change in the Incidence of Employer-Financed Training between 2014 and 2015 
Survey Years (Balanced Panel): Frequencies 
 
Group Total of 
observations 
No training in both 
years 
Training in both 
years 
Change 
Treatment 357 285 25 47 
Control 166 108 24 34 
Total 523 393 49 81 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2015, own calculations 
 
Table 3 provides an extended view on the descriptive statistics upon the change in the 
incidence of employer-sponsored training between both survey years. Positive transitions are 
clearly dominating, with their higher incidence of 14% (23/166) in the control group than in the 
treatment group (8% (28/357)). This major difference is not observed in the number of negative 
transitions (incidences of the shortage in employer-financed training). They are relatively 
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equally distributed within both groups: 6,6% (11/166) and 5,3% (19/357) respectively. 
Therefore, we prove the positive change in employer-sponsored training in 2015 survey year 
on a descriptive basis.   
 
Table  3. Employer-Financed Training Incidence between 2014 and 2015 Survey Years 
(Balanced Panel): Transition Frequencies 
 
 Control group Treatment group Total 
Positive transitions 23 28 51 
Negative transitions 11 19 30 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2015, own calculations 
 
In order to draw statistically significant conclusions upon the nature of the change and 
define its determinants, random effects model of logistic regression is presented in the Table 4 
below. With regards to the central research question, the model makes clear that incidence of 
employer-sponsored training for the treatment group is significantly lower than one of the 
control group (Variable: Affection by the minimum wage introduction). Comparing workers 
being equal on all the other parameters, the odds of the dependent variable are reduced by the 
factor of 0.43 for those directly affected by the law. Nevertheless, for both groups, an increase 
in odds of training provision of 50% (100/2.00) in the annual perspective (Variable: Survey 
year) is indicated. Business sector dominates in predicting the training participation. 
Manufacturing is selected as a reference category to represent one of the largest and 
technologically developed branches with a generally high level of training participation (Bilger 
and Strauß 2015). Higher employer-financed training rates are observed for Transportation and 
storage branch, which is also potentially one of the most severely affected by the minimum 
wage due to the inclusion of Taxis. Affiliation to the public services and resulting positive 
externalities, knowledge intensive tasks, high share of project and group work, as well as low 
substitutability potential of professions could explain higher rates of employer-sponsored sector 
in Education, as well as Human health and social work activities branches. “Other sectors” 
category includes all the branches with the small number of affected workers below 20 in the 
sample and is assumed to represent the least influenced ones. As expected, most probably due 
to the already high wage level independently of the law, these sectors also enjoy an increased 
level of training provision. These conclusions are based on the positive regression coefficients 
and odds ratios of above 1. Broad confidence intervals and relatively high standard errors still 
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indicate major variation in sectoral training provision policies, potentially attributed to the 
heterogeneity of workers within branches. Likewise expressed in the hypotheses, higher 
training incidence is indicated at the large companies (B=1.48; OR=4.38). 
On the individual level, job and performance-related characteristics influence human 
capital investments for the examined group. In the same manner as theoretically assumed, 
incidence of training provision is positively related to the job complexity. Namely, its each one 
point increases the odds of employer-financed training incidence by 55% (100/1,81).  More 
profound affection of marginal employment by the minimum wage introduction is also 
observed in terms of the employer-sponsored training. Its lower rates are observed for the 
“mini-jobs” in comparison to the full-time ones (B=-2.09; OR=0.12); whereas, the significant 
effect is absent for the traditional part-time employment. 
 Referring to the performance-related characteristics, education is defined as a 
significant predictor of participation in employer-sponsored training. On the one hand, it is 
positively associated with the length of studies (61% (100/1.63) increase in the odds of 
dependent variable with each additional year of education), which goes in line with the principle 
of credibility in the human capital theory. The application of the latter with regard to the formal 
achieved degree, however, is further moderated by the characteristics of the German dual 
training system (Allmendinger 1989), signal and filter theory (Arrow 1973, Spence 1973, 
Seibert and Solga 2005). Two categories deliver significant results at this point. First, holders 
of post-secondary non-tertiary degrees risk lower rates of training provision (B=-2.51; 
OR=0.08). The possible assumption behind is the previously mentioned fact that profound share 
of their education takes place on the workplace so that they further need less continuing 
vocational training. Holders of the highest degrees (Masters or equivalent and higher) face even 
greater risk of its shortage (B=-4.06; OR=0.02). Several possible explanations can be delivered 
for that. With regard to their ability, these employees might be considered already highly 
qualified and, therefore, do not need additional training. Alternatively, estimated time for 
potential returns influences the investment decision. Employers (as well as employees 
themselves) might not view this employment relationship as long-term, seeing the worker as 
overqualified and, therefore, being likely to resign. Personal characteristics do not have a 
significant impact on the employer’s human capital investments in the affected labor market 
segment, attributing all its heterogeneity to the job- and performance-related indicators.  
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Table  4. Determinants of Employer-Financed Training Incidence under the Minimum 
Wage Introduction: Random Effects Model of Logistic Regression 
  
B (SE) 
95% CI for Odds Ratio 
Lower OR Upper 
Constant -10.73***(2.65) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Firm location. Baseline: East Germany, incl. Berlin 0.22 (0.47) 0.50 1.24 3.12 
Business sector. Baseline: Manufacturing   
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles  0.62 (0.73) 0.44 1.86 7.86 
Accommodation and food service activities 1.58 (0.95) 0.75 4.83 31.31 
Transportation and storage  2.34** (0.82) 2.10 10.37 51.24 
Administrative and support service activities 0.73 (0.91) 0.35 2.08 12.28 
Education 2.31* (0.95) 1.58 10.08 64.34 
Human health and social work activities 2.49*** (0.73) 2.91 12.10 50.36 
Other sectors 1.42* (0.63) 1.21 4.13 14.16 
Company size. Baseline: LT 20     
GE 20 LT 200 0.78 (0.61) 0.66 2.18 7.23 
GE 200 LT 2000 1.14 (0.63) 0.92 3.13 10.67 
GE 2000 1.48* (0.66) 1.21 4.38 15.89 
Affection by the minimum wage introduction -0.84* (0.40) 0.20 0.43 0.95 
Labor income 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Job tenure 0.03 (0.02) 0.98 1.03 1.08 
Job complexity 0.59** (0.23) 1.15 1.81 2.82 
Contract duration 0.97 (0.61) 0.80 2.65 8.78 
Employment form. Baseline: Full-time employment     
Part-time employment -0.60 (0.53) 0.20 0.55 1.54 
Marginal employment -2.09* (0.92) 0.02 0.12 0.75 
Education: formal degree. Baseline: Lower secondary education and below     
Upper secondary education -1.07 (0.75) 0.08 0.34 1.50 
Post-secondary non-tertiary education -2.51* (1.24) 0.01 0.08 0.92 
Short-cycle tertiary education -1.17 (1.31) 0.02 0.31 4.05 
Bachelors or equivalent level -2.23 (1.32) 0.01 0.11 1.43 
Masters or equivalent level and above -4.06* (1.93) 0.00 0.02 0.76 
Education: duration of studies 0.49** (0.20) 0.00 1.63 2.40 
Work experience 0.01 (0.04) 0.93 1.01  1.10 
Age -0.04 (0.04) 0.88 0.96 1.05 
Gender. Baseline: Female -0.62 (0.05) 0.20 0.54 1.43 
Migration background. Baseline: No migration background     
Direct migration background -0.39 (0.57) 0.22 0.67 2.08 
Indirect migration background -0.78 (0.64) 0.13 0.45 1.60 
Survey year. Baseline: 2014. 2015 0.69** (0.26) 1.20 2.00 3.35 
N 884    
n 469    
Wald Chi2 56.10**    
Ll -307.68    
lnsig2u 1.52     
sigma_u 2.14     
Rho 0.58    
LR test of rho=0. Chibar2(01)  36.59***    
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05  
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2015, own calculations 
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A range of indicators has been presented to prove the statistical goodness of the model 
in the lower part of the table. Wald Chi2 is significant at 0.01 level, proving the fact that B-
coefficients for predictors are significantly different from 0 (Wooldridge 2012). The 
significance of LR test of rho=0 proves the fact that modelling the current data using random 
effects is more preferable than ordinary logistic regression (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). 
In other words, although the selected method tests the general impact of predictors instead of 
their change, there are major differences attributed to the panel variance. Their proportion is 
presented by the Rho indicator above. Giesselmann und Windzio (2013) define it also as a 
residual intra-class correlation in the share of variance contributed to the time-constant 
characteristics of units. To ensure the accuracy of approximation in the model (Rabe-Hesketh 
and Skrondal 2008), we run it several times with different number of integration points (up to 
14) to prove the stabilization of results by the default option.  The collinearity diagnostics 
(Tables 57-60 in the Appendix) proves the adequacy of the combination of predictors in the 
model (i.e. absence of multicollinearity). Following Wooldridge (2012) the observed strength 
of correlation remains acceptable.  
We use the xtrho command (Rodrıguez and Elo 2003) in the extended application and 
interpretation (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008) to gain an understanding of the marginal 
associations between the observed responses (Table 5 below). For an individual whose fixed 
part of the linear predictors is equal to the sample median, the marginal probability of getting 
an employer-sponsored training in one of the observation years is 0.11 and the joint probability 
of this event in both years is 0.05. The estimated odds ratio of 8.05 means that the odds of 
employer-financed training for an individual who had his training paid at the other occasion are 
8 times higher than for an individual with the same characteristics who did not have his training 
paid. Squaring the Pearson correlation of 0.32, we show that training paid by an employer in 
one year explains about 10% of the variation in employer-paid training in the other. The results 
are consistent with the descriptive statistics on training incidence dynamics presented at the 
beginning of the analysis (Table 2).  
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Table  5. Determinants of Employer-Financed Training Incidence under the Minimum 
Wage Introduction: Measures of Association at Median Fixed Part of the Model 
 
 
Measure 
 
Estimate 
95% CI 
Upper Lower 
Marginal probability 0.11 0.08 0.17 
Joint probability 0.05 0.02 0.09 
Odds ratio 8.05 4.66 14.05 
Pearson’s r 0.32 0.18 0.48 
Yule's Q 0.78 0.65 0.87 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2015, own calculations 
 
 
Table 6 below shows the average marginal effects that remain consistent with the 
findings in the already presented model and give an overview of the comparative strength of 
predictors. Strong positive effect on training provision is attributed to the firm-level 
characteristic – business sector. The highest indexes are observed by Human health and social 
work activities, Transportation and storage, Education branches. Strong negative average 
marginal effects are carried by two formal education degrees – Post secondary non-tertiary and 
Master and higher. Positive relationship between company size and training provision is also 
proven by the significant average marginal effect for middle-size companies (GE 200 LT 2000), 
which is absent in the logistic regression model. Together with the employment type, both 
indicators enjoy moderate impact on the dependent variable. The lowest value indexes are 
observed by job complexity, survey year and affection by the law variables. Before the final 
conclusion upon the predictors is formulated, their individual contributions are to be ranked.  
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Table  6. Determinants of Employer-Financed Training Incidence under the Minimum 
Wage Introduction: Average Marginal Effects 
 
  
dy/dx (SE) 
95% CI  
Lower Upper 
Firm location. Baseline: East Germany, incl. Berlin 0.02 (0.03) -0.05 0.08 
Business sector. Baseline: Manufacturing    
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles  0.03 (0.04) -0.05 0.11 
Accommodation and food service activities 0.10 (0.07) -0.03 0.24 
Transportation and storage  0.17** (0.06) 0.04 0.29 
Administrative and support service activities 0.04 -0.06 0.14 
Education 0.17* (0.08) 0.02 0.32 
Human health and social work activities 0.18*** (0.05) 0.09 0.28 
Other sectors 0.09* (0.04) 0.02 0.17 
Company size. Baseline: LT 20    
GE 20 LT 200 0.05 (0.04) -0.02 0.12 
GE 200 LT 2000 0.07* (0.04) 0.00 0.15 
GE 2000 0.10** (0.04) 0.02 0.18 
Affection by the minimum wage introduction -0.06* (0.03) -0.11 -0.01 
Labor income 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 
Job tenure 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.01 
Job complexity 0.04** (0.02) 0.01 0.08 
Contract duration 0.08 (0.04) -0.02 0.16 
Employment form. Baseline: Full-time employment    
Part-time employment -0.05 (0.04) -0.12 0.03 
Marginal employment -0.13** -0.21 -0.04 
Education: formal degree. Baseline: Lower secondary education and below    
Upper secondary education -0.09 (0.06) -0.21 0.04 
Post-secondary non-tertiary education -0.17* (0.08) -0.34 -0.01 
Short-cycle tertiary education -0.09 (-1.00) -0.29 0.10 
Bachelors or equivalent level -0.17 (0.09) -0.34 0.02 
Masters or equivalent level and above -0.24** (0.09) -0.41 -0.06 
Education: duration of studies 0.04** (0.01) 0.00 0.06 
Work experience 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 
Age 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 
Gender. Baseline: Female -0.05 (0.04) -0.12 0.03 
Migration background. Baseline: No migration background    
Direct migration background -0.03 (0.04) -0.11 0.05 
Indirect migration background -0.05 (0.04) -0.12 0.03 
Survey year. Baseline: 2014. 2015 0.05** (0.02) 0.01 0.09 
 
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2015, own calculations 
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We employ the method of adequacy (Harrell 2001, Thompson 2009) due to its 
compatibility with the longitudinal data structure and Stata software. Logistic regression 
models have been run with each predictor individually and compared to the maximum 
likelihood of the one with all predictors included. The most explanatory power is attributed to 
the business sector, followed by job complexity and duration of education. Apart from the main 
body of explanations, this might be also attributed to the variation in the substitutability of 
different groups of professions. Under the absence of the target variable controlling for that, 
this assumption remains theoretical. Although labor income loses its significance when 
controlling for other characteristics, it remains a powerful predictor of employer-training 
provision. For the affection by the legal minimum wage introduction the opposite effect is 
observed: although it does not carry the most explanatory power when ranking the independent 
variables, it is significant in the complete model.  
 
Table  7. Determinants of Employer-Financed Training Incidence under the Minimum 
Wage Introduction: Ranking Predictors (Adequacy) 
 
Single predictor included in the model Ll Wald Chi2 
Model with all predictors included -307.68 56.10** 
Business sector -376.48 27.00*** 
Job complexity -416.43 49.44*** 
Education: duration of studies -424.72 26.83*** 
Labor income -432.89 39.38*** 
Education: formal degree -440.36 24.31*** 
Employment form -442.55 24.80*** 
Company size -450.29 19.13*** 
Job tenure -450.61 21.13*** 
Work experience -452.98 1.82 
Affection by the minimum wage introduction -457.00 11.30*** 
Contract duration -458.13 8.21** 
Migration background -458.65 4.53 
Survey year -461.49 2.71 
Firm location -462.62 0.63 
Age -462.63 0.55 
Gender -462.66 0.50 
 
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05 
Predictors that are significant in the complete model are marked with bold 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2015, own calculations 
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The discrepancies in the regressors’ scores in comparison to the previous ranking (Table 
6) are embedded in differences in their scaling and nature of both methods. Whereas adequacy 
principle seeks to model the contribution of the predictor to the complete variation of the 
outcome, average marginal effects estimate the impact of its one unit of change. The latter 
represents the whole range of values by dummy variables and less profound change by metric 
ones. Hence, we regard the adequacy method as prior to average marginal effects. An important 
conclusion, delivered by both models is the fact that wage increase after the law does explain a 
share of variation in the training provision, but not on its own. Factors outlined by the human 
capital theory do powerfully moderate the investments, also independently of the minimum 
wage. We attribute the most explanatory power to the firm-level, job-and performance-related 
indicators, whereas personal characteristics are neither significant nor powerful predictors of 
the employer-sponsored training participation in the segment affected by the minimum wage 
introduction.  
At this point a first conclusion for the current findings could be formulated. The analysis 
above indicates the clear dominance of employer-provided training in the range of overtaken 
professional education activities within the observation period. We have indicated its increase 
within the target population in the survey years of 2014-2015. However, its rate is higher when 
anticipatory wage adjustments have been overtaken in comparison to the wage increase in a 
direct response to the law. The described model suggests that human capital investments in the 
observed labor market are mostly defined by the characteristics related to the workplace (firm-
level indicators, job and performance-related individual indicators) and not personal ones. 
Firm-level characteristics influence training provision within the sector-specific characteristics 
and in partial consistence to the affection by the minimum wage introduction. An impact of 
job-related indicators is also stable with regard to the human capital theory and the law. 
Performance-related characteristic, namely formal degree of education challenges the 
application of the latter for the affected labor market segment in several defined points. The 
current analysis suggests that it is the matter of affection by the minimum wage introduction 
(time point of wage adjustment) that predicts the firm-paid training provision and not the actual 
sum of labor income. In order to deepen the understanding of the current findings, we test them 
in an annual and between-group perspectives.  
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4.2.2. Predictors: Within and Between-Group Comparison. Interaction Effects 
 
 
The goal of this chapter is to define if there are differences in the effects of significant 
predictors within the control and treatment group. For this purpose, we employ interaction and 
average marginal effects, conditional-effects-plots (Kohler and Kreuter 2016). The latter are 
especially beneficial to illustrate non-linear multiplicative relationship and variation of 
predicted probability, holding other variables at fixed values (Andreß, Golsch et al. 2013).   
Before the discussion is placed upon the predictors, we compare the patterns of change 
in training incidence between and within groups. Already in 2014, its chances are 6% lower for 
the members of the treatment group, slightly decreasing to 7% lower in 2015 (Table 8). These 
differences remain consistent despite the increase for both in 2015. The latter reproduces 
previously established inequalities, as the effect of the time predictor does not differ 
substantially between the control and treatment group. The chances for training incidence have 
increased by 6% and 5% respectively (Table 9).  
 
Table  8. Employer-Financed Training Incidence and Affection by the Minimum Wage 
Introduction: Average Marginal Effects (Between-Group Comparison) 
 
 2014 2015  
Treatment group. Baseline: Control group -0.06*  -0.07* 
 
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2015, own calculations 
 
Table  9. Employer-Financed Training Incidence and Affection by the Minimum Wage 
Introduction: Average Marginal Effects (Within-Group Comparison) 
 
 Control group Treatment group 
2015. Baseline: 2014 0.06** 0.05** 
 
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2015, own calculations 
 
As defined through the above described analysis, the strongest predictor of employer-
sponsored training incidence is the branch. Three interaction effects are significant in the model 
controlling for other independent variables (Table 10 below). In the Manufacturing branch 
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training incidence is higher for the members of the control group. The same is true for the 
Human health and social work activities, Education sectors indicated as the ones having the 
highest level of training incidence in the baseline model (Table 4). The current findings show 
that this is mainly attributed to its provision for the members of the control group. Inclusion of 
the interaction effect of the business sector and minimum wage affection, diminish the 
significance of the formal degree of education, which marginally contributes to the formation 
of the described branch-specific differences. Controlling for them points out higher training 
incidence in the middle-sized firms (GE 200 LT 2000). The impact of other dependent variables 
remains persistent. 
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Table  10: Determinants of Employer-Financed Training Incidence: Interaction Effects 
(Business Sector and Affection by the Minimum Wage Introduction) 
  
B (SE) 
95% CI for Odds Ratio 
Lower OR Upper 
Constant -9.22 (2.56) *** 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Firm location. Baseline: East Germany, incl. Berlin 0.20 (0.46) 0.49 1.22 3.04 
Business sector. Baseline: Manufacturing # Control Group   
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles # Control Group 0.49 (1.08) 0.19 1.63 13.62 
Accommodation and food service activities # Control Group -0.45 (1.80) 0.02 0.64 21.85 
Transportation and storage # Control Group 1.40 (1.14) 0.44 4.06 37.88 
Education # Control Group 2.95* (1.51) 0.99 19.18 372.87 
Human health and social work activities # Control Group 2.54** (0.95) 1.96 12.67 82.02 
Other sectors # Control Group -0.17 (0.87) 0.15 0.85 4.65 
Manufacturing # Treatment Group -2.00* (0.95) 0.02 0.14 0.87 
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles # Treatment Group  -0.94 (0.92) 0.06 0.39 2.37 
Accommodation and food service activities # Treatment Group 0.69 (1.11) 0.23 1.99 17.51 
Transportation and storage # Treatment Group 1.15 (1.01) 0.44 3.16 22.97 
Administrative and support service activities # Treatment Group -0.14 (1.01) 0.12 0.87 6.32 
Education # Treatment Group 0.41 (1.10) 0.17 1.50 13.05 
Human health and social work activities # Treatment Group  0.52 (0.91) 0.29 1.69 9.98 
Other sectors # Treatment Group  0.73 (0.81) 0.43 2.08 10.17 
Company size. Baseline: LT 20. GE 20 LT 200 0.82 (0.61) 0.68 2.27 7.54 
GE 200 LT 2000 1.26* (0.63) 1.02 3.53 12.23 
GE 2000 1.47* (0.67) 1.17 4.33 16.04 
Labor income 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Job tenure 0.03 (0.02) 0.98 1.03 1.08 
Job complexity 0.58** (0.23) 1.15 1.78 2.77 
Contract duration 0.91 (0.61) 0.76 2.49 8.16 
Employment form. Baseline: Full-time employment Part-time employment -0.61 (0.52) 0.20 0.54 1.51 
Marginal employment -2.00* (0.91) 0.02 0.13 0.80 
Education: formal degree. Baseline: Lower secondary education and below     
Upper secondary education -0.81 (0.74) 0.11 0.45 1.89 
Post-secondary non-tertiary education -2.04 (1.22) 0.01 0.13 1.41 
Short-cycle tertiary education -0.37 (1.36) 0.05 0.69 9.94 
Bachelors or equivalent level -1.46 (1.30) 0.02 0.23 2.97 
Masters or equivalent level and above -3.39 (1.90) 0.00 0.03 1.37 
Education: duration of studies 0.39 * (0.19) 1.01 1.48 2.15 
Work experience 0.01 (0.04) 0.93 1.01 1.10 
Age -0.04 (0.04) 0.88 0.96 1.04 
Gender. Baseline: Female -0.62 (.0.50) 0.20 0.54 1.43 
Migration background. Baseline: No migration background Direct migration background -0.42 (0.60) 0.22 0.66 2.02 
Indirect migration background -0.83 (0.64) 0.13 0.44 1.51 
Survey year. Baseline:2014. 2015  0.70** (0.26) 1.20 2.01 3.37 
N 874    
n 463    
Wald Chi2 58.43**    
Ll -299.72    
lnsig2u 1.42    
sigma_u 2.03    
Rho 0.56    
LR test of rho=0. Chibar2(01)  30.97***    
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05; empty category 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2015, own calculations 
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We estimate the average marginal effects to compare group discrepancies under the 
sector affiliation and their persistence after the general increase in training provision. Table 10 
identifies two sectors with significant between-group differences. In the Manufacturing branch, 
the chances for employer-sponsored job-related training are 8% lower for the treatment group 
in comparison to the control group; decreasing further to 12% lower for the survey year 2015. 
Significant differences are also observed in the Human health and social work activities branch. 
Although, its rates of training provision are higher in comparison to Manufacturing, the 
discrepancies upon the wage adjustment are more profound. Namely, the workers in the 
treatment group have 20% lower chances of getting their training paid by the employer in 
comparison to the control group with the further slight decrease to 22% in 2015. Higher training 
incidence in the branch in comparison to the others is potentially associated with the 
institutionalized sectoral standards. The latter stand in a direct connection with wage tariff 
regulations that differ for the treatment and control group and, therefore, cause discrepancies in 
training provision.  
 
Table  11. Employer-Financed Training Incidence and Business Sector under the 
Minimum Wage Introduction: Average Marginal Effects (Between-Group Comparison) 
 
 2014 2015  
 Treatment group. Baseline: Control group 
Manufacturing  -0.08*  -0.12* 
Wholesale and retail, repair -0.09 -0.11 
Accommodation and food service  0.08 0.10 
Transportation and storage -0.02 -0.03 
Education  -0.26 -0.29 
Human health and social work  -0.20* -0.22** 
Other sectors  0.06 0.08 
 
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05; empty category 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2015, own calculations 
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Table 12 shows the significant increase in training provision for both groups across all 
the sectors. The highest rates are observed for the control group in Transportation and storage 
and Human health and social work activities sectors (8% higher chances in comparison to the 
previous year). In the latter, 7% increase is also observed for the members of the treatment 
group, who enjoy a moderate increase across other sectors either.  
 
Table  12. Employer-Financed Training Incidence and Business Sector under the 
Minimum Wage Introduction: Average Marginal Effects (Within-Group Comparison) 
 
 Control group Treatment group 
2015. Baseline: 2014 
Manufacturing  0.04*  0.03* 
Wholesale and retail, repair 0.05** 0.04* 
Accommodation and food service  0.06* 0.05* 
Transportation and storage 0.08** 0.06** 
Administrative and support service activities 0.05* 0.04* 
Education  0.08** 0.06* 
Human health and social work activities 0.08** 0.07** 
Other sectors  0.06** 0.05** 
 
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2015, own calculations 
 
The predictor with the second highest share in explaining the variation of training 
incidence for the workers affected by the minimum wage introduction is the job complexity. 
Conditional-effects-plot (Figure 2) proves the consistence of the findings with the ground 
assumptions of the human capital theory, as well as equivalent increase for the survey year 
2015. The latter still does not influence the prevalent differences between treatment and control 
group. For instance, the employees who perform most complex jobs and experience wage 
adjustment between 2014 and 2015, have only slightly exceed the level of training provision 
for the employees having been doing middle-skilled jobs and having their wage adjusted in 
2014.  
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Figure 2. Employer-Financed Training Incidence and Job Complexity under the 
Minimum Wage Introduction: Conditional-Effects-Plot 
 
 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2015, own calculations 
 
Similar effect is observed by the education duration (Figure 3). It is positively associated 
with the training incidence for both groups as predicted by the human capital theory. 
Nevertheless, within the control group the slope of the conditional effect line is steeper 
indicating more rapid increase in the training provision with additional years of education. In 
terms of the human capital theory, it means that higher ability of these workers has more 
profound impact on their credit constrains in comparison to those in the treatment group.    
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Figure 3. Employer-Financed Training Incidence and Education Duration under the 
Minimum Wage Introduction: Conditional-Effects-Plot 
 
 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2015, own calculations 
 
 
Table 13 shows the interaction effects in terms of the formal degree of education and 
treatment assignment. The understanding of their effect is further developed and visualized by 
the conditional-effects-plot (Figure 4). As already indicated in the basic model, its effect does 
not go in line with the human capital theory. For the low and middle skilled workers (up to 
Post-secondary non-tertiary education), training provision actually decreases for the holders of 
higher degrees in both groups.  When considering the mentioned direct relationship between 
job complexity and qualification, it is reasonable to assume that these workers do simple less 
demanding tasks. Holding a qualification reduces the need to train workers for performing 
them. An increase in the conditional effect line is observed by the skilled workers who most 
probably bring the most return from the human capital investment within the observed labor 
market segment. The interaction effect at this point is, however, not significant. As already 
discussed in the basic model, highly skilled workers are considered overqualified and have, 
therefore, lowest chances of human capital investments. A slight increase in training provision 
as well as similar pattern of change are persistent for both treatment and control group. 
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Table  13. Determinants of Employer-Financed Training Incidence: Interaction Effects 
(Formal Degree of Education and Affection by the Minimum Wage Introduction) 
 
  
B (SE) 
95% CI for Odds Ratio 
Lower OR Upper 
Constant -9.85*** (2.71) 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Firm location. Baseline: East Germany, incl. Berlin 0.27 (0.47) 0.52 1.31 3.30 
Business sector. Baseline: Manufacturing   
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles  0.68 (0.75) 0.46 1.97 8.50 
Accommodation and food service activities  1.69 (0.96) 0.82 5.40 35.59 
Transportation and storage 2.52** (0.83) 2.45 12.41 62.83 
Administrative and support service activities 0.77 (0.92) 0.35 2.15 14.00 
Education  2.48** (0.95) 1.84 11.92 77.19 
Human health and social work activities  2.61*** (0.74) 3.18 13.54 57.68 
Other sectors  1.49* (0.64) 1.27 4.43 15.45 
Company size. Baseline: LT 20. GE 20 LT 200 0.72 (0.61) 0.62 2.05 6.80 
GE 200 LT 2000 1.14 (0.63) 0.91 3.11 10.63 
GE 2000 1.48* (0.66) 1.21 4.40 15.94 
Labor income 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Job tenure 0.03 (0.02) 0.98 1.03 1.08 
Job complexity 0.56* (0.23) 1.12 1.75 2.74 
Contract duration 0.93 (0.61) 0.76 2.52 8.34 
Employment form. Baseline: Full-time employment Part-time employment -0.66 (0.53) 0.18 0.51 1.45 
Marginal employment -2.16* (0.93) 0.02 0.12 0.71 
Education: formal degree. Baseline: Lower secondary education and below # Control group     
Upper secondary education # Control group -2.09* (1.02) 0.02 0.12 0.91 
Post-secondary non-tertiary education # Control group -2.31 (1.49) 0.00 0.10 1.83 
Short-cycle tertiary education # Control group -0.97 (1.90) 0.00 0.38 15.90 
Bachelors or equivalent level # Control group -2.86 (1.49) 0.00 0.06 1.06 
Masters or equivalent level and above # Control group -4.64* (2.29) 0.00 0.01 0.86 
Lower secondary education and below # Treatment group -1.98 (1.20) 0.01 0.14 1.45 
Upper secondary education # Treatment group -2.31* (1.00) 0.01 0.10 0.70 
Post-secondary non-tertiary education # Treatment group -4.52** (1.54) 0.00 0.01 0.22 
Short-cycle tertiary education # Treatment group -3.10 (1.71) 0.00 0.05 1.29 
Bachelors or equivalent level # Treatment group -3.70* (1.56) 0.00 0.02 0.53 
Masters or equivalent level and above # Treatment group -5.65** (2.16) 0.00 0.01 0.24 
Education: duration of studies 0.49** (0.20) 1.11 1.64 2.41 
Work experience 0.02 (0.04) 0.93 1.02 1.11 
Age -0.05 (0.05) 0.87 0.95 1.04 
Gender. Baseline: Female -0.69 (0.51) 0.18 0.50 1.36 
Migration background. Baseline: No migration background Direct migration background -0.49 (0.58) 0.20 0.62 1.93 
Indirect migration background -0.83 (0.65) 0.12 0.44 1.56 
Survey year. Baseline: 2014. 2015 0.69** (0.26) 1.19 2.00 3.34 
N 884    
n 469    
Wald Chi2 56.65**    
Ll -305.73    
lnsig2u 1.51    
sigma_u 2.13    
Rho 0.58    
LR test of rho=0. Chibar2(01)  34.94***    
 
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2015, own calculation 
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Figure 4. Employer-Financed Training Incidence and Formal Degree of Education under 
the Minimum Wage Introduction: Conditional-Effects-Plot 
 
 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2015, own calculations 
 
Further job-related characteristic, significantly affecting training incidence in terms of 
the presented model is the type of employment. The lowest chances are attributed to the 
members of the treatment group who are marginally employed, followed by those in the part-
time employment (Table 14 below). The differences are not significant for the employment 
segments of the control group, nor they are supported by significant average marginal effects 
(Table 61 in the Appendix). An increase of training provision is indicated for the full- and part-
time employed in both groups, again with the higher pace in the control one (Table 15).  
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Table  14. Determinants of Employer-Financed Training Incidence: Interaction Effects 
(Type of Employment and Affection by the Minimum Wage Introduction) 
 
  
B (SE) 
95% CI for Odds Ratio 
Lower OR Upper 
Constant -10.71 (2.66) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Firm location. Baseline: East Germany, incl. Berlin 0.22 (0.47) 0.50 1.25 3.15 
Business sector. Baseline: Manufacturing   
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles  0.61 (0.74) 0.43 1.83 7.81 
Accommodation and food service activities  1.57 (0.96) 0.74 4.82 31.45 
Transportation and storage 2.36** (0.82) 2.11 10.54 52.67 
Administrative and support service activities 0.74 (0.91) 0.35 2.10 12.49 
Education  2.31* (0.95) 1.57 10.11 65.14 
Human health and social work activities  2.50*** (0.74) 2.88 12.16 52.43 
Other sectors  1.42* (0.63) 1.20 4.15 14.30 
Company size. Baseline: LT 20. GE 20 LT 200 0.79 (0.62) 0.66 2.20 7.39 
GE 200 LT 2000 1.15 (0.63) 0.92 3.17 10.91 
GE 2000 1.49* (0.66) 1.21 4.44 16.31 
Labor income 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Job tenure 0.03 (0.02) 0.98 1.03 1.08 
Job complexity 0.59** (0.23) 1.15 1.80 2.81 
Contract duration 0.96 (0.62) 0.78 2.61 8.72 
Employment form. Baseline: Full-time employment # Control group     
Part-time employment # Control group -0.48 (0.76) 0.14 0.62 2.72 
Marginal employment # Control group -1.62 (1.57) 0.01 0.20 4.26 
Full-time employment # Treatment group -0.76 (0.48) 0.18 0.47 1.21 
Part-time employment # Treatment group -1.42* (0.66) 0.07 0.24 0.88 
Marginal employment # Treatment group -3.03** (1.12) 0.00 0.05 0.44 
Education: formal degree. Baseline: Lower secondary education and below      
Upper secondary education  -1.06 (0.76) 0.08 0.35 1.52 
Post-secondary non-tertiary education  -2.49* (1.24) 0.00 0.08 0.95 
Short-cycle tertiary education  -1.18 (1.32) 0.02 0.31 4.05 
Bachelors or equivalent level  -2.20 (1.33) 0.00 0.11 1.50 
Masters or equivalent level and above  -4.04* (1.94) 0.00 0.02 0.79 
Education: duration of studies 0.49** (0.20) 1.10 1.63 2.40 
Work experience 0.01 (0.04) 0.93 1.01 1.10 
Age -0.05 (0.05) 0.96 0.87 1.05 
Gender. Baseline: Female -0.63 (0.50) 0.20 0.53 1.43 
Migration background. Baseline: No migration background Direct migration 
background 
-0.39 (0.58) 0.22 0.68 2.10 
Indirect migration background -0.80 (0.65) 0.13 0.45 1.59 
Survey year. Baseline: 2014. 2015 0.70*** (0.26) 1.20 2.01 3.37 
N 884    
n 469    
Wald Chi2 55.45**    
Ll -307.60    
lnsig2u 1.54    
sigma_u 2.16    
Rho 0.59    
LR test of rho=0. Chibar2(01)  36.28***    
 
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2015, own calculations 
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Table  15. Employer-Financed Training Incidence and Type of Employment: Average 
Marginal Effects (Within-Group Comparison) 
 
 Control group Treatment group 
2015. Baseline: 2014 
Full-time employment 0.07** 0.05** 
Part-time employment 0.06** 0.04** 
Marginal employment  0.04 0.02 
 
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2015, own calculations 
 
Figure 5 portraits the conditional effect of the company size on the dependent variable. 
Similar to the impact of other predictors, the pattern of change does not differ between groups 
and these differences remain persistent in 2015 survey year. For example, the probability of 
getting training for the members of the treatment group still remains lower than the one of the 
control group in small companies. At the same time, the chances for workers in the treatment 
group to get training at small companies are extremely low (close to 0), which is slightly 
improved after the predominant increase in 2015. We also reject the assumption upon the 
disproportionally negative effect of the minimum wage introduction on training opportunities 
in small companies, for which an increase also took place, though on a short-term basis.  
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Figure 5. Employer-Financed Training Incidence and Company Size under the Minimum 
Wage Introduction: Conditional-Effects-Plot 
 
 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2015, own calculations 
 
Table 16 summarizes interpretations of findings in the current chapter. In general terms, 
lower incidence of training provision for the treatment group is observed by every significant 
predictor (although is absent in few categories), as well as its increase in both groups for 2015 
wave. On the sectoral level, which represents the most variation in training provision, Human 
health and social work activities branch shows the highest level of employer-sponsored training, 
as well as the largest gap when comparing two sub-samples. Similar picture with the lower 
magnitude of differences is observed in the Education sphere. Training provision in the 
Transportation and storage branch as well as in the sectors less affected by the labor price 
increase is rather homogenous: group differences are not significant for these categories. The 
effects of job complexity and duration of education are identical: for both direct relationship is 
observed with persistent group differences and annual increase across all categories. No linear 
connection is present by the formal degree of education: skilled and highly skilled workers in 
both groups are placed under the risk of lower human capital investments, which is preserved 
despite the indicated increase in the dependent variable. Concerning the employment type, 
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training provision is homogenous by full-time workers unlike the part-time ones. Whereas both 
categories enjoy the indicated raise of human capital investments, whereas marginal 
employment remains the one with its lowest level. The effect of the size of the company is 
similar to the one of job complexity, although no statistically significant effect is observed for 
the middle-size companies. Indicated patterns are produced by various degrees of affection by 
the law for different labor market segments as well as independent influence of workplace-
related factors discussed in the theoretical overview.  
 
Table  16. Overall, Within- and Between-Groups Effects of Significant Predictors of 
Employer-Financed Training Incidence under the Minimum Wage Introduction 
Predictor Value Impact: Baseline model Between-group 
differences  
Within-group increase in 
2015 
Control 
group 
Treatment 
group 
Business  
sector 
Manufacturing Baseline category Yes Yes Yes 
Human health,  
social work 
Highest training incidence in sectoral 
comparison  
Yes Yes Yes 
Transportation 
and storage  
Second highest training  
incidence in sectoral comparison  
No Yes Yes 
Education Third highest training  
incidence in sectoral comparison 
Yes Yes Yes 
Other sectors Forth highest training  
incidence in sectoral comparison 
No Yes Yes 
Job 
complexity 
1-5 Positive impact on dependent variable Yes Yes Yes 
Duration of 
education 
7-18 Positive impact on dependent variable  Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
Formal 
degree of 
education 
Lower secondary, below Baseline category  
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
Post-secondary non-
tertiary 
Second lowest chances of training 
provision in cross-category comparison 
Masters/equivalent, 
above 
Lowest chances of training provision in 
cross-degree comparison 
Type of 
employment 
Full-time Baseline category No Yes Yes 
Part-time No significant effect Yes Yes Yes 
Marginal Lowest chances of training provision in 
cross-type comparison 
Yes No No 
Company 
size 
LT 20 Baseline category  
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
GE 200 LT 2000 Significant positive average marginal 
effect  
GE 2000 Highest rate of training provision in 
cross-category comparison 
 
Source: Chapters 4.2.1-4.2.2 of the paper 
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4.2.3. Minimum Wage Introduction and Employer-Financed Training Incidence: Interim 
Conclusion 
 
The first part of the analysis has shown that minimum wage introduction reproduces and 
deepens existing inequalities in training provision, as predicted in the theoretical overview. 
Although an annual raise in its incidence is observed, its pace preserves existing inequalities. 
Those are mainly attributed to the job characteristics on the firm and individual level. Sectoral 
minimum wage affection partially explains variation in training provision. For instance, in the 
severely affected Transportation branch, its incidence is higher than in the “Other sectors” 
category which is supposed to represent the ones with the least affection by the law.  Other 
highly affected service sectors do not show any significant variation in these terms. As 
predicted, large companies train their workers the most. No territorial variation has been 
detected at this point.  
On the individual level, consistence with the human capital theory is limited. On the one 
hand, our findings prove it in terms of the job complexity, duration of education and 
employment type. On the other hand, its application remains challenged by the non-linear 
relationships of the formal degree of education to the employer-sponsored continuous 
vocational education. No effect of the personal characteristics on the dependent variable has 
been defined. The current analysis has also indicated statistically significant decrease in training 
solely paid from other sources than employer.  
We find no major differences in the effect of predictors based on the treatment 
assignment, but discrepancies in training provision at single observation points. We do admit 
that anticipatory wage adjustments could be both considered causes and outcomes of the 
characteristics varying between both groups. We also take into consideration the prevalence of 
human capital theory patterns over minimum wage introduction in predicting the dependent 
variable. Nevertheless, we do find several contradictions attributing them to the peculiarities of 
the studied labor market. These conclusions remain segmented without the synthesis with the 
participation in training activities of any kind, as well as with the latency of the changes in a 
longer perspective. This task is performed in the next chapter.   
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4.3. Training Incidence under the Minimum Wage Introduction in Germany  
 
4.3.1. Dynamics and Predictors of Incidence 
 
The majority of the theoretical arguments of the change in training participation under  
the minimum wage introduction refer to employer-sponsored training, which also constitutes 
the largest segment of adult education activities in Germany. Nevertheless, the lack of detailed 
information upon the costs, shares of cost bearers in financing training, as well as its 
organization, often makes strict conceptual differentiations problematic. Therefore, training 
incidence is widespread associated with the participation rate in any kind of further education 
activities. Whereas employees’ human capital investments reflect individual attitudes towards 
lifelong learning and employer’s ones are the expression of developmental managerial 
strategies, training incidence at any costs is a suitable measure for comparing chance equality 
of different groups and its development. In a limited longitudinal perspective of the current 
research, we observe the link between professional and educational inequalities as well as their 
persistence under the major labor market reform. In the analysis below, we follow already 
established procedure applied for employer-provided training to ensure the comparability of 
results and incorporate the advantages of broadening the time perspective to three years.  
Figure 6 below shows the development of participation rate in the two groups within the 
observation period. As it has been already discussed in the previous chapter, for both, its slight 
fall in 2015 survey year has been detected, presumably due to the shortage in the activities 
solely paid from other sources than an employer, as noted in the previous chapter. Low number 
of cases in the category and lack of detailed information upon cost shares allow only for 
speculative assumptions with this regard. The restoration of the training incidence to the level 
of 2014 (with further slight increase in the control group and slight decrease in the treatment 
group) has taken place according to the 2016 survey year results. Group discrepancies in 
training participation remain persistent over the whole observation period. The descriptive 
statistics indicates a negative impact of the minimum wage introduction on the training 
incidence shortly before the law, which is, neglected after the law has come into force. Wage 
adjustment period does not seem to have an impact on the direction of training incidence 
development but on its absolute value at a given time point.  
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Figure 6. Training Incidence under the Minimum Wage Introduction in Germany: 
Descriptive Statistics  
 
 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
Training incidence dynamics on the individual level shares similar patterns with the 
employer-sponsored one and is shown in the Table 17 below. As the findings are drawn from 
two different samples, they are only contingently comparable. The share of respondents who 
never took part in training activities between 2014 and 2016 survey waves remains relatively 
high. These are 64% of the treatment group (194/302) and 46% (63/136) of the control group, 
which shows the positive tendency in comparison to the corresponding indicators of employer-
financed training (80% and 65% respectively). This lays in broadening the observation period 
as well as the scope of training activities. Expansion of training itself is less probable: 
participation rates have not increased, and the observed numbers are a product of interaction 
between positive and negative transitions (Table 18). Within- and between-group changes in 
their rates are predominantly stable. Extremely low shares of respondents (7% of the treatment 
group and 16% of the control group) regularly took part in continuing vocational education 
within the observation period. Not only participation rates but their consistency enables training 
to fulfill its functions. On this basis, we agree on the generally weakly established lifelong 
learning system in the observed labor market segment, discussed in the theoretical background. 
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Table  17. Change in Training Incidence between 2014 and 2016 Survey Years 
(Balanced Panel): Frequencies 
 
 Total of observations No training at three 
occasions  
Training at three 
occasions 
Treatment group 302 194 20 
Control group 136 63 22 
Total 438 257 42 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
Table  18. Training Incidence between 2014 and 2016 Survey Years (Balanced Panel): 
Transition Frequencies 
 
 Control group Treatment group Total 
2014-2015 survey years 
Positive transitions 22 24 46 
Negative transitions 17 33 50 
2015-2016 survey years 
Positive transitions 13 35 48 
Negative transitions 16 29 45 
  2014-2016 survey years 
Positive transitions 16 27 43 
Negative transitions 14 30 44 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
The descriptive findings are reflected in longitudinal modelling of determinants of 
training incidence using random coefficients (Table 19 below). There is no statistically 
significant change in training participation rate in an annual comparison. Looking back at the 
findings of the previous chapter an important conclusion can be drawn at this point. An increase 
in employer-financed training incidence in the target population before the law introduction is 
attributed solely to the employers’ human capital investments and did not cause a significant 
increase in the continuing vocational education participation. It appears logical to improve the 
productivity of workers before the increase in the labor force price, as afterwards additional 
expenditures become furthermore problematic. The assumption is reasonable due to the major 
debates widely taking place before the actual minimum wage implementation. Nevertheless, 
these investments are characterized by the major selectivity upon the workers’ education, job 
complexity and employment type. Reproduction of existing inequalities by the minimum wage 
introduction is further reflected in the higher rates of training provision in the control group, 
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despite anticipatory wage adjustments taking place in this period. There is no opportunity to 
conclude upon the development of firm human capital investments after the law introduction 
due to the absence of the information in the dataset. Therefore, we proceed further with the 
prior determinants of training incidence on the minimum wage labor market.   
Some of the already observed determinants of employer-sponsored training are present 
in the model. In particular, sectoral variation remains one of the most powerful predictors of 
training participation rate and affiliation to the Transportation and storage as well as Human 
health and social work activities sectors positively influences it Manufacturing remains a 
reference category. Taking a retrospective view on the findings in the previous chapter, higher 
rates of employer-sponsored training in these sectors are potentially derived from a basically 
higher levels of training participation there. It might in return stimulate firm human capital 
investments.  The same counts for the company size, job complexity and type of employment, 
thus, on the descriptive and not causal basis. Low training incidence is also observed by the 
part-time and marginal employment, as well as employees in simple jobs. The respective 
explanations of the previous step apply here as well.  
The only characteristic differentiating training incidence and employer-sponsored one 
is the gender, namely lower rates of training participation for men. As the finding contradicts 
the basics of the human capital theory, we attribute the observed pattern to the characteristics 
of the minimum wage labor market and formulate explanatory conclusions after examining 
group-specific trends. As gender differences are not observed by employer-sponsored training, 
they are a product of employee’s and/or third-party training initiatives.  
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Table  19. Determinants of Training Incidence under the Minimum Wage Introduction: 
Random Effects Model of Logistic Regression 
  
B (SE) 
95% CI for Odds Ratio 
Lower OR Upper 
Constant -7.20*** (2.00) 0.00 0.00 0.04 
Firm location . Baseline: East Germany, incl. Berlin 0.53 (0.37) 0.82 1.71 3.55 
Business sector. Baseline: Manufacturing   
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles  -0.03 (0.53) 0.34 0.97 2.73 
Accommodation and food service activities 0.69 (0.70) 0.51 2.00 7.88 
Transportation and storage  1.69** (0.61) 1.64 5.43 18.00 
Administrative and support service activities -0.25 (0.68) 0.20 0.78 2.98 
Education 1.27 (0.71) 0.89 3.56 14.22 
Human health and social work activities 1.58** (0.52) 1.74 4.84 13.42 
Other sectors 0.56 (0.48) 0.70 1.76 4.43 
Company size. Baseline: LT 20. GE 20 LT 200 0.30 (0.43) 0.58 1.35 3.12 
GE 200 LT 2000 0.86 (0.45) 0.98 2.36 5.68 
GE 2000 0.93* (0.46) 1.02 2.53 6.28 
Affection by the minimum wage introduction -0.44 (0.33) 0.34 0.65 1.25 
Labor income 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Job tenure 0.00 (0.02) 0.95 0.99 1.03 
Job complexity 0.66*** (0.17) 1.40 1.93 2.67 
Contract duration 0.11 (0.40) 0.51 1.11 2.42 
Employment form. Baseline: Full-time employment. Part-time -1.00** (0.40) 0.17 0.37 0.80 
Marginal employment -2.30*** (0.65) 0.03 0.10 0.35 
Education: formal degree. Baseline: Lower secondary education 
and below. Upper secondary education 
 
-0.12 (0.62) 
 
0.26 
 
0.88 
 
2.98 
Post-secondary non-tertiary education -1.39 (1.00) 0.03 0.25 1.78 
Short-cycle tertiary education 0.54 (0.98) 0.25 1.72 11.78 
Bachelors or equivalent level -0.49 (1.06) 0.08 0.61 4.93 
Masters or equivalent level and above -2.04 (1.56) 0.01 0.13 2.77 
Education: duration of studies 0.29 (0.16) 0.98 1.34 1.82 
Work experience 0.02 (0.03) 0.96 1.02 1.09 
Age -0.02 (0.03) 0.91 0.97 1.04 
Gender. Baseline: Female -0.81* (0.40) 0.20 0.45 0.98 
Migration background. Baseline: No migration background     
Direct migration background -0.42 (0.47) 0.26 0.66 1.64 
Indirect migration background -0.60 (0.51) 0.20 0.55 1.51 
Survey year. Baseline: 2014. 2015 -0.03 (0.23) 0.62 0.97 1.52 
2016 -0.12 (0.23) 0.56 0.88 1.40 
N 1353    
n 557    
Wald Chi2 84.44***    
Ll -555.51    
lnsig2u 1.63    
sigma_u 2.26    
Rho 0.61    
LR test of rho=0. Chibar2(01)  110.37***    
 
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
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The indicators employed for checking the statistical goodness of the model in the 
previous chapter remain valid in this case either. Wald Chi2 is significant at 0.001 level, as well 
as LR test of rho=0. The latter implies that similar to the employer-sponsored one, predicted 
training incidence is moderated by the panel-variance component and not only general impact 
of predictors. We also prove the correctness of the default number of iteration points and 
absence of multicollinearity (Tables 57, 62-64 in the Appendix). 
For capturing the marginal associations between observed values of the dependent 
variable, we employ already introduced xtrho command (Table 20 below). Individual 
probabilities of participating in training at one of the occasion (19%) and at all the three 
occasions (10%) have increased in comparison to those of employer-sponsored one (11% and 
5% respectively). Similar to the dynamics of variables on the individual level, this is a product 
of broadening the scope of training activities and observation period. The same reasons are 
behind a slight reduction in path dependency of training participation on 0.37 points (8.05-7.68) 
or 5% (0.37/8.05) in comparison to the corresponding value in the analysis of employer-
sponsored training. It implies that training incidence at a given time point remains highly 
dependent on the individual learning behavior, also when investments other than employer are 
taken into account. Odds of training incidence at one occasion are 7.68 times higher for an 
individual who participated in training at the other occasion than for the one with the same 
characteristics who did not. This also implies the increase in the share of variation in training 
incidence in one of the survey years explained by the variation of the variable in the other one 
(squared Pearson correlation: 10% for employer-sponsored training incidence, 15 % for training 
incidence).  
 
Table  20. Determinants of Training Incidence under the Minimum Wage Introduction: 
Measures of Association at Median Fixed Part of the Model 
 
 
Measure 
 
Estimate 
95% CI 
Upper Lower 
Marginal probability 0.19 0.16 0.23 
Joint probability 0.10 0.07 0.14 
Odds ratio 7.68 5.27 11.41 
Pearson’s r 0.39 0.29 0.49 
Yule's Q 0.77 0.68 0.84 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
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Ranking predictors by comparing marginal effects (Table 21) and log-likelihoods based 
on adequacy principle (Table 22) produces partially contradictory scores. The highest positive 
impact is attributed to the affiliation to both indicated business sectors, whereas the most 
negative one to the marginal form of employment. These findings are plausible in terms of the 
effect of the minimum wage introduction on the macro and micro levels. Company size is 
according to both estimation methods of a moderate importance for predicting dependent 
variable.  Gender is regarded to contribute the least to its variation according to adequacy 
principle ranking, whereas job complexity is regarded as one estimating average marginal 
effects. The source of the ranking discrepancies has been discussed in the compatible part of 
the previous chapter. We deepen the understanding of these differences by comparing groups 
upon single variables.  
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Table  21. Determinants of Training Incidence under the Minimum Wage Introduction: 
Average Marginal Effects 
 
  
dy/dx (SE) 
95% CI  
Lower Upper 
Firm location. Baseline: East Germany, incl. Berlin 0.05 (0.03) -0.02 0.11 
Business sector. Baseline: Manufacturing    
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles  0.00 (0.04) -0.08 0.07 
Accommodation and food service activities 0.06 (0.06) -0.06 0.18 
Transportation and storage  0.17** (0.07) 0.04 0.30 
Administrative and support service activities -0.02 (0.05) -0.11 0.08 
Education 0.12 (0.08) -0.03 0.26 
Human health and social work activities 0.15** (0.05) 0.05 0.26 
Other sectors 0.05 (0.04) -0.03 0.12 
Company size. Baseline: LT 20    
GE 20 LT 200 0.02 (0.03) -0.04 0.09 
GE 200 LT 2000 0.08* (0.04) 0.00 0.15 
GE 2000 0.08* (0.04) 0.00 0.16 
Affection by the minimum wage introduction -0.04 (0.03) -0.10 0.02 
Labor income 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 
Job tenure 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 
Job complexity 0.06*** (0.01) 0.03 0.09 
Contract duration 0.01 (0.04) -0.07 0.08 
Employment form. Baseline: Full-time employment    
Part-time employment -0.10** (0.04) -0.17 -0.03 
Marginal employment -0.18*** (0.04) -0.25 -0.10 
Education: formal degree. Baseline: Lower secondary education and below    
Upper secondary education -0.01 (0.06) -0.13 0.11 
Post-secondary non-tertiary education -0.11 (0.08) -0.27 0.05 
Short-cycle tertiary education 0.06 (0.11) -0.15 0.27 
Bachelors or equivalent level -0.05 (0.10) -0.24 0.15 
Masters or equivalent level and above -0.14 (0.10) -0.33 0.05 
Education: duration of studies 0.03 (0.01) 0.00 0.05 
Work experience 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.01 
Age 0.00 (0.00) -0.01 0.00 
Gender. Baseline: Female -0.08* (0.04) -0.14 0.00 
Migration background. Baseline: No migration background    
Direct migration background -0.04 (0.04) -0.12 0.04 
Indirect migration background -0.06 (0.05) -0.13 0.03 
Survey year. Baseline: 2014    
2015 0.00 -0.04 0.04 
2016 -0.01 -0.05 0.03 
 
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
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Table  22. Determinants of Training Incidence under the Minimum Wage Introduction: 
Ranking Predictors (Adequacy) 
 
Single predictor included in the model Ll Wald Chi2 
Model with all predictors included -555.51 84.44*** 
Business sector -646.94 34.57*** 
Job complexity -688.68 69.65*** 
Education: duration of studies -696.63 32.12*** 
Education: formal degree -718.18 32.60*** 
Labor income -721.13 46.60*** 
Employment form -723.53 34.48*** 
Work experience -731.58 0.21 
Company size -737.86 16.39*** 
Affection by the minimum wage introduction -742.39 10.31*** 
Job tenure -743.38 8.62** 
Contract duration -745.38 4.00* 
Migration background -745.58 2.81 
Firm location -746.36 1.67 
Gender -747.35 0.41 
Survey year -746.48 2.13 
Age -747.53 0.83* 
 
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05 
Predictors that are significant in the complete model are marked with bold 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
Before performing group comparisons, we formulate an interim conclusion upon newly 
introduced findings and their integration to those of the previous chapter. The above 
documented analysis has provided an understanding of the training incidence development and 
determinants on the minimum wage labor market, as well as broadened the perspective on 
employer-financed training. Training incidence dynamics remains unaffected by the changes in 
different sources of human capital investments observed in the previous chapter. This supports 
the limited evidences for the inter-compensation between different cost bearers and/or absence 
of the effect of the minimum wage introduction on training incidence. The range of regressors 
remain persistent in predicting the training incidence either; hence, firm and individual level 
workplace characteristics are in the first place in charge for any kind of human capital 
investments on the minimum wage labor market. Additionally, we observe a minor contribution 
of the personal characteristic, namely, gender. Concluding remarks upon these issues will be 
drawn after performing within- and between-group comparisons.  
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4.3.2. Predictors: Within and Between-Group Comparison. Interaction Effects 
 
In this chapter we examine group-specific effects of independent variables employing 
already introduced interaction effects, average marginal effects and conditional-effects-plots. 
As we already approached the majority of the predictors and group variations introduced in this 
chapter, the repeating explanations are shortened. The starting point is the most powerful 
predictor, sectoral variation. Table 23 below shows that higher training incidence in the Human 
health and social work activities branch are attributed to the members of the control group, 
which has already been the case for employer-sponsored training.  The finding is confirmed by 
comparing average marginal effects in the Table 24 that indicates 18% lower chances for 
training participation in the treatment group. The variation is consistent across the whole 
observation period, which partially proves its independence of the minimum wage introduction. 
No further sector and time-specific effects has been observed.  
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Table  23: Determinants of Training Incidence: Interaction Effects (Business Sector and 
Affection by the Minimum Wage Introduction) 
  
B (SE) 
95% CI for Odds Ratio 
Lower OR Upper 
Constant -6.65*** (1.99) 0.81 1.68 3.49 
Firm location. Baseline: East Germany, incl. Berlin 0.52 (0.37) 0.87 1.69 3.93 
Business sector. Baseline: Manufacturing # Control Group   
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles # Control Group -0.14 (0.94) 0.14  0.87 5.54 
Accommodation and food service activities # Control Group -0.34 (1.19) 0.07 0.71 7.39 
Transportation and storage # Control Group 0.63 (1.00) 0.26 1.87 13.26 
Administrative and support service activities # Control Group -1.11 (1.56) 0.02 0.33 7.08 
Education # Control Group 0.94 (1.14) 0.28 2.56 23.81 
Human health and social work activities # Control Group 2.03** (0.82) 1.53 7.60 37.86 
Other sectors # Control Group -0.20 (0.72) 0.20 0.82 3.35 
Manufacturing # Treatment Group -0.97 (0.69) 0.10 0.38 1.47 
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles # Treatment Group  -0.80 (0.71) 0.11 0.45 1.82 
Accommodation and food service activities # Treatment Group 0.33 (0.90) 0.24 1.39 8.19 
Transportation and storage # Treatment Group 1.29 (0.81) 0.75 3.64 17.76 
Administrative and support service activities # Treatment Group -0.85 (0.84) 0.08 0.43 2.20 
Education # Treatment Group 0.48 (0.90) 0.28 1.62 9.39 
Human health and social work activities # Treatment Group  0.41 (0.72) 0.37 1.51 6.20 
Other sectors # Treatment Group  0.17 (0.69) 0.31 1.19 4.62 
Company size. Baseline: LT 20. GE 20 LT 200 0.31 (0.43) 0.59 1.36 3.14 
GE 200 LT 2000 0.84 (0.45) 0.96 2.32 5.58 
GE 2000 0.89 (0.47) 0.98 2.43 6.05 
Labor income 0.00 (0.00) 0.99 1.00 1.01 
Job tenure 0.00 (0.02) 0.96 1.00 1.04 
Job complexity 0.64*** (0.16) 1.38 1.91 2.63 
Contract duration 0.07 (0.40) 0.50 1.08 2.34 
Employment form. Baseline: Full-time employment Part-time employment -1.04** (0.40) 0.16 0.35 0.77 
Marginal employment -2.27*** (0.64) 0.03 0.10 0.36 
Education: formal degree. Baseline: Lower secondary and below. Upper secondary 0.00 (0.62) 0.30 1.00 3.33 
Post-secondary non-tertiary education -1.25 (0.10) 0.04 0.29 2.02 
Short-cycle tertiary education 0.71 (0.98) 0.30 2.03 13.89 
Bachelors or equivalent level -0.26 (1.06) 0.10 0.77 6.12 
Masters or equivalent level and above -1.79 (1.54) 0.01 0.17 3.40 
Education: duration of studies 0.26 (0.16) 0.95 1.29 1.76 
Work experience 0.02 (0.03) 0.95 1.02 1.08 
Age -0.03 (0.03) 0.91 0.97 1.04 
Gender. Baseline: Female -0.79* (0.40) 0.21 0.45 0.99 
Migration background. Baseline: No migration background Direct migration background -0.42 (0.47) 0.26 0.66 1.63 
Indirect migration background -0.62 (0.51) 0.20 0.54 1.46 
Survey year. Baseline: 2014. 2015 -0.04 (0.23) 0.61 0.96 1.51 
2016 -0.10 (0.23) 0.57 0.91 1.44 
N 1353    
n 557    
Wald Chi2 89.16***    
Ll -551.86    
lnsig2u 1.58    
sigma_u 2.20    
Rho 0.60    
LR test of rho=0. Chibar2(01)  101.52    
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05  
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
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Table  24. Training Incidence and Business Sector under the Minimum Wage 
Introduction: Average Marginal Effects (Between-Group Comparison) 
 
 2014 2015  2016 
 Treatment group. Baseline: Control group 
Manufacturing  -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
Wholesale and retail, repair -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
Accommodation and food service  0.06 0.06 0.06 
Transportation and storage 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Administrative and support service activities 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Education -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
Human health and social work activities -0.18* -0.18* -0.18* 
Other sectors  0.03 0.03 0.03 
 
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
The effect of job complexity is best represented by conditional-effects-plot (Figure 7 
below). On the one hand, it shows already inspected discrepancies in training incidence with 
regard to the wage adjustment point, slightly less articulated than in the case of employer-
financed one. On the other hand, we do not find any heterogeneities in the annual comparison. 
Hence, no specific measures for training expansion for simple jobs has been overtaken with 
regard to the minimum wage law.  
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Figure 7. Training Incidence and Job Complexity under the Minimum Wage 
Introduction: Conditional-Effects-Plot 
 
 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
We do find a significant interaction effect for employment type (Table 25 below), 
indicating more profound vulnerability of the treatment group members employed on part-time 
and marginal jobs. Although the effect of both variables is same negative for the observations 
in the control group, it is not significant. Therefore, instability of atypical occupation forms for 
them might be compensated by learning opportunities and/or employee’s motivation to qualify 
for better positions. These still remains minor in comparison to the full-time ones.  
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Table  25. Determinants of Training Incidence: Interaction Effects (Type of Employment 
and Affection by the Minimum Wage Introduction) 
 
  
B (SE) 
95% CI for Odds Ratio 
Lower OR Upper 
Constant -7.20*** (2.00) 0.00 0.00 0.04 
Firm location. Baseline: East Germany, incl. Berlin 0.54 (0.37) 0.82 1.71 3.56 
Business sector. Baseline: Manufacturing   
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles  -0.04 (0.53) 0.34 0.96 2.72 
Accommodation and food service activities  0.69 (0.70) 0.50 1.99 7.84 
Transportation and storage 1.70** (0.61) 1.64 5.45 18.09 
Administrative and support service activities -0.25 (0.68) 0.20 0.78 2.98 
Education  1.26 (0.71) 0.89 3.54 14.16 
Human health and social work activities  1.57** (0.52) 1.73 4.82 13.40 
Other sectors  0.56 (0.47) 0.69 1.75 4.42 
Company size. Baseline: LT 20. GE 20 LT 200 0.30 (0.43) 0.58 1.35 3.14 
GE 200 LT 2000 0.86 (0.45) 0.99 2.37 5.72 
GE 2000 0.93* (0.47) 1.02 2.54 6.31 
Labor income 0.00 (0.00) 0.99 1.00 1.01 
Job tenure -0.01 (0.02) 0.95 0.99 1.03 
Job complexity 0.66*** (0.17) 1.39 1.93 2.67 
Contract duration 0.10 (0.40) 0.51 1.11 2.41 
Employment form. Baseline: Full-time employment # Control group     
Part-time employment # Control group -0.96 (0.64) 0.11 0.38 1.33 
Marginal employment # Control group -2.11 (1.12) 0.01 0.12 1.10 
Full-time employment # Treatment group -0.40 (0.39) 0.31 0.67 1.45 
Part-time employment # Treatment group -1.42 (0.52) 0.09 0.24 0.66 
Marginal employment # Treatment group -2.78 (0.77) 0.01 0.06 0.28 
Education: formal degree. Baseline: Lower secondary education and below      
Upper secondary education  -0.12 0.26 0.89 2.99 
Post-secondary non-tertiary education  -1.39 (1.00) 0.03 0.25 1.78 
Short-cycle tertiary education  0.54 (0.98) 0.25 1.72 11.80 
Bachelors or equivalent level  -0.48 (1.07) 0.08 0.62 4.98 
Masters or equivalent level and above  -2.03 (1.56) 0.01 0.13 2.80 
Education: duration of studies 0.29 (0.16) 0.98 1.34 1.82 
Work experience 0.02 (0.03) 0.96 1.02 1.09 
Age -0.03 (0.03) 0.91 0.97 1.04 
Gender. Baseline: Female -0.81* (0.40) 0.20 0.44 0.98 
Migration background. Baseline: No migration background Direct migration background -0.03 (0.23) 0.26 0.66 1.64 
Indirect migration background -0.60 (0.51) 0.20 0.55 1.50 
Survey year. Baseline: 2014. 2015 -0.03 (0.23) 0.62 0.97 1.52 
2016 -0.13 (0.24) 0.56 0.88 1.40 
N 1353    
n 557    
Wald Chi2 84.28***    
Ll -555.49    
lnsig2u 1.63    
sigma_u 2.26    
Rho 0.61    
LR test of rho=0. Chibar2(01)  110.41***    
 
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
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The effect of the company size on the training incidence independently of the cost bearer 
is identical to the one for the employer-sponsored training discussed in the chapter 4.2.2, except 
for the absence of profound time-specific trends.  
 
Figure 8. Training Incidence and Company Size under the Minimum Wage 
Introduction: Conditional-Effects-Plot 
 
 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
Higher training incidence for women in the contradiction to the patterns of the human 
capital theory allows for inspection of gender-specific trends on the minimum wage labor 
market. With regard to the wage adjustment point, the major effect is attributed to the significant 
negative effect for the men in the treatment group in comparison to the women in the control 
group (Table 25 below). Remarkably, controlling for that diminishes the effect of the company 
size on the dependent variable. Nevertheless, no significant marginal effects have been found 
in between- and within-group comparisons upon wage adjustments.  
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Table  26. Determinants of Training Incidence: Interaction Effects (Gender and Affection 
by the Minimum Wage Introduction) 
 
  
B (SE) 
95% CI for Odds Ratio 
Lower OR Upper 
Constant -7.63*** (2.03) 0.00 0.00 0.03 
Firm location. Baseline: East Germany, incl. Berlin 0.57 (0.37) 0.85 1.78 3.70 
Business sector. Baseline: Manufacturing   
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles  -0.03 (0.53) 0.34 0.97 2.75 
Accommodation and food service activities  0.72 (0.70) 0.52 2.06 8.11 
Transportation and storage 1.71** (0.61) 1.67 5.56 11.48 
Administrative and support service activities -0.23 (0.69) 5.56 0.79 18.48 
Education  1.27 (0.71) 0.89 3.58 3.03 
Human health and social work activities  1.63** (0.52) 1.83 5.08 14.16 
Other sectors  0.57 (0.47) 0.70 1.76 4.45 
Company size. Baseline: LT 20. GE 20 LT 200 0.26 (0.43) 0.56 1.30 3.01 
GE 200 LT 2000 0.83 (0.45) 0.96 2.30 5.52 
GE 2000 0.89 (0.46) 0.98 2.44 6.08 
Labor income 0.00 (0.00) 0.99 1.00 1.01 
Job tenure -0.01 (0.02) 0.96 0.99 1.03 
Job complexity 0.67*** (0.17) 1.41 1.95 2.70 
Contract duration 0.09 (0.40) 0.50 1.10 2.39 
Employment form. Baseline: Full-time employment      
Part-time employment  -1.04** (0.40) 0.16 0.35 0.78 
Marginal employment  -2.34*** (0.65) 0.03 0.10 0.34 
Education: formal degree. Baseline: Lower secondary education and below      
Upper secondary education  -0.13 (0.62) 0.26 0.88 2.97 
Post-secondary non-tertiary education  -1.45 (1.01) 0.03 0.23 1.68 
Short-cycle tertiary education  0.54 (0.98) 0.25 1.72 11.81 
Bachelors or equivalent level  -0.53 (1.07) 0.07 0.59 4.76 
Masters or equivalent level and above  -1.93 (1.56) 0.01 0.14 1.04 
Education: duration of studies 0.29 (0.16) 0.98 1.34 1.83 
Work experience 0.02 (0.03) 0.95 1.02 1.09 
Age -0.03 (0.03) 0.91 0.97 1.04 
Gender. Baseline: Female # Control group     
Female # Treatment group -0.01 (0.45) 0.40 0.99 2.40 
Male # Control group -0.25 (0.57) 0.26 0.78 2.39 
Male # Treatment group -1.15* (0.52) 0.11 0.32 0.89 
Migration background. Baseline: No migration background Direct migration background -0.39 (0.47) 0.27 0.67 1.68 
Indirect migration background -0.56 (0.51) 0.21 0.57 1.56 
Survey year. Baseline: 2014. 2015 -0.03 (0.23) 0.62 0.97 1.52 
2016 -0.13 (0.24) 0.56 0.88 1.40 
N 1353    
n 557    
Wald Chi2 85.13***    
Ll -554.58    
lnsig2u 1.63    
sigma_u 2.26    
Rho 0.61    
LR test of rho=0. Chibar2(01)  110.86***    
 
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculation 
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We proceed with the discussion of gender heterogeneities across the above indicated 
significant predictors. Namely, we find a persistent significant negative effect for men in all the 
examined sectors, except for Manufacturing and Administrative and support service activities. 
One possible explanation behind is the fact that men are more likely to perform manual and/or 
physically demanding less knowledge intense tasks, with less opportunities and need for 
further qualification. This finding could be partially supported by the absence of gender-specific 
differences when controlling for the job complexity (Figure 15 in the Appendix). On the other 
hand, there is a statistically significant dependence between sectoral distribution of employees 
and their gender (Table 69 in the Appendix). Namely, the negative effect for men is absent in 
the Manufacturing branch, which is clearly male-dominated. In the female-dominated sectors, 
both firms and workers possibly see employment opportunities for women as more favorable 
and/or long-term ones, which results in the higher rates of human capital investments for them.  
 
Table 27. Gender and Business Sector - Training Incidence under the Minimum Wage 
Introduction: Average Marginal Effects (Between-Group Comparison) 
 
 2014 2015  2016 
 Male. Baseline: Female 
Manufacturing  -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
Wholesale and retail, repair -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* 
Accommodation and food service  -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* 
Transportation and storage -0.09* -0.09* -0.09* 
Administrative and support service activities -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
Education -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* 
Human health and social work activities -0.09* -0.09* -0.09* 
Other sectors  -0.07* -0.07* -0.07* 
 
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
Perception of employment opportunities on the minimum wage labor market as well as 
nature of jobs are also applicable for explaining gender differences in training provision across 
three indicated employment forms (Table 28 below). Namely, significant negative effect for 
men is observed by full-time and part-time employment, whereas mini-jobs lack learning 
opportunities for both genders.  
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Table  28. Gender and Employment Form - Training Incidence under the Minimum Wage 
Introduction: Average Marginal Effects (Between-Group Comparison) 
 
 2014 2015  2016 
 Male. Baseline: Female 
Full-time employment -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* 
Part-time employment -0.07* -0.07* -0.06* 
Marginal employment -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
 
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
Table 29 below summarizes the above documented findings.  
 
Table  29. Overall, Within- and Between-Groups Effects of Significant Predictors of 
Training Incidence under the Minimum Wage Introduction 
 
Predictor Value Impact: Baseline model Between-group 
differences  
Gender 
differences 
Business  
sector 
Manufacturing Baseline category No No 
Transportation 
and storage  
Highest training incidence in sectoral 
comparison  
No Yes 
Human health,  
social work 
Second highest training  
incidence in sectoral comparison 
Yes Yes 
Job 
complexity 
1-5 Positive impact on dependent variable Yes No 
Type of 
employment 
Full-time Baseline category No Yes 
Part-time Second lowest chances of training 
participation in cross-type comparison 
Yes Yes 
Marginal Lowest chances of training participation 
in cross-type comparison 
Yes No 
Company size LT 20 Baseline category Yes No 
GE 200 LT 2000 Significant positive average marginal 
effect  
GE 2000 Highest rate of training participation in 
cross-category comparison 
Gender Male and Female Lower training incidence for men Yes - 
 
Source: Chapters 4.3.1-4.3.2 of the paper 
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The predicted variation on the basis of wage adjustment point is less articulated by 
training incidence independently of the training cost bearer but is still present. Namely, we have 
observed lower rates of training provision for the members of the treatment group in Human 
health and social work activities sector, on part-time and marginal positions, on the basis of job 
complexity, company size and gender. These are also the important variables for describing the 
affection by the minimum wage introduction on different levels. Hence, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis for the relevance of the law for training opportunities and inter-compensation 
between different sources for financing them. Nevertheless, we have not found any significant 
change in the dependent variable in an annual perspective, which, in its absolute terms, means 
the absence of the effect of minimum wage introduction on training incidence. The current 
analysis also broadens the understanding of the minimum wage labor market, namely from the 
gender perspective. In contradiction to the human capital theory, we have indicated lower 
training incidence for men that remains persistent in the sectoral variation and on the basis of 
employment form.  
 
 
4.2.3. Minimum Wage Introduction and Training Incidence: Interim Conclusion 
 
The second part of analysis has not indicated a significant effect of the minimum wage 
introduction on training incidence in the annual comparison. We do find the evidences for its 
variation with regard to the wage adjustment point in the within-group perspective. The current 
analysis fulfills the functions of both inspection of training participation trends independently 
of the cost bearer and identifying unique predictors of firm human capital investments on the 
minimum wage labor market.  Hence, we summarize the findings of the chapter in a 
retrospective with the employer-sponsored training incidence.  
Participation in employer-financed training as well as in training activities of any cost 
bearer is priory predicted on a sectoral level. Namely, the highest rates of both are observed in 
the Transportation and storage and Human health and social work activities branches. Both 
follow the same patterns of within-group variation with regard to the wage adjustment point. 
All kinds of human capital investments face the identical influence of job complexity, size of 
employing company and type of employment. The statistical significance of these variables 
indicates the consistency of the findings with the human capital theory. We also inspect within-
group trends, which indicate the direct relevance of the latter for the investments on the 
minimum wage labor market. 
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Performance-related indicators (formal degree of education and education duration) 
have an impact on employer-sponsored training only. In this case they perform a signal function 
for employee’s ability for the firm, but do not affect significantly training participation. Again, 
the relevance of inter-compensation explanation is proven, meaning that employees with lower 
formal degrees are likely to compensate for the lack of employer investments by own and/or 
third-party ones. At the same time, personal characteristic (gender) does affect training 
incidence but has no impact on employers’ investment decision. For both patterns respective 
explanations have been discussed in detail.   
At this point of analysis, we have documented a positive effect of the minimum wage 
introduction on employer-sponsored training opportunities for the affected workers, shortly 
before the law officially comes into force. This is, however, not significant for training 
incidence for activities at any cost. We also find persistent discrepancies on the basis of wage 
adjustment point. Nevertheless, their causality has double interpretation, for which we also 
address. The answer to the stated research question remains incomplete without inspecting 
training intensity, which is performed in the next chapter.  
 
 
4.4. Training Intensity under the Minimum Wage Introduction in Germany  
 
4.4.1. Dynamics and Predictors of Training Intensity  
 
The current chapter presents the final step of the analysis of the minimum wage 
outcomes on training in Germany. There is no strict theoretical framework developed with 
regard to the differentiated impact of the law on incidence and intensity for the reasons 
discussed in the second chapter. The majority of the sited sources suggest measuring training 
intensity for participants only, to ensure the independence of measurements from ones of 
training expansion that is already controlled by training incidence indicators. This approach 
places the focus on the strategies of training provision and participation behavior; though on 
the cost of significant sample reduction (Table 70 of the Appendix). We use two separate 
indicators for training intensity. Number of enrollments stands for the variety of training 
provision (width) when assuming that each training measure differs in the content. Though, this 
cannot be proven by the current data. Training volume is an indicator of training amount or 
depth for single events. The patterns of human capital theory remain valid for both; hence, 
parallel review will ensure the clear presentation of results.  
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First, we present the basic descriptive statistics on both dependent variables within the 
observation period. When calculating the number of enrollments (Table 30), training provision 
appears to be one of a relatively low intensity. Participating in training only once a year is the 
most widespread form by between-group and annual comparisons. The range of its percentages 
lay between 32 (15/46) in 2014 and 42 (22/53) in 2015 for the control group; and 41 (29/70) in 
2016 and 43 (31/72) in 2014 for the treatment group.  Participating in training twice a year is 
slightly less common and is the second most widespread. Hence, for both groups average 
number of training occasions per year does not go beyond 3 per participant and beyond 1 per 
person in both groups. On the other hand, the amount of provided training delivers slightly 
different perspective on the intensity pattern (Table 31), mainly due to its within-group 
heterogeneity. Its high dispersion of low (1-2 days) and high training volumes (8-20 days) is 
observed in the treatment group, whereas the distribution of the observations in the control 
group is more normalized. Training volume does not fall below 10 days per participant per year 
and reaches the maximum of almost 17 days for the treatment group (2014) and almost 16 days 
for the control group (2015). Therefore, we conclude upon the relatively long training duration 
under the low number of overtaken further education events.   
 
Table  30. Number of Enrollments and the Minimum Wage Introduction in Germany: 
Frequencies and Descriptive Statistics  
 
 2014 2015 2016 
 Control 
group 
Treatment 
group 
Control 
group 
Treatment 
group 
Control 
group 
Treatment  
group 
1 measure 15 31 22 32 16 29 
2 measures 13 19 9 21 9 19 
3 measures 6 6 7 9 11 9 
4 measures 5 4 7 7 6 3 
5 measures and more 7 12 8 4 3 11 
Mean (Participants) 2.59 2.49 2.74 2.18 2.38 2.56 
Mean (All) 0.75 0.51 0.76 0.36 0.72 0.51 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
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Table  31. Training Volume under the Minimum Wage Introduction in Germany: 
Frequencies and Descriptive Statistics 
 
 2014 2015 2016 
 Control 
group 
Treatment 
group 
Control  
group 
Treatment 
group 
Control 
group 
Treatment 
group 
1 day 3 6 7 7 6 13 
2 days 6 10 5 19 6 13 
3 days 6 5 6 9 9 5 
4 days 10 4 5 9 3 7 
5 days  8 13 6 4 7 10 
6 days 3 7 3 1 1 2 
7 days  1 3 1 3 0 1 
8-20 days 5 12 13 13 11 13 
21-50 days 3 7 4 3 0 4 
More than 50 days 1 5 3 5 2 2 
Mean (Participants) 10.61 16.93 15.77 11.62 10.60 10.46 
Mean (All) 3.09 3.50 4.40 1.92 3.62 2.07 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
Visualizing two central concepts (number of enrollments) and training volume (number 
of days in training) per participant makes the different patterns of their change as well as within- 
and between-group differences clear. The mean of training activities (Figure 9) has dramatically 
decreased in the treatment group shortly before the law introduction (survey year 2015) under 
its slight increase for training participants in the control group. After the law officially comes 
into force (survey year 2016), an opposite process is observed. Namely, the number of 
enrollments increases clearly for the participants in the treatment group and decreases for those 
in the control group.  
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Figure 9. Number of Enrollments under the Minimum Wage Introduction in Germany: 
Mean Value (Participants) 
 
 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
The Figure 10 below presents an overview of the development of training volume per 
participant within the observation period. Remarkably, before the law introduction (survey year 
2014) it is clearly higher in the treatment than in the control group, following the pattern of 
change for the number of enrollments for 2015. The gradual fall in the average training volume 
is observed in the treatment group. Official implementation of the minimum wage (survey year 
2016) resembles the measurements in the sample. We postpone interpretations of described 
tendencies before their statistical significance is proved.   
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Figure 10. Training Volume under the Minimum Wage Introduction in Germany: Mean 
Value (Participants) 
 
 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
We perform an effort to combine both measurements on a descriptive basis calculating 
an average duration of training events (Table 32 below). Its dominant majority takes no longer 
than two days for both groups within the observation period. Again, the maximums are 
indicated for the measurements of the control group in 2015 (slightly less than two weeks) and 
for treatment group in 2014 (almost 13 days), whereas other values are placed around 8. Hence, 
it is impossible to formulate an unambiguous characteristic of training intensity dynamics 
through synthesis of two concepts. We also do not find any significant correlations for statistical 
modelling of their relationship. To sum it up, the current descriptive statistics provide only a 
limited proof for the increase in training duration when the number of enrollments decreases.  
 
 
 
 
 
110 
 
Table  32. Average Duration of Training Events (Rounded) under the Minimum Wage 
Introduction in Germany: Frequencies and Descriptive Statistics 
 
 2014 2015 2016 
 Control 
group 
Treatment 
group 
Control  
group 
Treatment 
group 
Control  
group 
Treatment 
group 
Less than 1 day 1 0 2 0 0 0 
1-2 days 30 39 31 44 31 49 
3-7 days 9 19 8 17 9 13 
8-20 days 4 5 7 5 3 3 
21-50 days 1 4 2 3 0 3 
More than 50 days 1 5 3 4 2 2 
Mean (per Event) 7.95 13.94 12.82 8.12 8.12 7.29 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
Further alternative for the descriptive analysis of the change in training intensity on the 
annual comparison basis is calculating the total overtaken number of training measures and 
days (Tables 33 and 34). The absolute numbers provide a very general overview of the concepts 
due to within- and between group differences in the number of cases. The dynamics of both 
concepts repeats the one of the respective mean values (Figures 9 and 10). Namely, a clear 
increase of 22% ((145-119)/119) in the total number of overtaken training measures by the 
members of the control group is observed in 2015 survey year; followed by the return to the 
level of 2014. The opposite tendency of 11% ((179-159)/159) single decrease in the variable is 
present for the treatment group. For the training volume, a major 71% ((836-488)/488) increase 
takes place for the control group; whereas total number of days in training is gradually falling 
in the treatment one. Whereas the dynamic has almost no impact on the shares of group sums 
in the total number of overtaken training activities in the sample with regard to the number of 
observations; it does have an effect for the training volume measures. At their maximum point 
of 2014 survey year, 73% (1289/1777) of the whole training volume is assigned to the treatment 
group members. The proportion is decreasing due to the above described dynamics.  
 
Table  33. Total Number of Enrollments under the Minimum Wage Introduction in 
Germany: Sum 
 
 2014 2015 2016 
Control group 119 145 107 
Treatment group 179 159 179 
Total 298 304 286 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
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Table  34. Annual Training Volume under the Minimum Wage Introduction in Germany: 
Sum  
 
 2014 2015 2016 
Control group 488 836 477 
Treatment group 1289 848 732 
Total 1777 1684 1209 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
Before we model the statistical change in training intensity, a short notice on its 
predictors is needed, as several transformations have been done in comparison to the random 
effects logistic regression. Namely, nominal variables have been recoded into dummy variables 
to estimate the impact of their change instead of one if its actual value. This was not needed for 
ordinal and metric variables. As it has been discussed in the Research Design, due to the 
limitations of the method, the impact of several predictors cannot be quantified and is, therefore, 
treated as an unobserved unit effect. The latter, in its turn, refers to the major advantages of 
First Differences Regression.  
Table 71 in the Appendix provides a descriptive overview of the changes frequencies of 
the valid difference scores for the regressors and outcomes. Those do not reflect the discussed 
employment outcomes of the minimum wage law accurately due to the selectivity of the 
balanced panel construction approach. As estimating the direction and magnitude of their 
impact on the dependent variables without representative conclusions upon the fact of 
occurrence is the current research objective, we apply the sample for further analysis. We 
differentiate the descriptive statistics across the observation periods pairwise, as it is later 
applied in the regressions.  
With regard to the presented changes, number of enrollments is slightly less sensitive to 
annual adjustments than the training volume, still under the high variation of both. Namely, the 
change in the number of enrollments covers between 54% and 79% of the members of the 
treatment group and between 69% and 78% of those in the control group. Remarkably, its 
highest rate takes place under the most stability in the number of overtaken training measures 
in the treatment group (survey years 2015-2016). Training volume is showing greater annual 
dynamics and its incidence clearly varies between groups either (79%-88% in the treatment 
group; 76%-94% in the control group). Adjustments of the duration of training events are more 
common when their number remains stable than the other way around (Tables 72 and 73 of the 
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Appendix). This appears logical, as changing shortening or prolonging single courses is of a 
lower financial and organizational costs than their organization. 
 Apart from the wage adjustment fact, which is the central change with regard to the 
stated research question, widespread within-unit variation is observed by the labor income. 
Inclusion of both variables is necessary, as the latter stands for measuring the magnitude of the 
income increase. Due to the nature of the method, variables of work experience and job tenure 
measure the effect of occupational transitions and career breaks within the employment history 
for the first variable, and with regard to the current employer for the second variable. For the 
dominant majority of the respondents those were absent. Within the 2015-2016 observation 
period, business sector and company size transitions are more frequent. Those could be 
attributed both to individual- and firm-level adjustments. Following the previously established 
analytical procedure, we first build the common model for the sample and deepen their findings 
through within- and between-group comparisons.   
Table 35 below shows the application of First Differences Regression as suggested by 
Allison (2009) for the change in training intensity calculated as the number of overtaken further 
education events per year. Wage adjustment between 2014 and 2015 modelled as one unit 
increase in the affection by the minimum wage introduction variable increases the mean of the 
total number of training events for 1.88 in 2015-2016 survey years’ comparison. Controlled for 
other time-varying predictors, it explains 15% of the variation in the dependent variable 
(R2=0.15) indicating the major importance of further factors for human capital investments.  
The magnitude of the described effect decreases to 0.51, when modelling the link between 
2014-2015 and 2015-2016 changes and accounting for the dependence of the measurements at 
three time points last column. In terms of the standardized regression coefficients (Table 36), 
we estimate the effect sizes (Cohen 1988). The observed medium effect directly after the law 
implementation is the result of its enhancement by the wage increase (Beta=0.33); whereas 
throughout the whole observation period it remains small (Beta=0.10).  
In a limited longitudinal perspective, the impact of firm-level characteristics overcomes 
the one of the wage adjustment. Their change could be attributed both to company restructuring 
and individual employment decisions.  Switching the business sector has a significantly positive 
effect (B=0.94) of a little strength (Beta=0.14) on the number of enrollments. It most probably 
reflects an increased need to acquire new skills in a different occupational branch. Switching to 
a larger company has a significant negative effect (B=-0.86) on the total number of overtaken 
training activities.  With the highest value of the standardized coefficient (Beta=-0.26), it 
becomes the strongest predictor of training participation within the constructed model.   
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Table  35. Determinants of the Change in the Number of Enrollments under the Minimum 
Wage Introduction: First Differences Regression 
 
 2014-2015 OLS 2015-2016 OLS 2014-2016 OLS Combined GLS 
B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) 
Constant 0.31 (2.00) -0.54 (1.37) 1.25 (2.01) -0.26 (0.38) 
Firm location  0.06 (2.18) 0.00 (0.00) 0.57 (3.00) -0.69 (2.59) 
Business sector -0.05 (2.18) 0.83 (0.82) 1.25 (0.83) 0.94*** (0.25) 
Company size  0.55 (0.41) 0.05 (0.46) -0.61 (0.56) -0.86*** (0.16) 
Affection by the minimum wage introduction -1.08 (0.55) 1.88** (0.74) 0.41 (0.75) 0.51*** (0.12) 
Labor income 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Job tenure -0.36 (1.17) 0.03 (0.12) -0.06 (0.30) 0.01 (0.06) 
Job complexity 0.07 (0.52) -0.19 (1.75) 0.17 (0.79) -0.04 (0.28) 
Contract duration 0.15 (0.96) -0.77 (1.66) 0.58 (2.83) -0.10 (0.59) 
Employment form  -1.33 (1.29) -0.71 (1.74) -1.09 (1.63) -1.09 (0.65) 
Work experience 0.59 (1.05) -0.57 (1.32) 0.41 (0.92) 0.03 (0.25) 
N 65 65 55 130 
R2 0.14 0.15 0.10  
Equation dummy    0.04 (0.56) 
Wald Chi2    81.74*** 
 
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
Table  36. Determinants of the Change in the Number of Enrollments under the Minimum 
Wage Introduction: First Differences Regression (Standardized Coefficients) 
 
 2014-2015 OLS 2015-2016 OLS 2014-2016 OLS Combined GLS 
Beta  Beta Beta Beta 
Firm location  0.00 0.00 0.03  -0.03 
Business sector 0.00 0.13  0.23 0.14*** 
Company size  0.18 0.01  -0.17 -0.26*** 
Affection by the minimum wage introduction -0.26 0.33** 0.08 0.10*** 
Labor income 0.06 0.16 0.00 0.04 
Job tenure -0.06 0.05 -0.04 0.01 
Job complexity 0.02 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 
Contract duration 0.02 -0.08 0.04 -0.01 
Employment form  -0.14 -0.05 -0.12 -0.09 
Work experience 0.08 -0.05 0.08 0.00 
Equation dummy    0.01 
 
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
 
Tables 37 and 38 below prove greater variation of training volume thought the panel 
spaces, already previously indicated in the descriptive statistics. Namely, we find a significant 
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decrease of 38.34 intercept days in training for an individual in the control group for whom 
other selected characteristics did not change within 2015-2016 survey years. Its domination 
over statistically insignificant increase between 2014 and 2015 survey years is proven by the 
trend effect of -21.37 in the last column. We find an unusually high persistent negative effect 
of changing the firm location from West to East Germany, attributed to a single influential case. 
Therefore, we omit it in the main body of findings and proceed with the remaining predictors.   
There are several further implications on training volume with regard to the change in 
the job- and performance-related, as well as firm-level characteristics. On the contrary to the 
number of enrollments, we find a significantly positive effect of switching to a larger company. 
Combining two indicators, we conclude that larger companies tend to offer less further 
education events, but those of a longer duration. The finding could be assigned to the specificity 
of work in small firms discussed in the theoretical overview. In particular, employees there tend 
to fulfill the broader variety of tasks, hence, more shorter training events are needed. Instead, 
workers of large companies are more specifically focused on their field of functions and their 
further education is, therefore, more depth-oriented.  
In addition to this, we observe a contradicting effect of job tenure and work experience 
variables in the four constructed models.  Namely, prior to the law implementation, mastering 
firm-specific skills has been of a major importance for predicting training participation 
intensity; and higher training volumes are attributed to the persons having gained less of them. 
Namely, each extra year of work by the current employer is associated with an estimated 
decrease in the expectation of training volume of -12.94. After the law implementation, 
industry- and/or individual-specific (general) skills additionally controlled by work experience 
are with the effect size of 36.94 and 22.09 beneficial for further human capital investments, 
slightly dominating over the impact of firm-level characteristics. The difference might reflect 
the fact that prior to the labor price increase improving already established production process 
is more economically reasonable than innovations, and therefore, more urgent for the employer 
to generate the additional income for salaries in advance. Therefore, newly recruited employees 
enjoyed the most human capital investments and/or showed higher training initiative under the 
fear of losing the current workplace. After the law implementation, strategic human resource 
development through higher investment level by abler more experienced persons regulates 
intensity of training participation instead. The effect sizes for the observed standardized 
coefficients are placed in the same range between small and medium.  
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Table  37. Determinants of the Change in the Training Volume under the Minimum Wage 
Introduction: First Differences Regression 
 
 2014-2015 OLS 2015-2016 OLS 2014-2016 OLS Combined GLS 
B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) 
Constant 9.74 (8.03) -38.34* (16.17) 0.43 (6.62) -21.37*** (8.02) 
Firm location  -196.80*** (8.76) 0.00 (0.00) -167.13*** (9.86) -184.72*** (24.14) 
Business sector -11.58 (8.76) 10.49 (9.60) 3.12 (2.73) 5.25 (6.25) 
Company size  0.28 (1.65) 11.59* (5.41) -3.38 (1.83) 7.30** (2.92) 
Affection by the minimum wage introduction -3.86 (2.22) -0.92 (8.69) 2.96 (2.46) -1.73 (4.24) 
Labor income 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Job tenure -12.94** (4.70) -0.09 (1.37) 0.20 (0.99) -0.14 (0.77) 
Job complexity -0.35 (2.09) -6.09 (20.59) 3.35 (2.59) 0.45 (5.18) 
Contract duration 4.26 (3.86) 5.47 (19.52) 9.79 (9.31) 5.33 (8.15) 
Employment form  1.34 (5.17) -3.70 (20.50) -2.28 (3.37) -3.13 (10.03) 
Work experience 3.60 (4.21) 36.94* (15.59) -1.72 (3.01) 22.09*** (7.47) 
N 65 65 55 130 
R2 0.91 0.18 0.91  
Equation dummy    -3.43 (4.66) 
Wald Chi2    86.56*** 
 
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
Table  38. Determinants of the Change in the Training Volume under the Minimum Wage 
Introduction: First Differences Regression (Standardized Coefficients) 
 
 2014-2015 OLS 2015-2016 OLS 2014-2016 OLS Combined GLS 
Beta  Beta Beta Beta 
Firm location  -0.94*** 0.00 -0.89*** -0.74*** 
Business sector -0.08 0.14 0.06 0.06 
Company size  0.01 0.28* -0.09 0.18**  
Affection by the minimum wage introduction -0.07 -0.01 0.06 -0.03  
Labor income 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.02 
Job tenure -0.17** -0.01 0.01 -0.01 
Job complexity -0.01 -0.04 0.07 0.01 
Contract duration 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.05 
Employment form  0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Work experience 0.04 0.30* -0.03 0.22*** 
Equation dummy    -0.06 
 
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
Due to the fact that the regression models of each panel space are calculated on the basis 
of different datasets, we are able to compare standardized coefficients within columns only. 
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Similar to the training incidence, its intensity is mainly determined by the workplace 
characteristics.  Whereas firm-level ones are clearly dominating for the number of enrollments 
(strengthened by an additional impact of the business sector change), they are of almost an 
equal importance as individual performance-related characteristic of work experience for the 
training volume. This indicates a high level of the impact of organizational decisions in the first 
case and their moderation by workers’ employment background in the second one. All the 
presented results are ensured by valid model estimates.  
The first stage of the analysis provides limited evidences for a medium positive impact 
of the law implementation on training intensity for the workers in a direct response to the 
minimum wage adjustment treatment group and conditional negative effect with regard to the 
anticipatory wage adjustments control group. Although both inspected dependent variables 
show different patterns of change, they share high impact of workplace characteristics, which 
indicates the decisive role of the employer in the intensity of training participation on the 
observed labor market segment. The comprehensive conclusion is performed factoring for 
group-specific tendencies.  
 
 
4.4.2. Predictors: Within and Between-Group Comparison. Interaction Effects 
 
 
As for the two already inspected dependent variables, we employ interaction and 
marginal effects to characterize group heterogeneities. For the clear presentation of the results 
under the broadened observation period and both dependent variables measured on a metric 
scale, we discuss statistically significant results only. The theoretical effects that are not 
included in the interpreted body of findings are to be considered unimportant for training 
intensity on the minimum wage labor market.     
As the introduced method of analysis works with the difference scores instead of actual 
values of the variables, estimating the systematic impact of the wage adjustment within 
observation periods by interaction effects is needed in terms of the joined model only. OLS 
models for the two measurement points perform the estimation by nature of their construction. 
Table 39 below proves previously indicated results. We find higher number of training events 
for the members of the treatment group in comparison to those of the control group in 2015-
2016 observation periods, provided that other characteristics are held stable. No meaningful 
interaction effects are indicated for the training volume, which, as discussed, has significantly 
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decreased after the law implementation for the members of the control group who have not 
changed their listed explanatory characteristics.  
 
Table  39. Determinants of the Change in the Training Intensity: Interaction Effects 
(Affection by the Minimum Wage Introduction and Equation Dummy) in the GLS 
Population-Averaged Model  
 
 Number of 
enrollments: B(SE) 
Training  
volume: B(SE) 
Constant -0.99 (0.56) -22.20** (8.27) 
Firm location -1.04 (2.47) -185.73*** (6.27) 
Business sector  0.92** (0.37) 5.06 (6.27) 
Company size -0.59** (0.22) 7.33** (2.92) 
Labor income 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Job tenure 0.03 (0.07) -0.15 (0.77) 
Job complexity -0.11 (0.38) 0.44 (5.18) 
Contract duration -0.29 (0.70) 5.35 (8.14) 
Employment form -0.77 (0.82) -2.55 (10.10) 
Work experience 0.08 (0.39) 22.05*** (7.46) 
Affection by the minimum wage introduction #  
Equation dummy. Baseline: Control group # 2015-2016 
  
Control group # 2014-2015 1.30 (0.78) -1.53 (6.40) 
Treatment group # 2014-2015 0.60 (0.55) 0.10 (5.98) 
Treatment group # 2015-2016 1.66*** (0.55) -5.15 (6.17) 
 
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
An additional alternative for specifying the time trends within groups is calculating 
predictive margins to gain an understanding of the mean values of predicted annual changes.  
The results are presented in the Tables 40 and 41 below. Whereas for the number of training 
events those are identical in the direction of change to the previously presented ones, they 
deliver new insights for the dynamic of training volume. In particular, we observe a statistically 
significant average decrease of 6 days for the members of the treatment group prior to the law 
implementation, which is also present in the discussed descriptive statistics. This is not the case 
for an increase of 5.18 in a two-year perspective of 2014-2016. We attribute the effect to the 6 
indicated most influential cases, four of which represent usual increase in training volume for 
the treatment group and two – its major decrease for the units in the control group. Hence, the 
finding concerns individual cases and does not represent a tendency. This explains the absence 
of its impact on the reported total and average training volumes of the group.  
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Table  40. Change in the Number of Enrollments and Affection by the Minimum Wage 
Introduction: Predictive Margins   
 
 2014-2015 OLS 2015-2016 OLS 2014-2016 OLS Combined GLS 
Control group 0.60 -0.82 -0.23 -0.12 
Treatment group  -0.48 1.07* 0.17 0.39*** 
 
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
Table  41. Change in the Training Volume and Affection by the Minimum Wage 
Introduction: Predictive Margins   
 
 2014-2015 OLS 2015-2016 OLS 2014-2016 OLS Combined GLS 
Control group -2.14 1.36 2.17 -0.78 
Treatment group  -6.00*** 0.44 5.18*** -2.52 
 
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
Time trends of the variables measured on ordinary scales are most clearly represented 
in the differentiated conditional-effects-plots. Figure 11 below proves the negative influence of 
the change to a larger company on the number of enrollments within both groups. The effect is 
also held stable within two observation periods, indicating its independence on the minimum 
wage introduction.  
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Figure 11.  Change in the Number of Enrollments and Change of the Company Size under 
the Minimum Wage Introduction: Conditional-Effects-Plot 
 
 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
As noted, the predictor has an opposite effect for the training volume (shown in the 
Figure 12 below). It also moderately increases for both in a difference score of a second 
observation period. The significance of the company size variable across the four examined 
models allows to make a generalized interim conclusion. Despite the indicated discrepancies in 
the training incidence between the treatment and control groups on the basis of company size, 
those are absent for the training intensity. Hence, there are entry barriers for training 
participation with regard to the wage adjustment, combined to a simultaneous equality of 
opportunities in terms of the amount of human capital investments per participant. Differences 
within company size categories remain persistent across all the models.  
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Figure 12. Change in the Training Volume and Change of the Company Size under the 
Minimum Wage Introduction: Conditional-Effects-Plot 
 
 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
The baseline models of First Difference Regression show that change of the business 
sector does have an effect on the number of enrollments only. We find a significant interaction 
effect between the predictor and affection by the minimum wage introduction presented in the 
Table 42 below. Namely, change of the occupational sector for the person whose income was 
adjusted with accordance to the law implementation increases the total annual number of 
overtaken training events by 1.59. This provides limited evidences for following developmental 
strategies under company restructuring and/or recruitments. Those differ further in the 
magnitude with regard to the company size, as described above.   
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Table  42. Determinants of the Number of Enrollments: Interaction Effects (Change of 
the Business Sector and Affection by the Minimum Wage Introduction) 
 
 2014-2015 OLS 2015-2016 OLS 2014-2016 OLS Combined GLS 
B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) 
Constant -0.50 (2.27) -0.39 (1.42) -1.05 (1.98) -0.27 (0.38) 
Firm location  0.69 (2.21) 0.00 (0.00) 0.83 (3.00) -1.12 (2.60) 
Affection by the minimum wage introduction #  
Change of the business sector 
1.18 (5.34) 1.67 (1.09) 1.54 (0.98) 1.59*** (0.34) 
Company size 0.63 (0.42) -0.10 (0.47) -0.73 (0.55) -0.99** (0.17) 
Labor income 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Job tenure 0.15 (1.87) 0.05 (0.12) -0.04 (0.30) 0.01 (0.06) 
Job complexity 0.08 (0.53) -0.15 (1.82) 0.13 (0.78) 0.02 (0.29) 
Contract duration 0.03 (0.98) -1.08 (1.78) 0.09 (2.77) -0.58 (0.61) 
Employment form -1.70 (1.33) -0.90 (1.81) -0.83 (1.62)  -1.33 (0.67) 
Work experience 0.31 (1.02) 0.20 (1.36) 0.41 (0.88) 0.24 (0.26) 
N 65 65 55 130 
R2 0.08 0.07 0.10  
Equation dummy    0.13 (0.56) 
Wald Chi2    60.84*** 
 
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
Figures 12 and 13 show the group characteristics in the effect of workplace change and 
worker’s employment background. Despite the fact that direction of the relationship between 
the outcome and predictor remain the same on four graphics, a closer look with regard to the 
values of the predictive margins is needed for group comparison. In particular, the workers in 
the control group risk the most decrease in the training volume by switching the workplace of 
a long job tenure (sample maximum: 30 years). The fall becomes less as the job tenure of the 
previous employment relationship shortens. On the one hand, this is attributed to the reduced 
need for training due to already acquired abilities. Alternatively, job tenure of a long duration 
is also a sign for the worker’s older age that decreases human capital investment motivation. 
The same pattern is observed in the treatment group with the difference in a baseline level. This 
implies that the workers in the treatment group who continued working by the current employer 
have received a minor increase in the number of days of further education. On the contrary, 
training volume shortens in the control group unless having stayed at the workplace for the 
previous year. The exact decimal values of the change in both predictors are ambiguous due to 
the annual differences in the interviewing dates. Law implementation negatively affects the 
strength of the described statistical relationships.  
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Figure 13. Change in the Training Volume and Change of the Job Tenure under the 
Minimum Wage Introduction: Conditional-Effects-Plot 
 
 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
The same pattern is indicated by the change in work experience. The discussion in the 
first part of the analysis has covered the positive impact of its increase on the amount of human 
capital investments measured as a total annual training volume. Similar to the job tenure, the 
effect of the regressor is more profoundly expressed in the treatment group. In this case, 
absolute zero point in the difference score does not have a practical application, as sample 
includes persons employed in both years. Values that are very close to zero refer to the job start 
at the end of the year prior to the data collection. Annual comparison does not support an 
assumption in the increase in strategic human resources activities on the work experience basis 
after the minimum wage implementation. Those actually decrease in comparison to the previous 
observation period, for which the effect has not appeared as significant in the baseline model.  
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Figure 14. Change in the Training Volume and Change of the Work Experience under the 
Minimum Wage Introduction: Conditional-Effects-Plot 
 
 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
Table 43 summarizes the previous findings for the number of training events. Its 
increase after the minimum wage adjustment in accordance to the law is independent on the 
change of other controlled characteristics of the employees. Nevertheless, transitions in those 
of a firm level are of a higher statistical strength in predicting the dependent variable. Its 
strongest negative relationships are observed with the difference score by the company size 
under the absence of group-specific and time trends. The second and last indicated time-
changing predictor in the number of enrollments is the significant interaction effect of the 
occupational sector switch for the treatment group. 
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Table  43. Overall, Within- and Between-Groups Effects of Significant Predictors of 
Change of the Number of Enrollments under the Minimum Wage Introduction 
 
Change in the 
predictor 
Relationships: Baseline 
model 
Between-group 
differences  
Change in the strength of the relationships after the 
minimum wage implementation 
Control group Treatment group 
Company size Inverse No No No 
Business 
sector 
Positive impact on dependent 
variable 
Yes No No 
 
Source: Chapters 4.4.1-4.4.2 of the paper 
 
Table 44 does the same for the change in training volume. Prior analysis of statistical 
significances delivers limited evidences for its decrease for the members of the treatment group 
before the law implementation and for those of the control group afterwards particularly as well 
as in the whole observation period. These patterns are restrictedly reflected in the effect of the 
listed predictors. Namely positive relationship of the training volume difference score are 
captured with those of the work experience and job tenure. Complications for the interpretation 
under the group-specific values have been addressed in the respective parts of the chapter. The 
score of the change in the company size stands in the positive connection with the increase in 
training volume for both groups. Comparing the statistical strength of three predictors in a row 
is problematic due to the drawn limitations.  
 
Table  44. Overall, Within- and Between-Groups Effects of Significant Predictors of 
Change of the Training Volume under the Minimum Wage Introduction 
 
Change in the 
predictor 
Relationships: Baseline 
model 
Between-group 
differences  
Change in the strength of the relationships after the 
minimum wage implementation 
Control group Treatment group 
Work experience Positive Yes Decrease Decrease 
Job tenure Positive (See 
interpretation) 
Yes Decrease Decrease 
Company size Positive No Increase Increase 
 
Source: Chapters 4.4.1-4.4.2 of the paper 
 
 
 
 
125 
 
The current chapter closes the analysis of the indicators of training participation and 
provision with regard to the minimum wage introduction. To keep the coherence in the 
presentation of results and make reading the paper suitable for inspecting indicators separately, 
we first formulate the interim conclusion for the training intensity only. The synthesis of all the 
drawn conclusions is performed in last part of the closing chapter.  
 
 
4.3.3. Minimum Wage Introduction and Training Intensity: Interim Conclusion 
 
The analysis of training intensity has solidly broadened our understanding of the 
minimum wage impact on further education of the affected workers. Usage of several metric 
variables, comprehensive experimental logic of the method, multidimensional interpretations 
exclude the possibility of a holistic answer for the stated research question. The results of this 
stage of analysis are also contrasting from the previous ones due to their implication for the 
training participants only and operation on the difference scores instead of the actual values of 
the variables. Reasons for these methodological decisions and their benefits have been 
discussed on the respective stages of the analytical procedure.  
The number of enrollments show consistent results when comparing descriptive 
statistics and with their significance analysis. We find a moderate positive impact on the number 
of training events after the law implementation for the workers whose wage has been adjusted 
in a juridically prescribed time frame in comparison to those who have been covered by the 
anticipatory wage adjustments. The finding is also valid for the whole observation period either, 
though with the lower effect size and minor inconsistencies with the descriptive statistics due 
to the balanced panel construction. For the members of the treatment group, the effect of the 
predictor is enhanced by the occupational sector adjustments. Hence, strategies for the human 
resource and organizational development, production process optimization and advancement in 
response to the increased labor price are present with regard to broadening the learning 
spectrum.  
In comparison to the number of further education events, training volume is more 
sensitive to individual-level variation instead of one of organizational-level decisions. Hence, 
its dynamic for the central research question is less clearly articulated. In particular, we observe 
limited evidences for a decrease in training volume for the directly affected workers before the 
law implementation and for the selected observations in the control group afterwards, when 
controlling for the change in other explanatory characteristics. For this reason, it is reasonable 
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to explain the above described developmental strategies by the cost-saving ones through 
shortening the duration of training events. The observed significant relationships of the latter 
with the work experience and job tenure variables, provides additional insights with regard to 
worker’s employment biography and latently, age.  
Special attention should be given to the dynamics of both predictors in relation to the 
change in the employing company size. First, it has provided an additional prove for the 
tendency of shortening the duration of training events when their number increases. The 
evidence is mediated by the specificity of work in the companies of different sizes. Second, it 
has opened an additional discussion field upon the equality of organizational opportunities 
independent of training incidence expansion. The stability of the predictor for the number of 
enrollments and its minor dynamics with regard to the training volume, also allow for its 
attribution to the overall strategies of further education participation and provision instead of 
the minimum wage introduction framework.  
Although the law does have a significant impact on training intensity, its other predictors 
included in the model implicitly and controlled as unobserved unit effect are dominating it. 
Minimum wage does not radically change the strategies of training behavior and/or provision 
but corrects them for group specifics at the given time-points. Despite the differences in the 
dynamic of selected indicators, they remain subordinate for the patterns of the human capital 
theory. Formulated explanations for the observed patterns are drawn on the theoretical basis 
and are not free of the approached limitations. The incorporation of the three stages of findings 
into a common model and their comprehensive discussion are the subjects of the concluding 
chapter.  
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Chapter 5. Implication of the Research Results and Conclusion 
 
5.1. Aggregation of the Findings  
 
 
Further education fulfills the number of functions that are vital for both firms and 
employees. From the company’s side, training demonstrates the orientation for technological 
innovations and organizational development. Under a major expansion of further education in 
the recent decade, it has become one of the essential standards of the employment quality to 
attract and retain qualified labor force. In return, workers are placed under the reciprocal 
pressure to realize own professionalization initiative, continuously acquire new skills and 
develop present ones through specialization. Nevertheless, this perspective is not 
unconditionally transferable to the minimum wage labor market. Before the law introduction, 
potentially affected groups have already shown lower training participation. Profound labor 
price increase has made its further development highly debatable. We contribute to this 
discussion by empirical evidences and their implications to the theory.  
For the treatment assignment, we use a subjective assessment on the basis of the branch 
tariff adjustment which allows differentiating between employees who have received a pay 
raise within the juridically prescribed period and those falling under the anticipatory wage 
adjustments. This allows modelling the factual event of the law impact, whereas labor income 
is used as the measure of the affectedness magnitude. At this point, we have fulfilled the goal 
of separating the increase in the hourly wage due to the establishment of the minimum one from 
the additional payments, bonuses, compensations for the extra work, etc. We have explicitly 
excluded the cases of incompliance with the law to control for the effect of the actual labor 
price increase. Our findings advocate the fact that it is the wage adjustment point and not the 
absolute sum of the income that regulate human capital investments on the minimum wage 
labor market.  
The limitation of the current sample construction is made transparent either. We do 
capture inconsistencies in the statistical profiles of its two parts. As the treatment and control 
groups do not differ in the direction of relationships the central variables other than those 
answering the research question, we suggest the extrapolation of our findings for predicting the 
training provision and participation on the minimum wage labor market. At the same time, we 
place a stronger emphasis on the notion of a direct affection by the law and check the robustness 
in between and within-groups comparisons. Members of the control group prominently show 
higher rate of human capital investments expansion; therefore, we cannot fully reject the 
assumption that the indicated discrepancies in the characteristics are potential sources, as well 
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as outcomes of an earlier income raise. With this, we fulfill the central research objective 
presenting the evidences for the dynamics of training indicators and their predictors on the 
minimum wage labor market. 
Illustration 3 summarizes the findings of the current paper with the focus on trends of 
the dependent variables. Due to the nature of the employed statistical procedures, it is possible 
to compare the directions of the relationships only as well as synthesize the conclusions upon 
their content. Each model is a product of implication of the comprehensive theoretical overview 
for the methodology, fitted to the nature of the research question. In order to schematically 
present the results, we differentiate between three notions with regard to the time trends: 
absence of tendencies (ellipse), meaningful absolute increase (chevron) and limited evidences 
for a downward adjustment (pentagon). The separation between the latter two is performed on 
the basis of the pattern of statistical significances. In the first case, variables show the same 
character of change throughout the baseline model and a robustness check; in the second one 
their coefficients are only episodically significant (e.g. marginal effects). The colors are 
introduced to mark outcomes with respective predictors. The latter are ranked with regard to 
the magnitude of their effect in the baseline model and will be discussed later in detail. 
Employing the variety of solutions for modelling the panel data comes at the cost of limitation 
of their cross-model comparison. The timeline represents the actual calendar years and findings 
fitted into it, as discussed in the Research Design (Illustration 2).  
The summary of findings proves the complexity of the minimum wage introduction 
impact on the training participation of the affected workers. The current research shows that 
the concept of human capital investments is not ambiguous. The choice of the indicator is 
crucial for estimating the effect of the labor price increase at different stages of the law 
implementation. Training incidence, which is a general expansion measure for training 
participation, does not exhibit any statistically significant time trends. This appears plausible 
because of the inter-compensation between different sources of human capital investments in 
the period of their adjustment. To what extent each cost bearer contributes to the variation, 
remains an exercise for the future research to explore. We have presented a number of valid 
evidences for a clear domination of the firm in these terms. Moreover, the announcement upon 
the law introduction induces a further increase in employer-financed training incidence. As the 
latter is a sign for developmental and production optimization strategies through training 
provision, it appears comprehensible that they are rational for a firm to adopt prior to the labor 
price increase in order to cover the latter with the gained profits.  Further empirical insights are 
needed to detect the upcoming shifts of the variable. Additionally, the underlined productivity 
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update is reflected in an upward adjustment in the number of enrollments after the minimum 
wage implementation for the workers who have received a pay raise at this time. This clearly 
reflects the precise strategy of human resources development. The variety of training measures 
potentially represents the spectrum for acquisition of additional skills. Due to its high 
organizational and financial costs, it is reasonable to perform on a group-specific selective 
basis. On the one hand, those are the workers who most urgently need the productivity increase, 
as their labor has instantly become more expensive. On the other hand, human capital 
investments are supposed to bring the most return when the workers already have a sufficient 
basis for further qualifying. The latter is predominantly one’s training background, which is 
controlled by constructing the indicator for the participants only. Finally, the data provides 
evidences that the upcoming training costs are potentially passed along and absorbed by the 
two indicated negative shifts in the training volume. Despite the fact that those are cost-saving 
initiatives, they are minor in their influence on the overall training expansion and content 
variety. These are also potential signs for the discussed optimization of training participation 
itself through shortening the duration of courses, changing their content and composition 
without an effect on the training expansion. Hence, we advocate the prevalence of the “high 
road” strategy with regard to the law introduction. To sum it up, we conclude upon the moderate 
differentiated positive effect of the minimum wage on training opportunities for the affected 
workers in Germany.  
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Illustration 3. Minimum Wage Introduction in Germany and Training for the Affected 
Workers: Summary of Findings  
 
 
 
Source: Chapter 4 of the paper  
 
Illustration 4 extends the upper part of the previous scheme with regard to the direction 
and magnitude of the influence of predictors. The magnitude is constructed as a measure of 
frequency of statistical significance of the regressor across all models. Four groups of 
independent variables are derived with regard to the number of predicted outcomes (listed in 
black) and marked with descending blocks. The predictors are further classified according to 
the type of characteristics: firm-level (pink), individual work-related (purple), individual 
performance-related (grey) and personal (blue). We also differentiate between positive (marked 
with green) and negative (marked with red) impacts on the dependent variable(s).  
Characteristics that are related to the workplace solidly contribute to establishing 
discrepancies in human capital investments for all the cost bearers. It is worth noticing that both 
dominating firm-level variables show the same implication when differentiating between 
overall training incidence and one provided by an employer. This confirms the primary 
assumption of the human capital theory for the incorporation of different sources for 
investments towards the unified standards of credibility. Therefore, the influence of labor force 
characteristics and further education context is reciprocal. Compliance with the human capital 
theory is preserved by the workplace characteristics on the individual level as well. Those go 
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in line with the affection of different positions by the minimum wage introduction and imply 
reproduction of training provision inequalities within the current observation period. The 
assumptions of the signal theory are hold valid either, due to the significance of education for 
the employer’s training cost coverage only. Screening the most abler persons on the basis of 
formal certificates basis constitutes a clear feature of a firm investment decision in comparison 
to other training cost bearers. The impact of the job tenure and work experience characteristics 
is not by default integrated in this argument, as its significance is predominantly driven by an 
emerging workplace transition and not the complete employment background of the worker. 
Instead, training incidence shows sensitivity towards personal characteristics, namely gender. 
It is reflected in the baseline model as well as in comparative focus on the employment type 
and business sectors. The latter is a product of the branch-specific labor force compositions, 
whereas others potentially reflect differences in perceiving minimum wage and/or part-time 
employment in a gender perspective. Focused qualitative research would become the most 
appropriate methodological solution with this regard. Notably, the influence of other personal 
characteristics is virtually zero. We believe that this is a result of a homogenous socio-
demographic structure of the studied employees’ segment, in comparison to others, absorbing 
the whole body of predicted disadvantages.  
 
Illustration 4. Predictors of Human Capital Investments under the Minimum Wage 
Introduction: Summary of Findings  
 
 
 
Source: Chapter 4 of the paper  
132 
 
The results of the current analysis entitle company size as the most important predictor 
of the human capital investments on the minimum wage labor market, as it is highly significant 
for all the four inspected indicators. This is plausible with regard to a high importance of the 
variable for defining the distribution of the minimum wage impact, firm economic behavior 
and characteristics of the employed labor force. Illustration 5 deepens the understanding of the 
relationships of different measures of training and company size. We use following attributes 
for meaningful connections. Positive impact on the outcome is marked with green and negative 
one with red. The increase of the influence is marked with a pentagon and its stability with an 
ellipse. Between-group inequalities are demonstrated in the thick blocks by their absence and 
thin ones when they are present.  
In particular, we find a dominating positive relationship between the company size and 
the incidence and amount of human capital investments, except for the number of enrollments. 
The latter is relevant with regard to the functional specificity and labor division strategies in 
the companies of different scope, discussed in detail for respective variables. The presence of 
strengthening the relationship between the predictor and the outcome as an alternative to the 
absence of a meaningful time trend is a sufficient basis to conclude upon a moderate positive 
effect of the minimum wage introduction with regard to the company size. On the one hand, we 
do observe an increase of employer-financed training incidence and training volume for the 
companies of all sizes, but it goes in line with an established framework of inequalities that 
does not exhibit major development. The latter is driven by the stability of training incidence 
indicator with regard to the central research question.  At the same time, the amount of human 
capital investments has the most potential for diminishing between-group inequalities of 
training provision. Although the companies still exhibit major selectivity with regard to the 
further education expansion, participants are treated equally both in the number and duration of 
training events. The most comprehensive conclusion with this regard could be made comparing 
all groups of workers.  
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Illustration 5. Company Size and Training under the Minimum Wage Introduction in 
Germany: Summary of Findings 
 
 
 
Source: Chapter 4 of the paper  
 
Business sector is significant by the three of four presented indicators and with this is 
the second most important predictor of human capital investments on the minimum wage labor 
market. It is both a basis for the wage adjustment and training provision policies, technological 
standards and developments, characteristics and requirements of the workforce. Illustration 6 
summarizes graphically the findings upon the training participation and its development in the 
largest sectors of the minimum wage labor market, where further education is highly 
widespread. Similar to the previous scheme, we separate several types of logical relations: a 
meaningful increase of the employer-financed training incidence under the preservation of 
between-group inequalities (chevron), a meaningful increase of the employer-financed training 
incidence without between-group differences (arrow right), an overall high level of training 
incidence without between-group differences (ellipse), an overall high level of training 
incidence under the preservation of between-group inequalities (slanted edges) and a 
meaningful increase in the number of enrollments in the experimental participants’ group (thick 
chevron). The current state of research characterizes Manufacturing as a suitable representation 
of a highly developed branch with the high level of training participation, therefore, it serves as 
the baseline category.   
It is important to combine the findings upon different indicators to gain an understanding 
of how the training incidence level within the branch influences employers’ human capital 
investment decisions. In particular, a higher level of employer-financed training provision in 
the Transportation and storage and Human health and social work activities branches is not a 
product of employers’ developmental strategies on their own as it is the case in the sectors 
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below but takes place in response to the high sectoral further education standards. No 
straightforward theoretical interpretation is derived on the basis of between-group inequalities, 
as three sectors, for which both indicators are available, show different combinations of these 
relationships. In particular, in the Human health and social work activities sector, higher levels 
of both training incidence and employer-financed one are observed for the control group. This 
is potentially attributed to the strict hierarchical structure of tasks and gains in the branch that 
discourage employee’s training initiatives. In Manufacturing, the tasks are also hierarchically 
distributed, but promotion does not require completing an additional formal degree, as it is often 
the case in the Human health and social work activities sector. Therefore, between-group 
differences in the training incidence are absent. The Transportation and storage branch does not 
exhibit group-specific differences with regard to both terms. For the two lower sectors, variation 
upon the employer-financed training incidence is significant only. It is reasonable to relate the 
group inequalities of training provision in the Education branch to those described for the 
Human health and social work activities. In the “Other sectors” category, they are absent as it 
does not demonstrate a particular institutional framework but is a cumulative representation of 
those branches less affected by the minimum wage introduction. Remarkably, an increase in 
the number of enrollments for the treatment group under the sectoral change takes place 
independently of the branch.  
Our findings imply that the primary further education standards in the business sectors  
dominate the impact of the minimum wage introduction. We find limited evidences for an 
increase in employer-provided training incidence in the sectors of a higher technological 
development and knowledge intense work and/or those providing public services. As there is 
no statistically significant negative impact for the sectors with the highest shares of workers 
affected by the law, the presented baseline explanations are more comprehensible for explaining 
higher rates of training participation in these branches in comparison to the lower impact of the 
law for them. Transportation and storage sector partially falls under a twofold interpretation 
with this regard. On the one hand, it does include Taxis that are one of the major target groups 
of the legislation. On the other hand, their share within the whole branch is too low to be able 
to establish a meaningful positive effect of the minimum wage introduction on training 
opportunities for these workers. Taking into account the whole bench of findings, we define a 
business sector as an important institutional framework for training participation on the 
minimum wage labor market and not its emerging predictor with regard to the law 
implementation.  
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Illustration 6. Business Sector and Training under the Minimum Wage Introduction in 
Germany: Summary of Findings 
 
 
 
Source: Chapter 4 of the paper  
 
Our findings imply the differentiated impact of the minimum wage introduction on 
various indicators of human capital investments and, with this, prove the necessity of parallel 
trends’ comparison for several of them to achieve comprehensive modelling of casual 
relationships. The impacts of predictors remain plausible in their relations to the minimum wage 
introduction. Nevertheless, their magnitude goes in line with the predominating theoretical 
framework and episodically enhances it. Therefore, training dynamics on the minimum wage 
labor market is beneficial to study in its terms. The short time period after the law introduction, 
prevalence of other labor price-related issues, prioritization of other groups of workers in 
further education provision shape the impact of the minimum wage introduction towards 
reproducing previously established inequalities. The episodically observed increases in the 
dependent variables and cases of absence of the between-group inequalities form a basis for 
positive predictions with regard to the human capital development in the observed labor market. 
Its indicated peculiarities with regard to other segments are reflected in the several challenges 
towards patterns of the baseline theory. Table 45 summarizes the formal hypothesis check.  
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Table  45. Minimum Wage Introduction in Germany and Training for the Affected 
Workers: Hypothesis Check (Summary) 
 
Hypothesis Result 
Introduction of the legal minimum wage reproduces and deepens existing 
inequalities in training incidence and intensity of the affected workers.  
 
Confirmed 
On the contextual level, lower training participation is observed in the most 
affected sectors (Retail, Accommodation and food service activities, 
Transportation) and in small companies. Its higher rate is attributed to the East 
German establishments in comparison to the West ones.  
 
 
Partially confirmed 
In terms of the job-related characteristics, higher job complexity, permanent 
and/or full-time contracts have positive impact on training provision, whereas the 
relation of the latter two to labor income and job tenure is reverse.  
 
 
Partially confirmed 
For performance-related characteristics, education and training remain 
complements. The connection of the latter to work experience is opposite.  
 
Partially confirmed 
Personal characteristics affect training participation in the following way: 
younger age, male gender and absence of migration background increase the 
training chances of an employee. 
 
Rejected 
 
Source: Chapters 2 and 5.1 of the paper  
 
The current analysis makes clear that the patterns of training provision and participation 
under the minimum wage introduction go beyond the simplicity of straightforward theoretical 
links. Most of the hypothesis are confirmed only partially and are of a little scientific value 
without a detailed explanation. Before closing conclusions, we present a critical evaluation of 
the study in the next chapter.  
 
 
5.2. Evaluation of the Study  
 
As the current paper seeks to make representative conclusions on the country basis, it is 
important to make the shortcomings in the extrapolation of the findings transparent. As for any 
quantitative research, we have met numerous methodological choices that have established the 
limitations of the gained knowledge. The driving motivation behind is the clear fulfillment of 
the drawn research objectives, straightforward answer to its central question and conclusions. 
We do admit a share of arbitrariness in the current analytical procedure which is unavoidable 
in experiments and their quantitative evaluation under the absence of unified standards. 
Therefore, at these points alternative methodological solutions could be reasonable either. At 
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the same time, we advocate our research design as the most reasonable implication for the 
formulated problematics in the described scientific context.  
The paper starts with a comprehensive theoretical framework and revision of the main 
meaningful links and their predictors. We seek to establish the interdisciplinary approach that 
comes at the cost of reducing the complexity of single concepts. As we place our study in the 
framework of labor economic approach and human capital theory, our focus is limited by the 
level, dynamics and predictors of the dependent variables. Therefore, we suggest future 
research on the basis of further education panels capturing a greater variety of outcome 
indicators to detect the impact of the minimum wage introduction on different types of training 
depending on skills, organizational degree and form; their reference to the demand for different 
skills’ groups; cost shares in their financing. The current paper is not claimed to estimate 
comprehensively the outcome of the minimum wage but focuses on its further education 
impact. Therefore, we believe in the vital necessity to cover further changing aspects in the 
employment quality, workplace characteristics, subjective gains of both workers and employers 
after the law introduction.  
We overtake the order of evaluation criteria in the next two paragraphs from the 
nominated meta-analysis in the field of further education research (Glaub and Frese 2011) and 
make generalized conclusions with the bench of applied methodological literature. Our analysis 
is carried on using the sample of a high quality. Its size meets the predominant statistical 
requirements and the procedure of construction makes it representative for the population of 
the targeted individuals. The usage of the multi-themes survey minimized the selection bias that 
is still unavoidable in the balanced panel construction. The framework of the research design 
follows the policy evaluation procedure and implies a quasi-experimental logic. We use the 
control group to control for extraneous variables influencing the outcome and joined models 
for baseline conclusions within the whole labor market segment. Due to the nature of the 
research question and survey instrument, a complete randomization in the control and treatment 
group assignment is impossible. Therefore, we pay special attention to the dual interpretation 
of their socio-demographic differences. Further development of the research topic with regard 
to the target population would potentially include a single minimum wage sample construction 
to enable multilevel modelling. We do use the pre and post-intervention measurements to detect 
the development of variables over time. Though the current conclusions remain descriptive and 
short-term, whereas longer observation period will allow to treat the time trends 
comprehensively in the future. The usage of the secondary data of the German Socio-Economic 
Panel ensures the validity, reliability and objectivity of the measurements.  
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 The methodological application corresponds to the drawn research needs maximizing 
the benefits of the longitudinal dataset. The main body of findings are derived from the analysis 
for significance testing. We deliver a comprehensive analytical solution through the 
combination and inter-compensation of procedures. Descriptive statistics are employed for 
introductory and background information. We further check the robustness through the variety 
of postestimation procedures.  Alternative explanations of the results are achieved using 
multivariate techniques instead of less consecutive methods. Nevertheless, they are limited by 
the available range of explanatory variables and their given levels of measurement. A 
qualitative research is preferable for a deeper understanding of the outlined meaningful 
relationships and extending their argumentations.  
To sum it up, we encourage to perceive the results of the current analysis as the starting 
point of the minimum wage and training research in Germany and not as a final argument in its 
discussion. We have provided the maximum available range of evidences and their respective 
explanations that are possible to draw within the current state of issue. As for any another 
intervention or reform, the outcomes of the legal minimum wage might have a dynamic nature 
and several waves of adjustments. At this point, our findings comply with those of the 
competent researchers in the field, which is a further solid prove of their quality. Constant 
monitoring in the prolonged observation period, inclusion of additional indicators for the causes 
and outcomes, mixed-methods approach are the prominent directions for answering the open 
questions and extending the current findings.  
 
 
5.3. Conclusion 
 
The questions stated in the longitudinal nature refer to the bench of knowledge to be 
constantly developed. In the variety of currently available data, the answers become 
furthermore complicated and, therefore, even more valuable. Nevertheless, the major goal of 
science is to gain them at the single time points for falsification and verification. Both minimum 
wage and further education research fields are no exceptions in these terms. Within both topics, 
a great variety of nominated panel studies, administrative data, recently gaining popularity Big 
Data are assessible to the scholars to monitor comprehensively upcoming events, gain new 
insights on the past ones and establish casual relationships between both. Qualitative studies 
are no less beneficial for broadening single perspectives and selected issues.  Our research 
ambition has been to deliver the interdisciplinary importance, complexity of interrelation and 
internal variety of the approached fields. Providing an emerging answer to a widely discussed 
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contemporary problematics, we hope to encourage alternative methodological solutions and 
future related studies.  
We have made clear that the minimum wage introduction in Germany does follow a 
“quality enhancing high road” strategy. Nevertheless, it comes at the costs of other adjustment 
channels, as well as preserves previously established inequalities. For the latter, we have shown 
a differentiated picture under the focus on various firm- and individual-level indicators. The 
valid evidences for the complexity of training provision policies and participants’ further 
education behavior have been discussed with regard to the impact of the minimum wage 
introduction on various indicators. The predominant theoretical framework does provide the 
guidelines for the meaningful relationships but is not sufficient for explaining all of them in the 
employment relationships of the minimum wage labor market. We have aimed to draw the 
attention to the necessity of the separated approach towards its studying.  
Lifelong learning is one of the most powerful instruments to compensate for the chance 
inequalities of the initial education. It is an important component of the firm economic growth 
and individual professional development. It is an indicator of employment quality and an 
element of socialization. On the national level, it is one of the decisive characteristics of the 
country’s labor force and its competitiveness. Nevertheless, coverage of the training costs often 
remains a point of conflict. It is furthermore common case for the low-paid low-skilled workers, 
who are in its most need. The topic is up to date in Germany, where the standards of 
employment relationships have already gone beyond the availability of basic competencies for 
performing the tasks and financial labor compensation. In its societal value, this research 
contributes to discussing on-the-job training as the potential solution for this inequality of 
outcomes. It is a solution that meets the interests of all the affected actors, is oriented for 
innovation and contributes to the common welfare.  
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Appendix  
 
Table  46. Measurement of Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
Concept Original 
SOEP 
long 
variable 
Variable (new) Values 
(new) 
Incorporation 
into analysis 
Dependent Variables 
Training 
incidence 
PLG0269 genpart: Person 
participated in 
training in a given 
year, at any cost 
1-Yes 
0-No 
Dummy 
Employer-
financed 
training 
incidence 
PLG0275 
PLG0286 
emppay:  
One most 
important training 
measure paid by 
employer 
1-Yes 
0-No 
Dummy 
Training 
intensity: 
number of 
enrollments 
PLG0270 trameas: Total 
number of training 
measures overtaken 
Metric variable Metric 
Training 
intensity: 
training 
volume (total 
duration of 
events in 
days) 
PLG0271 traday: Total 
number of days 
which the training 
measures took 
place 
Metric variable Metric 
Independent variables: Firm level 
Firm location  PLJ0116 jobloc: Location of 
the job 
1-West Germany 
0-East Germany, 
incl. Berlin 
Dummy 
151 
 
Business 
sector 
PGNACE sector: 2 Digit 
NACE industry, 
sector 
0-Manufacturing  
1-Wholesale and 
retail trade, repair 
of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles 
2-Accommodation 
and food service 
activities  
3-Transportation 
and storage 
4-Administrative 
and support service 
activities 
5-Education 
6-Human health 
and social work 
activities 
7-Other sectors 
Categories’ 
dummies 
Reference 
category: 0-
Manufacturing 
Company 
size 
 
 
PGALLB
E 
comp_size: Core 
category size of the 
company 
1 - LT 20 
2 - GE 20 LT 200 
3 - GE 200 LT 
2000 
4 - GE 2000 
Categories’ 
dummies  
Reference 
category: 1- 
LT 20 
Independent variables: Individual level (Job-related) 
Affection by 
the minimum 
wage 
introduction 
PLC0508 
PLC0509 
PLC0510 
PLC0511 
PLC0512 
affect: Affection by 
the law 
introduction 
0-Control group 
(8.50 in 2014 and 
in 2015) 
1-Treatment group 
(no minimum wage 
or less than 8.50 in 
2014 and 8.50 and 
above in 2015) 
Dummy 
152 
 
Labor 
income 
PGLABG
RO 
labor_inc: Current 
gross labor income 
in Euro 
Generic metric 
variable  
Metric 
Job tenure PGERWZ
EIT 
empdur: Length of 
time with firm  
Generic metric 
variable 
Metric 
Job 
complexity: 
training 
required for 
the position 
PGAUSB requ_tra: Required 
training for job 
1-No training 
required 
2-Introduction to 
the job  
3-On-the-job 
training or courses 
4-Vocational 
training 
5-University 
degree or college 
Categories’ 
dummies  
Reference 
category: 
1- No training 
required 
Contract 
duration 
PLB0037 type_cont:Duration 
of work contract 
0-Temporary job 
1-Permanent job 
Dummy 
Employment 
form 
PGEMPL
ST 
emptype: Type of 
employment  
1-Full-time 
employment 
2-Part-time 
employment 
3-Marginal 
employment 
Categories’ 
dummies  
Reference 
category: 1-
Full-time 
employment 
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Independent variables: Individual level (Performance-related) 
Education as 
a formal 
(highest) 
degree 
PGISCED
11 
edulevel: ISCED-
2011-classification 
0-Lower secondary 
education and 
below 
1-Upper secondary 
education 
2-Post-secondary 
non-tertiary 
education  
3-Short-cycle 
tertiary education 
4-Bachelors or 
equivalent level 
5-Masters or 
equivalent level 
and above 
 
Categories’ 
dummies  
Reference 
category: 
0-Lower 
secondary 
education and 
below 
 
Education as 
duration of 
studies 
PGBILZE
IT 
edu_ye: Amount of 
education or 
training in years 
Generic metric 
variable 
Metric 
Work 
experience 
PGEXPFT 
PGEXPPT 
work_exp_total: 
total working 
experience  
Generic metric 
variable  
Metric 
Independent variables: Individual level (Personal) 
Age D11101 age: Age of 
individual 
Generic metric 
variable 
Metric 
Gender SEX sex: Gender of 
individual 
0-Female 
1-Male 
 
Dummy 
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Migration 
background 
MIGBAC
K 
migback: 
Migration 
background 
1-No migration 
background 
2-Direct migration 
background 
3-Indirect 
migration 
background 
Categories’ 
dummies  
Reference 
category: 1-No 
migration 
background 
Survey year 
Year dummy SYEAR SYEAR: Survey 
year 
2014, 2015 and 
2016 
Categories’ 
dummies 
Reference 
category: 2014 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own recoding 
 
Table  47. Descriptive Statistics for Nominal Dependent Variables 
 
 
Concept 
Survey 
year 
All (%) Control group (%) Treatment group (%) 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
All observations 
 
Training participation 
 
2014 23.41 78.59 29.30 70.70 20.75 79.25 
2015 19.94 80.06 27.89 72.11 16.52 83.48 
2016 22.91 77.09 30.41 69.59 19.77 80.23 
Training paid by the 
employer 
2014 15.08 84.92 21.02 78.98 12.39 87.61 
2015 16.93 83.07 24.74 75.26 13.57 86.43 
Training paid from 
other sources 
2014 8.33 91.67 8.28 91.72 8.36 91.64 
2015 3.01 96.99 3.16 96.84 2.94 97.06 
Participants (“No” answer indicates that training has been paid from other sources than employer)  
Training paid by the  
employer 
2014 64.41 35.59 71.74 28.26 59.72 40.28 
2015 84.92 15.08 88.68 11.32 82.19 17.81 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
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Table  48. Descriptive Statistics for Metric Dependent Variables 
 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Concept 
Survey  
year 
All (%) Control group (%) Treatment group (%) 
Mean Std Dev  Mean Std Dev  Mean Std Dev 
All observations 
 2014 0.59 1.42 0.75 1.48 0.51 1.38 
Number of  2015 0.48 1.33 0.76 1.76 0.36 1.07 
enrollments 2016 0.57 1.37 0.72 1.32 0.51 1.39 
 All 0.54 1.37 0.75 1.55 0.45 1.28 
 2014 3.37 18.38 3.08 16.52 3.50 19.19 
Training volume  2015 2.66 14.23 4.40 20.44 1.92 10.42 
 2016 2.41 13.02 3.22 15.82 2.07 11.67 
 All 2.80 15.30 3.63 17.91 2.45 14.01 
Participants 
 
Number of  
enrollments 
2014 2.53 1.93 2.59 1.67 2.49 2.10 
2015 2.41 2.05 2.74 2.40 2.18 1.73 
2016 2.49 1.87 2.38 1.34 2.56 2.15 
All 2.47 1.95 2.58 1.88 2.40 2.00 
 
 
Training volume 
2014 14.47 36.01 10.61 29.51 16.93 39.61 
2015 13.37 29.63 15.77 36.56 11.62 23.48 
2016 10.51 25.68 10.6 27.49 10.46 24.65 
All 12.81 30.71 12.51 31.61 13.02 30.16 
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Table  49. Descriptive Statistics for Nominal and Ordinal Independent Variables: 
Frequencies 
 
 
Concept 
 
Value (short) 
All (%) Control group (%) Treatment group (%) 
2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 
Firm 
location 
East Germany, incl. 
Berlin 
29.84 28.68 29.80 15.82 16.32 16.00 36.21 34.01 35.56 
West Germany 70.16 71.32 70.20 84.18 83.68 84.00 63.79 65.99 64.44 
 
 
 
 
Business 
sector 
Manufacturing 19.67 20.32 18.62 21.43 21.74 20.00 18.84 19.67 18.05 
Wholesale, retail, 
repair 
17.60 16.93 18.22 12.99 11.59 12.41 19.76 19.34 20.63 
Accommodation and 
food 
6.42 6.09 7.29 7.14 5.07 8.28 6.08 6.56 6.88 
Transportation, 
storage 
7.45 7.45 8.70 9.09 9.42 6.90 6.69 6.56 9.46 
Administration, 
support 
10.14 9.71 10.32 3.90 2.90 3.45 13.07 12.79 13.18 
Education 5.80 5.64 4.25 5.19 5.07 4.83 6.08 5.90 4.01 
Health, social work 13.87 14.45 13.97 16.88 18.84 15.17 12.46 12.46 13.47 
Other sectors 19.05 19.41 18.62 23.38 25.36 28.97 17.02 16.72 14.33 
 
Company 
size 
LT 20 19.84 20.77 19.84 17.72 18.42 16.22 20.81 21.79 21.37 
GE 20 LT 200 30.75 29.23 27.05 27.85 25.79 23.30 32.08 30.73 29.06 
GE 200 LT 2000 25.60 25.72 26.65 29.11 25.79 27.70 23.99 25.69 26.21 
GE 2000 23.81 24.28 26.45 25.32 30.00 33.78 23.12 21.79 23.36 
Contract 
duration 
Temporary job 18.38 19.49 16.14 13.92 17.46 11.49 20.40 20.36 18.08 
Permanent job 81.62 80.51 83.86 86.08 82.54 88.51 79.60 79.64 81.92 
Employ- 
ment 
form 
Full-time 
employment 
53.53 53.32 58.17 66.67 64.74 67.57 47.58 48.42 54.24 
Part-time 
employment 
28.82 29.11 28.69 23.90 26.84 25.00 31.05 30.09 30.23 
Marginal 
employment 
17.65 17.56 13.15 9.43 8.42 7.43 21.37 21.49 15.54 
 
 
Education 
level 
Lower second. and 
below 
15.08 15.30 13.33 16.67 15.22 14.69 14.37 15.33 12.78 
Upper secondary 57.54 55.88 57.78 49.36 47.83 46.85 61.21 59.27 62.22 
Post-second. non-
tertiary 
7.74 8.37 8.69 8.97 10.33 11.19 7.18 7.55 7.67 
Short-cycle tertiary 2.98 2.90 5.66 2.56 3.26 9.79 3.16 2.75 3.98 
Bachelors / 
equivalent 
13.10 14.17 10.91 17.95 19.02 13.99 10.92 12.13 9.66 
Masters/equivalent, 
above 
3.57 3.38 3.64 4.49 4.35 3.50 3.16 2.97 3.69 
 
Gender 
Female 58.13 56.65 56.16 53.01 52.63 50.00 60.50 58.37 58.73 
Male 41.87 43.35 43.84 46.99 47.37 50.00 39.50 41.63 41.72 
Migration 
back-
ground 
No migration 
background 
69.79 66.24 72.41 66.27 65.26 70.00 71.43 66.67 73.41 
Direct migration 
background 
19.12 22.03 19.77 23.49 24.21 24.00 17.09 21.09 18.01 
Indirect migration 
background 
11.09 11.73 7.83 10.24 10.53 6.00 11.48 12.24 8.59 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
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Table  50. Statistical Significance of Group Differences in the Variation of Nominal and 
Ordinal Independent Variables: Chi-Square Test 
 
 
Concept 
Chi2 
2014 2015 2016 
Firm location 21.57*** 20.33*** 19.35*** 
Business sector 16.63* 20.98** 26.61*** 
Company size 2.49 5.50 7.51 
Contract duration 3.04 0.71 3.35 
Employment form 18.22*** 20.05*** 9.36** 
Education level 8.18 9.41 13.71** 
Gender 2.61 1.78 3.28 
Migration background 3.02 0.96 3.00 
 
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
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Table  51. Descriptive Statistics for Metric Independent Variables: Frequencies (Recoded) 
 
Concept Value (short) All (%) Control group (%) Treatment group (%) 
2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 
 
Labor 
income 
Less than 
1000 Euro 
33.99 32.59   27.47 18.35 19.47 17.57 41.09 38.24 31.64 
1000 - 1500 
Euro 
18.38 21.52 20.32 15.82 17.89 13.51 19.54 23.08 23.16 
1501 - 3000 
Euro 
31.62 30.54 34.46 41.77 38.95 41.22 27.01 26.92 31.64 
More than 
3000 Euro 
16.01 15.35 17.73 24.05 23.68 27.70 12.36 11.76 13.56 
 
 
Job 
tenure 
Less than 6 
months 
9.29 10.28 6.77 10.13 8.42 4.05 8.91 11.09 7.91 
6 months to  
< 1 year 
6.13 5.22 10.76 3.80 6.32 2.70 7.18 4.75 4.52 
1 year to < 3 
years 
20.36 21.84 19.32 18.35 17.89 17.57 21.26 23.53 20.62 
3 years to < 5 
years 
13.04 13.92 14.54 6.33 10.00 14.19 16.09 15.61 14.69 
5 years to < 10 
years 
15.22 15.35 85 15.82 14.21 13.51 14.94 15.84 18.36 
More than 10 
years 
35.97 33.39 193 45.57 43.16 47.97 31.61 29.19 34.46 
 
Job 
comple- 
xity 
No training  0.21 20.10 12.63 0.65 15.43 10.88 0.00 22.10 13.35 
Job 
introduction 
28.01 15.95 16.63 20.92 10.64 12.24 31.31 18.22 18.47 
On-the-job 
training 
13.07 6.54 9.82 11.76 4.79 6.80 13.68   7.29 11.08 
Vocational 
training 
47.93 46.89 49.10 52.94 54.26 55.10 45.59 43.74 46.59 
University or 
college 
10.79 10.53 11.82 13.73 14.89 14.97 9.42 8.66 10.51 
 
Duration 
of educa-
tion 
7 to 9 years 10.98 11.33 10.47 12.42 11.60 11.97 10.32 11.21 9.86 
10 to <13 
years 
65.85 65.02 66.74 62.75 62.98 64.79 67.26 65.89 67.54 
13 to  17 
years 
19.51 19.54 18.48 20.26 20.99 19.01 19.17 18.93 18.26 
18 years 3.66 4.11 4.31 4.58 4.42 4.23 3.24 3.97 4.35 
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Work 
experien- 
ce 
Less than 5 
years 
13.08 14.88 11.67 9.09 11.64 6.80 14.87 16.28 13.71 
5 to < 10 years 12.68 13.92 11.27 11.69 12.70   10.88 13.12 14.45 11.43 
10 to < 20 
years 
28.37 27.68 27.16 27.27 23.81 22.45 28.86 29.36 29.14 
20 to < 30 
years 
26.16 23.52 24.35 35.71 33.33 37.41 21.87 19.27 18.86 
More than 30 
years 
19.72 20.00 25.55 16.23 18.52 22.45 21.28 20.64 26.86 
 
 
 
Age 
 
 
17 - 24 years 7.65 7.28 6.46 9.04 7.89 6.67 7.00 7.01 6.37 
25 - 34 years 14.72 16.14 13.70 11.45 12.63 8.67 16.25 17.65 15.79 
35 - 44 years  28.68 25.79 24.66 29.52 25.26 25.33 28.29 26.02 24.38 
45 - 54 years 29.45 31.80 33.27 36.14 40.53 44.00 26.33 28.05 28.81 
55 - 64 years 17.40 16.14 18.59 13.86 13.16 14.67 19.05 17.42 20.22 
Older than 65 
years 
2.10 2.85 3.33 0.00 0.53 0.67 3.08 3.85 4.43 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
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Table  52. Descriptive Statistics for Metric Independent Variables: Mean and Standard 
Deviation 
 
 
Concept 
Survey 
year 
All Control group Treatment group 
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
 
Labor 
income 
2014 1749.79 1351.11 2240.97 1402.29 1526.79 1267.78 
2015 1756.27 1477.80 2227.04 1452.71 1553.91 1443.54 
2016 1942.31 1420.32 2436.10 1574.11 1735.87 1298.56 
All 1811.22 1429.89 2293.86 1474.44 1601.96 1349.4 
 2014 9.23 9.43 10.80 10.02 8.52 9.08 
 2015 8.80 9.32 10.89 10.26 7.90 8.75 
Job tenure 2016 10.09 9.84 12.20 10.59 9.21 9.38 
 All 9.33 9.53 11.25 10.29 8.49 9.06 
 2014 3.41 1.02 3.58 0.99 3.33 1.10 
Job 
complexity 
2015 3.12 1.36 3.43 1.30 2.99 1.36 
2016 3.31 1.24 3.51 1.21 3.22 1.25 
All 3.26 1.23 3.5 1.18 3.16 1.24 
 2014 11.78 2.17 11.86 2.40 11.74 2.06 
Duration of 
education 
2015 11.78 2.24 11.90 2.35 11.73 2.19 
2016 11.83 2.18 11.89 2.33 11.80 2.12 
All 11.80 2.20 11.89 2.35 11.76 2.13 
 
Work 
experience 
2014 18.81 11.69 19.47 10.35 18.51 12.24 
2015 18.34 11.93 19.20 10.94 17.96 12.32 
2016 20.21 12.00 21.12 10.56 19.83 12.55 
All 19.06 11.90 19.86 10.65 18.71 12.38 
 2014 43.43 11.82 42.80 10.66 43.72 12.32 
 2015 43.49 12.00 43.1 11.02 43.66 12.40 
Age 2016 44.99 11.91 44.95 10.55 45.01 12.44 
 All 43.93 11.93 43.55 10.78 44.10 12.39 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
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Table  53. Statistical Significance of Group Differences in the Variation of Metric 
Independent Variables: T-Test for Independent Samples  
 
 
Concept 
Mean Difference  
2014 2015 2016 
Labor income 714.18*** 673.13*** 700.22*** 
Job tenure 2.27*** 2.99*** 2.99*** 
Job complexity 0.25** 0.44*** 0.29*** 
Duration of education 0.12 0.17 0.09 
Work experience 0.95 1.24 1.28 
Age -0.09 -0.06 -0.06 
 
Note: Mean Difference = Control group value - Treatment group value  
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
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Table  54. Descriptive Summary Statistics for Between- and Within-Observations 
Variation of Metric Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
 
Concept 
 
Variation 
2014-2015 2014-2016 
Std 
Dev 
Min Max N Std Dev Min Max N 
Training 
intensity: 
measures 
B 1.13 0 9 1138 1.07 0 7.33 1640 
W 0.72 -5.47 6.53 632 0.82 -4.13 8.54 632 
Training 
intensity: 
days 
B 13.32 0 170 1138 9.67 0 100 1640 
W 10.23 -147.02 152.98 632 11.80 -97.20 202.80 632 
Labor 
income 
B 1359.15 0 11784.5 1138 1347.56 15 10223.67 1640 
W 325.84 -4621.11 8127.90 632 341.35 -3002.45 9746.55 632 
 
Job tenure 
B 9.20 0 43 1138 9.26 0 43.47 1640 
W 0.90 -2.76 20.74 632 1.29 -10.47 25.01 632 
Job 
complexity 
B 1.24 1 5 1109 1.22 1 5 1608 
W 0.44 1.75 4.75 631 0.44 1.60 5.26 631 
Duration of 
studies 
B 2.22 7 18 1101 2.22 7 18 1588 
W 0.17 9.28 14.28 609 0.16 0.28 2.95 609 
Work 
experience 
B 11.86 0 49.3 1122 11.91 0 49.8 1616 
W 0.49 17.55 19.55 625 0.77 17.06 21.06 625 
 
Age 
B 0.11 0.02 0.08 1155 0.01 0.02 0.08 1666 
W 0.00 0.04 0.04 632 0.00 0.04 0.04 632 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
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Table  55. Fixed Effects VS Random Effects in the Logistic Regression Model for 
Employer-Financed Training Incidence (2014-2015 Survey Years): Hausman Test 
 
Explanatory variables  Estimated coefficients 
Fixed effects Random effects Difference Std. Error 
Firm location 37.96 0.19 37.77 2704.55 
Company size     
2. GE 20 LT 200 16.06 0.76 15.30 3300.20 
3. GE 200 LT 2000 16.65 1.12 15.54 3300.20 
4. GE 2000 18.63 1.45 17.17 3300.20 
Labor income -0.92 0.23 -1.15 0.96 
Job tenure 604.81 31.49 573.32 2173.02 
Job complexity -1533.10 579.83 -2112.93 759.19 
Contract duration 15.95 0.99 14.96 1543.31 
Employment form     
2. Part-time employment  -16.43 -0.55 -15.88 5992.74 
3. Marginal employment -15.68 -1.98 -13.71 5992.74 
Work experience 194.23 7.09 187.14 1395.63 
Age 184.58 -37.17 221.75 2567.47 
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
Chi2(9) = 12.77     
Prob >Chi2 = 0.17 
 
Note: Omitted variables  
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2015, own calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
164 
 
Table  56. Fixed Effects VS Random Effects in the Logistic Regression Model for Training 
Incidence (2014-2016): Hausman Test 
 
Explanatory variables  Estimated coefficients 
 Fixed effects Random effects Difference Std. Error 
Firm location 1.15 0.42 0.73 1.38 
Business sector      
Wholesale, retail, repair of motor 
vehicles,motorcycles 
-16.40 0.05 -16.45 2057.44 
Accommodation,food service -13.44 0.91 -14.35 64642.56 
Transportation and storage 17.66 1.65 16.01 2866.68 
Administrative and support 
service activities 
-2.11 0.09 -2.20 6496.06 
Education -9.89 1.64 -11.53 64364.9 
Human health and social work 
activities 
-27.45 1.88 -29.33 64412.13 
Other sectors -32.91 0.80 -33.71 3821.37 
Company size     
GE 20 LT 200 0.30 0.10 0.20 0.59 
GE 200 LT 2000 0.66 0.60 0.07 0.75 
GE 2000 1.47 0.72 0.74 0.80 
Labor income -0.20 0.09 -0.28 0.33 
Job tenure -544.78 0.20 -544.98 407.64 
Job complexity 132.67 770.38 -637.71   227.96 
Contract duration   -0.08 0.05 -0.13 0.52 
Employment form     
Part-time employment  -1.34 -0.59 -0.75 0.76 
Marginal employment -2.30 -1.92 -0.39 1.16 
Work experience -114.98 2.39 -117.37 568.25 
Age 500.49 -11.25 511.74 769.36 
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
Chi2(11) = 10.56     
Prob >Chi2 = 0.48 
 
Note: Omitted variables  
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2015, own calculations 
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Table  57. Multicollinearity Diagnostics (Variance Inflation Factor): Random Effects 
Logistic Regression Models     
 
Variable VIF-1 VIF-2 
Firm location 1.26 1.24 
Business sector 1.08 1.08 
Company size 1.15 1.17 
Affection by the minimum 
wage introduction 
1.15 1.14 
Labor income 2.98 3.07 
Job tenure 1.74 1.76 
Job complexity 1.56 1.53 
Contract duration 1.15 1.15 
Employment form 2.03 1.98 
Education level 3.88 4.01 
Duration of studies 3.94 4.06 
Work experience  5.91 5.98 
Age 5.40 5.51 
Gender 1.50 1.49 
Migration background 1.13 1.15 
Mean VIF 2.39 2.42 
 
Note: VIF1-Incidence of employer-financed training (2014-2015); VIF2-Training incidence (2014-2016) 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
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Table  58. Determinants of Employer-Financed Training Incidence under the Minimum 
Wage Introduction in Germany: Correlation Matrix of Coefficients (Part 1) 
 
 Firm  
locat. 
Sector- 
1 
Sector- 
2 
Sector- 
3 
Sector- 
4 
Sector- 
5 
Sector- 
6 
Sector- 
7 
Comp. 
size-2 
Comp. 
size-3 
Comp. 
size-4 
Affection 
Firm  
location 
1.00            
Sector-1 -0.11 1.00           
Sector-2 -0.05 0.39 1.00          
Sector-3 -0.02 0.41 0.35 1.00         
Sector-4 0.14 0.37 0.32 0.34 1.00        
Sector-5 0.01 0.39 0.32 0.34 0.30 1.00       
Sector-6 -0.01 0.52 0.42 0.50 0.41 0.50 1.00      
Sector-7 -0.04 0.53 0.42 0.50 0.40 0.50 0.62 1.00     
Comp. 
size-2 
0.08 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.11 0.02 0.11 1.00    
Comp. 
size-3 
0.04 0.04 0.05 0.09 -0.03 0.10 0.09 0.14 0.72 1.00   
Comp. 
size-4 
0.08 0.01 0.04 0.06 -0.03 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.70 0.77 1.00  
Affection  
by law 
0.17 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 -0.08 -0.08 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 1.00 
Labor 
Income 
-0.24 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.09 -0.05 -0.11 -0.15 0.04 
Job  
tenure 
-0.07 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.10 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 
Job  
complex. 
0.03 -0.06 0.07 0.06 0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 0.06 0.02 0.06 -0.02 
Contract 
duration 
0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.10 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.08 -0.07 
Employm. 
form-2 
-0.15 -0.02 0.07 -0.03 -0.01 -0.09 -0.16 -0.08 -0.01 -0.07 -0.12 -0.04 
Employm. 
form-3 
-0.19 -0.09 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.10 -0.10 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.10 -0.01 
Education 
level-1 
0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.06 
Education 
level-2 
0.03 -0.07 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.11 
Education 
level-3 
0.00 0.02 -0.04 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.10 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.04 
Education 
level-4 
0.07 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.15 
Education 
level-5 
0.05 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.01 -0.13 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.14 
Duration of 
studies 
0.07 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.05 -0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.18 
Work 
experience 
0.05 -0.09 0.00 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.08 
Age -0.03 0.06 -0.02 -0.12 -0.09 -0.10 -0.13 -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 
Gender 0.00 0.14 0.13 -0.08 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.03 -0.02 -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 
Mig.back-2 -0.28 0.07 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 0.00 -0.09 0.00 -0.10 -0.07 -0.13 -0.02 
Mig.back-3 -0.17 0.04 0.06 -0.03 0.05 0.04 -0.04 0.06 -0.05 -0.10 -0.17 -0.04 
Year-2015 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.06 -0.07 
Constant -0.17 -0.20 -0.16 -0.16 -0.14 -0.08 -0.15 -0.17 -0.21 -0.17 -0.17 0.11 
lnsig2u 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.27 0.06 0.27 0.37 0.24 0.19 0.26 0.30 -0.20 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2015, own calculations 
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Table  59. Determinants of Employer-Financed Training Incidence under the Minimum 
Wage Introduction in Germany: Correlation Matrix of Coefficients (Part 2) 
 
 Labor 
income 
Job 
tenure 
Job  
complex. 
Contract 
duration 
Employ. 
form-2 
Employ. 
form-3 
Educ. 
level-1 
Educ. 
level-2 
Educ. 
level-3 
Educ. 
level-4 
Educ. 
level-5 
Duration 
of 
studies 
Labor 
income 
1.00            
Job tenure -0.19 1.00           
Job complex. -0.15 -0.10 1.00          
Contract 
duration 
-0.10 -0.08 0.06 1.00         
Employ. 
form-2 
0.29 -0.02 0.00 -0.08 1.00        
Employ. 
form-3 
0.27 -0.05 0.08 -0.07 0.41 1.00       
Educ. 
level-1 
-0.03 -0.02 -0.10 -0.11 0.03 0.08 1.00      
Educ. 
level-2 
-0.07 -0.09 -0.07 -0.12 0.04 0.11 0.75 1.00     
Educ. 
level-3 
-0.04 -0.10 -0.08 -0.08 0.00 0.04 0.58 0.53 1.00    
Educ. 
level-4 
-0.13 -0.02 -0.11 -0.12 0.04 0.07 0.78 0.81 0.56 1.00   
Educ. 
level-5 
-0.19 0.00 -0.09 -0.06 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.74 0.51 0.83 1.00  
Duration 
of studies 
-0.02 0.06 -0.09 0.09 -0.08 -0.13 -0.05 -0.70 -0.40 -0.78 -0.76 1.00 
Work 
experience 
-0.04 -0.24 -0.07 -0.05 0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.08 
Age 0.01 -0.02 0.14 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 -0.06 -0.04 -0.09 -0.08 -0.06 
Gender -0.24 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.12 0.05 0.07 -0.02 0.08 0.05 -0.06 
Mig. back.-2 0.24 0.16 0.07 -0.05 0.09 0.09 0.01 -0.13 0.01 -0.16 -0.11 0.15 
Mig. back.-3 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.05 0.05 0.08 0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.06 -0.04 0.03 
Year-2015 -0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.06 -0.08 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.06 
Constant -0.02 0.00 -0.29 -0.22 0.02 0.05 0.21 0.45 0.22 0.53 0.56 -0.70 
lnsig2u 0.09 0.15 0.03 -0.18 -0.18 -0.22 -0.75 -0.13 -0.03 -0.10 -0.15 0.24 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2015, own calculations 
 
Table  60. Determinants of Employer-Financed Training Incidence under the Minimum 
Wage Introduction in Germany: Correlation Matrix of Coefficients (Part 3) 
 
 Work experience Age Gender Mig. backgr.-2 Mig. backgr.-3 Year-2015 Constant 
Work experience 1.00       
Age -0.86 1.00      
Gender -0.14 0.11 1.00     
Mig. backgr.-2 -0.09 0.15 -0.05 1.00    
Mig. backgr.-3 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.24 1.00   
Year-2015 0.02 -0.06 -0.01 -0.06 -0.03 1.00  
Constant 0.29 -0.41 -0.07 -0.21 -0.02 -0.10 1.00 
lnsig2u 0.05 -0.13 -0.11 -0.11 -0.15 0.22 -0.34 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2015, own calculations 
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Table  61. Employer-Financed Training Incidence and Type of Employment: Average 
Marginal Effects (Between-Group Comparison) 
 
 2014 2015  
Treatment group. Baseline: Control group 
Full-time employment -0.06 -0.07 
Part-time employment -0.06 -0.08 
Marginal employment  -0.05 -0.07 
 
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2015, own calculations 
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Table  62. Determinants of Training Incidence under the Minimum Wage Introduction in 
Germany (Part 1) 
 
 Firm  
location 
Sector- 
1 
Sector- 
2 
Sector- 
3 
Sector- 
4 
Sector- 
5 
Sector-  
6 
Sector- 
7 
Comp. 
size-2 
Comp. 
size-3 
Comp. 
size-4 
Firm  
location 
1.00           
Sector-1 -0.11 1.00          
Sector-2 -0.05 0.39 1.00         
Sector-3 -0.02 0.41 0.35 1.00        
Sector-4 0.14 0.37 0.32 0.34 1.00       
Sector-5 0.01 0.39 0.32 0.34 0.30 1.00      
Sector-6 -0.01 0.52 0.42 0.50 0.41 0.50 1.00     
Sector-7 -0.04 0.53 0.42 0.50 0.40 0.50 0.62 1.00    
Company size-2 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.11 0.02 0.11 1.00   
Company size-3 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.09 -0.03 0.10 0.09 0.14 0.72 1.00  
Company size-4 0.08 0.01 0.04 0.06 -0.03 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.70 0.77 1.00 
Affection  
by law 
0.17 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 -0.08 -0.08 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 
Labor 
income 
-0.24 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.09 -0.05 -0.11 -0.15 
Job  
tenure 
-0.07 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.10 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 
Job  
complexity 
0.03 -0.06 0.07 0.06 0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 0.06 0.02 0.06 
Contract 
duration 
0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.10 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.08 
Employment 
form-2 
-0.15 -0.02 0.07 -0.03 -0.01 -0.09 -0.16 -0.08 -0.01 -0.07 -0.12 
Employment 
form-3 
-0.19 -0.09 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.10 -0.10 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.10 
Education level-1 0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.04 
Education level-2 0.03 -0.07 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.02 
Education level-3 0.00 0.02 -0.04 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.10 0.05 0.10 0.10 
Education level-4 0.07 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.08 
Education level-5 0.05 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.01 -0.13 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.03 
Duration of 
studies 
0.07 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.05 -0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.03 
Work 
experience 
0.05 -0.09 0.00 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.05 
Age -0.03 0.06 -0.02 -0.12 -0.09 -0.10 -0.13 -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 
Gender 0.00 0.14 0.13 -0.08 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.03 -0.02 -0.08 -0.07 
Mig.back-2 -0.28 0.07 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 0.00 -0.09 0.00 -0.10 -0.07 -0.13 
Mig.back-3 -0.17 0.04 0.06 -0.03 0.05 0.04 -0.04 0.06 -0.05 -0.10 -0.17 
Year-2015 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.06 
Year-2016 -0.17 -0.20 -0.16 -0.16 -0.14 -0.08 -0.15 -0.17 -0.21 -0.17 -0.17 
Constant 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.27 0.06 0.27 0.37 0.24 0.19 0.26 0.30 
lnsig2u 0.10 -0.07 0.06 0.13 -0.09 0.14 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.15 0.17 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
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Table  63. Determinants of Training Incidence under the Minimum Wage Introduction 
in Germany (Part 2) 
 
 Affection  
by law 
Labor 
income 
Job 
tenure 
Job  
complex. 
Contract 
duration 
Employm. 
form-2 
Employm. 
form-3 
Educ. 
level-1 
Educ. 
level-2 
Educ. 
level-3 
Educ. 
level-4 
Affection  
by law 1.00           
Labor 
Income 0.06 1.00          
Job tenure 0.04 -0.22 1.00         
Job complexity 
-0.02 -0.15 
-0.14 1.00        
Contract 
duration -0.01 -0.09 -0.14 0.07 1.00       
Employm.form-2 
-0.04 0.28 0.03 -0.07 -0.04 1.00      
Employm.form-3 -0.03 0.30 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.45 1.00     
Educ. 
level-1 
0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.05 -0.11 -0.01 0.01 1.00    
Educ. 
level-2 0.05 -0.07 -0.02 -0.05 -0.09 0.01 0.05 0.74 1.00   
Educ. 
level-3 0.05 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.09 -0.02 0.00 0.69 0.63 1.00  
Educ. 
level-4 0.09 -0.11 0.02 -0.07 -0.10 0.00 0.01 0.77 0.80 0.72 1.00 
Educ. 
level-5 
0.09 -0.16 0.07 -0.06 -0.05 0.01 0.04 0.65 0.73 0.62 0.81 
Duration 
of studies -0.11 -0.03 -0.02 -0.08 0.07 -0.07 -0.11 -0.49 -0.69 -0.52 -0.77 
Work experience 0.06 -0.05 -0.23 -0.05 -0.07 0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01 
Age -0.06 0.04 -0.01 0.12 0.01 -0.07 -0.04 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07 
Gender -0.02 -0.25 0.12 -0.03 0.04 0.36 0.15 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.07 
Mig. back.-2 -0.01 0.05 0.17 0.08 -0.02 0.09 0.10 0.03 -0.14 -0.03 -0.17 
Mig. back.-3 -0.10 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.04 
Year-2015 -0.01 -0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Year-2016 -0.03 -0.09 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.07 
Constant 0.00 -0.01 0.11 -0.26 -0.18 0.05 0.05 0.17 0.42 0.26 0.51 
lnsig2u -0.08 0.05 -0.10 0.11 -0.01 -0.24 -0.28 0.03 -0.06 0.07 0.00 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
171 
 
Table  64. Determinants of Training Incidence under the Minimum Wage Introduction in 
Germany (Part 3) 
 
 Educ.level-5 Work 
experience 
Age Gender Migration 
background-2 
Migration 
background-3 
Year-
2015 
Constant 
Educ. level-5 1.00        
Work 
experience -0.77 1.00       
Age 0.03 0.11 1.00      
Gender 
-0.09 -0.05 
-0.87 1.00     
Migration 
background-2 0.06 -0.08 -0.16 0.13 1.00    
Migration 
background-3 -0.13 0.18 -0.05 0.08 -0.06 1.00   
Year-2015 
-0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.21 1.00  
Constant 
0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.00 1.00 
lnsig2u -0.08 0.14 0.07 -0.06 -0.17 -0.11 -0.06 -0.01 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
Table  65. Heteroscedasticity Diagnostics (Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg Test): OLS 
Training Intensity Models   
 
 2014-2015 2015-2016 2014-2016 
TM TD TM TD TM TD 
Chi2 2.30 0.11 0.05 16.98 0.05 0.89 
Prob >Chi2 0.13 0.74 0.83 0.76 0.83 0.34 
 
Note: TM - Total number of overtaken training measures; TD -Total number of days within which overtaken training measures took place  
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
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Table  66. Multicollinearity Diagnostics (Variance Inflation Factor): OLS Training 
Intensity Models   
 
Variable 2014-2015 2015-2016 2014-2016 
Firm location  1.08 1.30 1.36 
Business sector 1.66 1.18 1.14 
Company size 1.08 1.13 1.18 
Affection by the minimum wage 
introduction 
1.10 1.09 1.22 
Labor income 1.02 1.02 1.15 
Job tenure 1.90 1.93 2.36 
Job complexity 1.14 1.45 1.21 
Contract duration 1.03 1.95 2.39 
Employment form  1.03 1.42 1.04 
Work experience 1.42 1.08 1.48 
Mean VIF 1.25 1.36 1.45 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
Table  67. Training Incidence and Affection by the Minimum Wage Introduction: Average 
Marginal Effects (Between-Group Comparison) 
 
 2014 2015  2016 
Treatment group. Baseline: Control group -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
 
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
Table  68. Training Incidence and Affection by the Minimum Wage Introduction: 
Average Marginal Effects (Within-Group Comparison) 
 
Survey year. Baseline: 2014 Control group Treatment group 
2015 0.00  0.00 
2016 -0.01 -0.01 
 
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2015, own calculations 
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Figure 15. Gender and Job Complexity – Training Incidence under the Minimum Wage 
Introduction: Conditional-Effects-Plot 
 
 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
Table  69. Descriptive Statistics on Gender Composition of Business Sectors 
 
 2014 2015  2016 
Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Manufacturing  32.63 67.37 32.22 67.78 27.17 72.83 
Wholesale and retail, repair 76.29 24.71 77.33 22.67 72.22 27.78 
Accommodation and food service  74.19 25.81 70.37 29.63 69.44 30.56 
Transportation and storage 33.33 66.67 33.33 66.67 30.23 69.77 
Administrative and support service activities 65.31 34.69 60.47 39.53 52.94 47.06 
Education 67.86 32.14 76.00 24.00 61.90 38.10 
Human health and social work activities 80.60 19.40 79.69 20.31 82.61 17.39 
Other sectors 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 57.61 42.39 
Chi2 66.59*** 63.95*** 75.37*** 
 
Note: *** p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
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Table  70. Baseline Sample Size for the Analysis of Training Intensity (Participants): 
Frequencies 
 
 2014 2015 2016 
Control group 46 53 45 
Treatment group 72 73 70 
Total 118 126 115 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
Table  71. Change of the Variables in Training Intensity Models: Frequencies 
 
 2014-2015 2015-2016  2014-2016  
 Control group Treatment 
group 
Control group Treatment 
group 
Control group Treatment  
group 
Dependent variables 
Number of enrollments 20 26 25 18 18 23 
Training volume 23 34 26 25 23 26 
Independent variables 
Firm location  1 1 0 0 0 3 
Business sector 1 1 8 12 6 11 
Company size  11 7 10 12 7 14 
Affection by the minimum 
wage introduction 
0 39 32 35 0 32 
Labor income 25 33 29 27 22 28 
Job tenure 29 39 32 35 26 32 
Job complexity 5 3 1 3 4 2 
Contract duration 1 4 2 4 1 1 
Employment form  0 3 0 3 1 4 
Work experience 28 37 30 31 26 29 
Valid observations  29 36 32 33 26 29 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
Table  72. Change of the Number of Enrollments under the Constant Training Volume: 
Frequencies 
 
Change of the number of 
enrollments (Value) 
Frequency 
-2 1 
-1 4 
0 19 
1 2 
7 1 
Total 27 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
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Table  73. Change of the Training Volume under the Constant Number of Enrollments: 
Frequencies 
 
Change of the training volume 
(Value) 
Frequency 
-197 
-30 
-27 
-25 
-19 
-18 
-15 
-10 
-7 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
2 
4 
5 
7 
14 
22 
48 
49 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
19 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Total 46 
 
Source: SOEP Data 2014-2016, own calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
